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ABSTRACT
SECULAR BUT NOT SUPERFICIAL: 
AN OVERLOOKED NONRELIGIOUS / 
NONSPIRITUAL IDENTITY
Daniel G. Delaney
November 15, 2016
Since Durkheim’s characterization of the sacred and profane as “an-
tagonistic rivals,” the strict dichotomy has been framed in such a way that 
“being religious” evokes images of a life filled with profound meaning and 
value, while “being secular” evokes images of a meaningless, self-centered, 
superficial life, often characterized by materialistic consumerism and the 
cold, heartless environment of corporate greed. Consequently, to iden-
tify as “neither religious nor spiritual” runs the risk of being stigmatized 
as superficial, untrustworthy, and immoral. Conflicts and confusions en-
countered in the process of negotiating a nonreligious/nonspiritual iden-
tity, caused by the ambiguous nature of religious language, were explored 
through qualitative interviews with 14 ex-ministers and 1 atheist minis-
ter—individuals for whom supernaturalist religion had formed the central 
core of identity, but who have deconverted and no longer hold supernat-
ural beliefs. The cognitive linguistics approach of Frame Semantics was 
applied to the process of “oppositional identity work” to examine why 
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certain identity labels are avoided or embraced due to considerations of 
the cognitive frames evoked by those labels.
Through the constant comparative method of grounded theory, a 
host of useful theoretical concepts emerged from the data. Several im-
pediments to the construction of a “secular but not superficial” identity 
were identified, and a framework of new theoretical concepts developed to 
make sense of them: sense disparity, frame disparity, identity misfire, foiled 
identity, sense conflation, and conflated frames. Several consequences 
arising from these impediments were explored: (1) consequences of sense 
conflation and conflated frames for the study of religion; (2) consequenc-
es of conflated frames for religious terminology; and (3) consequences of 
the negation of conflated frames for those who identify as not religious, 
not spiritual, or not Christian. Additionally, four types of oppositional 
identity work were identified and analyzed: (1) avoidance identity work, 
(2) dissonant identity work, (3) adaptive identity work, and (4) alterna-
tive identity work. Finally, the concept of conflated frames was applied 
to suggest a new interpretation of the classic Weberian disenchantment 
narrative.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This is a study of nonbelievers—a vague term, to be sure, but one 
commonly used in reference to those who do not believe that anything 
supernatural exists. By supernatural, I do not mean merely “any order of 
things that goes beyond our understanding” (Durkheim [1912]1995:22). 
By supernatural, I refer specifically to concepts such as ghosts, gods, devils, 
demons, angels, heaven, hell, spirits, spells, and any other conceivable enti-
ties, powers, or realms that purportedly exist in some way outside, above, 
or beyond the natural cosmos. Nonbelievers in the supernatural may 
choose to identify with any number of labels, including atheist, agnostic, 
secularist, pantheist, humanist, skeptic, rationalist, and so forth; or they may 
feel no need to include their nonbelief as a part of their self-identities at all. 
I am not interested here in just any type of nonbeliever. The focus of this 
study is specifically those who possess what philosopher (and nonbeliever) 
Thomas Nagel (2009) referred to as a “religious temperament”—that is, 
those with the same feelings, sentiments, experiences, and concerns that 
are often exclusively associated with religion and/or spirituality, but who 
typically do not identify as either.
Many good, general qualitative studies have been published in recent 
years that finally allow nonbelievers to speak for themselves about what 
they believe and how they live their lives (e.g., Zuckerman 2008, 2011; 
Brewster 2014; Cimino & Smith 2014; Baker & Smith 2015; Zucker-
man, Galen & Pasquale 2016). Some of the stories told by those non-
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believers hint at the difficulties they face with the ambiguous and vague 
nature of identity labels such as “religious,” “spiritual,” “atheist,” and “ag-
nostic.” No studies thus far, however, have specifically analyzed the nature 
of that ambiguity and its role in the conflicts and confusion encountered 
when deeply religious believers deconvert from their supernaturalist, reli-
gious identities and face the arduous task of constructing new, naturalistic 
(meaning only “not supernatural”) identities that still communicate the 
depth of their personal convictions.
I addressed these issues by interviewing people whose self-identities 
had once been thoroughly imbued with a worldview based on supernatu-
ral religious beliefs, and who subsequently abandoned those supernatural 
worldviews and their accompanying identities—people who Altemeyer 
and Hunsberger (1997) referred to as “amazing apostates.” Ex-ministers 
offer a clear contrast between a time in their lives when religion/spirituali-
ty constituted the primary core of their personal and social identities, and 
a later time when, after having abandoning those beliefs and identities, 
they had to construct new ones. I sought ex-ministers who no longer be-
lieve any of the supernatural doctrines they had once preached, and who 
(with one exception) have abandoned the identity of “Christian minister.” 
All of them continue to question and explore the “deeper” aspects of life 
traditionally ascribed exclusively to religion and/or spirituality. Through 
in-depth interviews, I asked them to explain the meanings they had for 
religious language, and whether they had found new language to express 
those meanings.
Background: Trends, Identities, and Characterizations
In the late 1990s, social scientists began to notice two trends becoming 
more prevalent in the American religious landscape. First, an increasing 
number of people were beginning to reject the identity of “religious,” but 
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continuing to identify as “spiritual”—and clearly distinguishing between 
the two (Hill et al. 2000; Marler & Hadaway 2002). While being religious 
increasingly came to be associated only with being affiliated with an insti-
tutional religious tradition, at the same time, being spiritual came to indi-
cate an independent, personal search for such things as deeper meaning, 
value, and purpose in life, independently from organized religion. Those 
who identified as “spiritual but not religious” were deliberately distancing 
themselves from institutional religions. Many social scientists began us-
ing this same distinction (e.g., Zinnbauer et al. 1997; Roof 1999; Elling-
son 2001), some going so far as to declare a “silent takeover of religion” 
(Carrette & King 2005) which was “giving way to spirituality” (Heelas & 
Woodhead 2005). Subsequently, many scholars started treating “religious” 
and “spiritual” as separate identity variables (e.g., Zinnbauer et al. 1997; 
Marler & Hadaway 2002; Schnell 2012; Streib & Hood 2016), combin-
ing the four possible answer pairs into a fourfold typology: (1) nonreli-
gious/nonspiritual, (2) nonreligious/spiritual, (3) religious/nonspiritual, 
and (4) religious/spiritual.
Second, multiple large-scale, national surveys (e.g., General Social 
Survey, American Religious Identity Survey, National Election Study) 
had revealed that the percentage of religious “nones”—those who answer 
“nothing in particular” or “none” when asked, “What is your religion?”—
had doubled between 1991 and 2000, from approximately 7 percent to 
14 percent of the adult population (Kosmin, Mayer, & Keysar 2001; Hout 
& Fischer 2002). By contrast, that number had risen only gradually over 
the previous 30 years—from 2.2 percent in 1960 to 7.3 percent in 1980 
(Glenn 1987), then levelling off at approximately 7 percent throughout 
the 1980s (Hout & Fischer 2002). By 2014, the religious “nones” had 
grown to approximately 23 percent of the United States adult popula-
tion (Lipka 2015).
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Initial interpretations, especially among atheist organizations, as-
sumed that all these so-called “nones” were nonbelievers. Closer analysis, 
however, revealed that only 31 percent of the “nones” (7 percent of the 
overall adult population), explicitly identified as either atheist or agnostic. 
The remaining 69 percent said their religion was “nothing in particular” 
because, in accordance with the new religious/spiritual distinction men-
tioned above, they chose not to affiliate with any organized religion. In 
fact, even while unaffiliated, 30 percent said that religion is still important 
in their lives, situating them within the nonreligious/spiritual category. 
Now commonly known as the “spiritual but not religious,” this category 
has received a great deal of attention over the past two decades (e.g., Zinn-
bauer et al. 1997; Fuller 2001; Marler & Hadaway, 2002; Johnston 2012; 
Ammerman 2013; Escobar 2014; Mercadante 2014; Kenneson 2015; 
Packard & Hope 2015).
Unlike the “spiritual but not religious,” the “nonreligious/nonspiri-
tual” category (the “neither religious nor spiritual”) has received relatively 
little attention from social scientists—although that trend has been steadi-
ly and rapidly increasing since 2006. The data show that the category 
is anything but homogeneous, and many subtle nuances remain to be 
explored and subcategories to be delineated. For example, the “neither 
religious nor spiritual” demographic is certainly not all atheists. Of the 
39 percent of “nones” who said that religion is not important in their lives, 
over half still said they believe in God or a higher power, in whatever way 
they define those terms (Lipka 2015). Some of those who said that they 
do not believe in God or a higher power nonetheless said that they do not 
accept being labeled as an “atheist.” All of this begs the question: what do 
labels such as “religion,” “spiritual,” “God,” and “atheist” actually mean 
to those in the nonreligious/nonspiritual category? And how do disparate 
understandings of those vague terms contribute to the task of circum-
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scribing the subgroup boundaries within the category to recognize more 
precise identities?
Though little research has been conducted on them, a great many 
things have been said about nonbelievers who identify as neither re-
ligious nor spiritual, much of it derogatory and ill-informed. Whether 
they self-identify as atheist, agnostic, nonbeliever, secularist, deist, pantheist, 
bright, humanist, or freethinker, people who do not identify as either reli-
gious or spiritual are the targets of disdain from many directions. Pastor 
James Emery White, for example, asserted that people in the nonreligious/
nonspiritual category “do not have much of an inner world, much less a 
place of hope or promise” (2014:197). Psychologist Paul Vitz wrote an 
entire book to argue that “the worldview of those who reject God cre-
ates problems like the meaninglessness and the alienation of modern life” 
(1999:xiii). Taking his assessment a step further, he proposed that “irra-
tional, often neurotic, psychological barriers to belief in God are of great 
importance” (1999:5). Theologian J. P. Moreland believes that “happi-
ness, meaning to life, and human flourishing are impossible if there is no 
God” (2009:152).
Special invective is reserved for the “atheist” label. Eminent schol-
ar of religion Wilfred Cantwell Smith, for example, made the following 
scathing remarks in a 1963 radio broadcast: “It has been said, and I think 
rightly [emphasis added], that the only true atheist is he who loves no one 
and whom no one loves; who is blind to all beauty and all justice; who 
knows no truth; and who has lost all hope” (1963:138). He repeated that 
appraisal at least twice more in print, adding further that the true atheist 
“knows no courage and no joy,” and “finds no meaning” (1972:53–54; 
1979:20). The ease with which anyone can use the Internet to “publish” 
anything they feel inclined to write has lifted anti-atheist rhetoric to new 
heights. Using the infamous Madalyn Murray O’Hair as a paradigm of 
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atheism, hyperbolic political blogger Dave Jolly asserted the following 
characterization of atheists:
True atheism doesn’t stop with the denial God [sic], but the question and 
rebellion against all authority. . . . It’s not just about religious beliefs, but 
about every aspect of decency, morals and values. . . . True atheists are not 
just lost souls, but they are dangerous people. They should not be trusted. 
(2014)
A reader of Jolly’s blog added the following comment: “Atheism is the 
abode of small minds. Like animals they cannot grasp the concept and, 
in their arrogant ignorance they mock what they cannot grasp.” These are 
only a small handful (and far from the worst) among many disparaging 
opinions of nonbelievers who identify as neither religious nor spiritual. 
Such uncharitable opinions stem from the dichotomous relationship of 
the concepts of “religious” and “secular,” which have been framed over the 
past few hundred years in such a way that the former represents all that is 
meaningful in life and the latter represents all that is superficial.
The Religious-Secular Divide
Émile Durkheim, in 1912, explicitly laid the foundation for the strict 
dichotomy between the religious and the secular. In his highly influential 
analysis, the sacred and the profane are not merely two ends of a spec-
trum, similar in kind but different in degree. Rather, the sacred and the 
profane represent two qualitatively different kinds of things, polar op-
posites, antagonistic rivals occupying “two worlds with nothing in com-
mon” ([1912]1995:36). The dichotomy is thus absolute, according to 
Durkheim. As William Swatos noted, however, the word “profane” for 
Durkheim simply referred to the “ordinary or everyday”—closer to the 
meaning of “mundane” than to “profanity” (2003:40). Hence, although 
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sacred things are “things set apart and forbidden” ([1912]1995:44), the 
ordinary and everyday things from which they are set apart are not neces-
sarily considered vulgar or obscene.
Mircea Eliade, almost fifty years later, reinforced this dichotomy. 
Similar to Durkheim, he envisioned an “abyss that divides the two modal-
ities of experience—the sacred and profane” (1959:14). Eliade, however, 
characterized the profane in strongly negative terms, as the polar oppo-
site of the sacred in all respects. By dubbing our species “homo religiosus” 
(1959:18), he declared religiosity the essence of being fully human. The 
implication for the nonreligious is difficult to overlook. In his rather gran-
diose and hyperbolic style, Eliade explained that “nonreligious man . . . 
assumes a tragic existence” (1959:203), and “all vital experiences . . . are 
deprived of spiritual significance, hence deprived of their truly human 
dimension” (1959:168). Eliade was not alone in this usage of “profane.” 
According to Edward Bailey, the meaning of profane, “in ordinary Brit-
ish English at least, has the quality of (negative) sacredness about it: it 
is a moral Abomination, a doctrinal Heresy, an ontological Blasphemy” 
(2003:64).
Over time, scholars began increasingly to substitute “secular” for 
“profane” in the old dichotomy. We can observe this transition merely by 
looking at book titles over the years: The Sacred in a Secular Age (Ham-
mond 1985), Between Sacred and Secular (Greil & Robbins 1994), Beyond 
the Sacred-Secular Divide (Allen 2011), Social Identities Between the Sacred 
and the Secular (Day, Vincett & Cotter 2013), and many more. Through-
out the twentieth-century, this polarized, binary view fueled the develop-
ment of a deep-rooted conceptual framework commonly referred to as the 
“religious-secular divide” (Bernstein 2009; Davaney 2009; Mack 2009; 
Nongbri 2013) or the “secular-religious binary” (Hurd 2011; Bender & 
Taves 2012). In this scheme, the religious and the secular are framed as 
diametrically opposed, antithetical life stances.
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On one side of the divide, “the religious” (and its corollary, “the spir-
itual”) represents what is often described as deeper, higher, or ultimate con-
cerns for meaning, value, and purpose in life, as distinct from the normal, 
mundane concerns of everyday, worldly living. Peter Berger conceptual-
ized religion as “an all-embracing sacred order . . . capable of maintaining 
itself in the ever-present face of chaos” (1967:51). Chaos, in this case, 
entails the “anomic phenomena of suffering, evil and, above all, death” 
(1967:53). Religion, in his definition, is a social institution that serves to 
stave off the threat of nihilism—a “sacred canopy” under which humans 
in a religious society can lead meaningful lives while keeping the meaning-
less futility of chaos at bay.
The positive aspects of human nature are often ascribed exclusively 
to religion and spirituality. For example, in his classic work on the stages 
of religious faith, psychologist and minister James Fowler declared that 
the deep, searching questions about the meaning and purpose of our lives 
are quintessentially “questions of faith” (1981:3). Fowler used the word 
“faith” the way today’s authors use the word “spirituality,” as something 
“deeper and more personal than religion” (1981:9). Similarly, when one 
of his subjects joined a discussion group at his girlfriend’s church, after 
being nonreligious his entire adult life, sociologist of religion Wade Clark 
Roof (1999) described how it “triggered experiences of joy, optimism, and 
hope—elementary religious responses,” and that “through this reawakening 
of religious emotions, . . . he [found] himself searching in his own life for 
greater depth [emphases added]” (1999:20). By simply declaring them to 
be “elementary religious responses” and “religious emotions,” Roof sub-
sumed the fundamental human emotions of joy, optimism, and hope, 
solely within the purview of religion. And just as Fowler had done, Roof 
circumscribed questions of the deeper meaning and purpose of life—
questions that could arise for any self-reflective human being, whether 
religious or not—and claimed them for religion.
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On the other side of the divide, “the secular” is always defined in 
contradistinction to “the religious” in one way or another—as one scholar 
put it, the secular is “religion’s universally recognized antonym” (Bailey 
2003:60). I will only briefly describe the most commonly used senses, then 
elaborate on the sense that is most salient for this inquiry. In the mundane 
sense, “secular” is merely an adjective for places, objects, and activities that 
are “this-worldly” and have nothing to do with religion: hotels, grocery 
stores, fashion magazines, mowing the lawn, watching a movie, and so 
forth—any aspect of life in which religion is simply not relevant. In the 
political sense, secular and secularism refer to the separation of church 
and state, the political conviction that institutional religions should not 
have control or influence over government institutions. Secularism can 
also refer to the decline of religious practice and belief—people no longer 
participating in religious organizations or believing the doctrines espoused 
by religions. Charles Taylor suggests that this is the sense people typically 
have in mind when speaking of secularism (2007:2).
In his monumental work, A Secular Age, Taylor proposed another 
sense, subtly distinct from the previous one, which he calls the pluralist 
conditions of belief. He described this sense as “a move from a society where 
belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which 
it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the 
easiest to embrace” (2007:3). Many years earlier, Peter Berger had noted 
that the pluralization of religious options was “an important cause of the 
diminishing plausibility of religious traditions” (1969:55). To extend his 
famous metaphor, we can envision the tent flaps around the edge of the 
“sacred canopy” propped wide open, so that people can choose to step 
outside and explore other possibilities.
The concept of “secularization” refers to an overall recession of religion 
from the public sphere, described by Berger as “the process by which sec-
tors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious 
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institutions and symbols” (1967:107). Since the beginning of the scien-
tific study of religion, this so-called “secularization hypothesis” has been 
framed by Max Weber’s notion of the “disenchantment of the world.” 
According to the disenchantment narrative, the rational, naturalistic ex-
planations of the world we live in, as revealed by modern science, would 
slowly chip away at the supernatural explanations offered by religion. By 
extension, religious dogmas would come to be seen as superstitions, lead-
ing inevitably to diminishing religious beliefs and ultimately to the end 
of traditional, institutional religion (Herberg 1962; Berger 1967; Shiner 
1967; Mathewes and Nichols 2000; Furseth and Repstad 2006).
Most proponents of the secularization hypothesis and its disenchant-
ment narrative considered religious adherence and belief essential for a 
healthy society, and so viewed the decline of religion as a serious threat. 
If the majority of the population adopted an overly rational and scientific 
worldview, they feared, society could drift toward a more secular orienta-
tion, leading to a state of disenchantment in which a crisis in existential 
meaning could potentially plunge modern society into a dysfunctional, 
nihilistic malaise (Taylor 1998; Taylor 2007:299ff). The fear of the im-
pending doom of religion through secularization continued through the 
twentieth century. Will Herberg wrote in 1962 that “secularism . . . has 
been recognized as a problem by many philosophers, theologians, and 
social scientists” (1962:149). And the Catholic bishops at the Second Vat-
ican Council declared that “atheism must be accounted among the most 
serious problems of this age” (Pope Paul VI 1965).
Thus, the concept of “the secular” eventually took on pejorative 
meaning as it increasingly came to represent the antithesis of all the bene-
fits and values that religion stands for and came to be regarded as a threat 
to both religious institutions and society as a whole. This is the sense I am 
dealing with in this inquiry: “the secular” as the antithesis of the religious. In 
this sense, the secular represents the shallow, superficial, lower, base, ma-
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terial concerns of life, and an absence of those deeper, higher, or ultimate 
concerns ascribed exclusively to religion and spirituality. This meaning 
especially evokes a sense of the secular as the ominous specter of that cha-
os outside the sacred canopy, embodying the negation of all the meaning 
and values of religion. This sense is the foundation of the religious-secular 
divide. Caspar Melville summarized this understanding particularly well:
Much beloved of the Islamists and evangelicals, this secularism is the 
handy one-word distillation for all that is wrong in the modern world. 
Consumerism, divorce, drugs, Harry Potter, prostitution, Twitter, rela-
tivism, Big Brother, lack of moral compass, lack of community cohe-
sion, lack of moral values, vajazzling—all can be lumped together and 
explained by the word secular, a kind of contemporary contraction of 
heathen and barbarian, with undertones of greed, perfidity and vulgarity. 
(2011)
Traditionally, the label of “godless” has served as the negative epithet 
against nonbelievers—as in “godless heathens,” or the “godless Japanese” 
during World War II, and “godless communists” during the Cold War. 
To carry on the tradition, Franklin Graham—son of famed preacher Billy 
Graham—is currently promoting the negative characterization of “god-
less secularism” as a replacement for the now passé “godless communism” 
(Montgomery 2016).
In this sense, the secular is often understood in psychological terms, 
to refer to what Peter Berger called the “secularization of consciousness” 
(1969:4), the development of a psychological shortcoming afflicting in-
dividuals said to possess a “secular consciousness” (Peck 1997) or “sec-
ular mind” (Coles 1999). Since the 1970s, evangelical apologists and 
activists have deliberately characterized secular people as immoral, nihil-
istic, self-centered, narcissistic, or even psychotic (e.g.: Vitz 1999; Mo-
reland 2009; Spiegel 2010; Tashman 2012). Catholic priest John Pasqui-
ni (2009) characterized disbelief in God as a psychological “personality 
12 SECULAR BUT NOT SUPERFICIAL
disorder” stemming from a “distorted mindset.” M. Scott Peck asserted 
that people who consider themselves nonreligious have a peculiar kind of 
self-centered consciousness, and that they are “often to experience a sense 
of meaninglessness and insignificance . . . despite their imagined centrality” 
(1997:123). Robert Coles (1999) devoted an entire book to painting a 
disparaging image of the so-called “secular mind,” characterizing it vari-
ously as spiritual indifference (21), cold, calculating, heartless rationalism 
(31), sin and hedonistic temptation (35), living it up/having a good time 
(41), consumerism/materialism (102), self-centered, selfish living (103), 
immorality, or at least moral indifference (104), the embodiment of vices 
(106), and shallow, superficial living (106).
The above examples illustrate how the meanings of religious and 
secular have been framed throughout the years in such a way that “the 
religious” is portrayed as the sole avenue to a meaningful, fulfilled life, 
and “the secular” as a back alley leading to a superficial, nihilistic life. As 
Abraham Maslow observed, “[v]ery many people in our society apparently 
see . . . religion as the locus . . . of the spiritual life. [It is] widely and officially 
accepted as the path, by many as the only path, to the life of righteousness, 
of purity and virtue, of justice and goodness, etc.” (1964:4). According 
to this strict, binary dichotomy, “the religious” represents all that is pro-
found, significant, selfless, communal, and meaningful. “The secular,” on 
the other hand, represents all that is mundane, superficial, narcissistic, 
individualistic, and nihilistic, often exemplified by characterizations of 
absolutist ideologies, rampant materialistic consumerism, and the heart-
less greed of corporate business culture (e.g., Axel 1993; Coles 1999; Lo-
zoff 2000; Moreland 2009).
This division of concerns between religious (deep, higher, ultimate) 
versus secular (shallow, lower, materialistic) often influences how research-
ers interpret the subjects they encounter in the field. Whereas observa-
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tions of people showing concern over deeper meaning and value in life are 
categorized as religious, observations of people showing shallow concerns 
over petty desires, empty pleasures, and vain ambitions are counted as 
examples of the so-called secular world outside of religion. Consequent-
ly, when faced with empirical examples of self-identified nonreligious/
nonspiritual people showing concerns for depth of meaning in life, social 
scientists often employ rhetorical acrobatics which allow them to sub-
sume those observations, however tenuously, within the category of reli-
gion—because by the definitions imposed by the religious-secular divide, 
those people should not be considered secular (Herberg 1962; Roof 1999; 
Besecke 2005). For example, despite the fact that his subject did not 
self-identify as religious, Wade Clark Roof stretched the boundaries of the 
“religious” category around him, because he could not bring himself to 
place the man within the “secular” category:
To think of him as a ‘None’ (or a nonaffiliate) overlooks the fact that 
something profoundly moving is happening within him. Doubt and lack 
of a clear conviction about what to believe do not here translate into a 
secular outlook; rather they appear to signify just the opposite—a more 
open, questioning posture [emphasis added]. (1999:19)
Roof thus insinuated that religious “nones” cannot feel “something pro-
foundly moving” within them, and that a “secular outlook” is the opposite 
of an open, questioning posture.
I do not think that this was a deliberate, pernicious effort on Roof ’s 
part, but rather an indication of how the religious-secular divide is sub-
consciously pervasive in the way we think about such matters. The di-
chotomy is deeply embedded within our cognitive processes, and strewn 
throughout the language we use in discourse about religion versus non-
religion. It is ensconced in the fundamental metaphors that shape the 
way we think and speak about such things: lost/found, descend/ascend, 
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dark/light, down/up, shallow/deep. Hence, a lost soul is envisioned as hav-
ing descended into darkness, then raised up by religion to ascend into the 
light—it once was lost, but now it’s found—out of the darkness and into 
the light. Entrenched that deeply within our psyches, the dichotomy typ-
ically goes unnoticed and unchallenged.
Definitional Considerations
The words of religious discourse are used in an exceptionally wide vari-
ety of disparate senses. I will not attempt here to establish necessary and 
sufficient attributes with which to demarcate religion from nonreligion, 
or spirituality from nonspirituality. Nor will I suggest rigid and limit-
ed working definitions (much less, essentialist definitions) for terms such 
as religious, spiritual, atheist, agnostic, transcendent, sacred, soul, spirit, and 
so forth. Rather, one objective of this study is to understand what those 
words mean for the participants of the study—that is, the emic meanings 
that they hold for the terms, as opposed to the etic meanings ascribed 
to them by scholars. Nonetheless, I will need to make explicitly clear a 
few fundamental distinctions that are too often left unacknowledged, but 
which will be indispensable for the analysis to come.
Figurative and Supernatural Senses of Religious Language
Most of the central religious terms (e.g., sacred, spiritual, God, soul, etc.) 
are associated with a wide range of meanings, which can be categorized 
in a number of ways. Bernard Spilka, for example, found that the mul-
tifarious meanings of “spirituality” could be sorted into three broad cat-
egories: God-oriented, world-oriented, and people-oriented/humanistic 
(Hill et al. 2000:57). Greenwald and Harder (2003), from a principle 
components factor analysis of ratings of 122 adjectives, found that four 
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categories emerged: Loving Connection to others, Self-effacing Altruism, 
Blissful Transcendence, and Religiosity/Sacredness. Most religious terms, 
however, and the concepts associated with them, can be sorted fairly clean-
ly into two broad senses: the figurative sense and the supernatural sense. I 
am not suggesting that this is a strict dichotomy. Some meanings will fall 
into both sense categories; a few others might not fall into either. The 
vast majority, however—the ones most pertinent to this investigation—
are mostly used in one of these two main senses. Other categorization 
schemes, too, can be sorted into these two broad senses. The first and third 
of Spilka’s categories, for example, correspond for the most part to the 
supernatural and figurative senses, respectively. His second category could 
be interpreted either way, depending on the individual’s worldview. The 
first two of Greenwald and Harder’s categories are fairly unambiguously 
figurative, and the second two could be interpreted either way.
To make this perfectly clear, we can examine data from a study by 
La Cour, Ausker, and Hvidt (2012). They produced an exhaustive list of 
115 words and phrases, by asking participants from a variety of world-
views to “express freely all their associations (both positive and negative) 
with the word ‘spirituality’” (2012:65). Discarding the negative (e.g., an-
ti-intellectual person, self-absorbed person) and everyday (e.g., sport, di-
ets) items as inconsequential for our purposes, we are left with 99 items. 
A handful of those items can be interpreted either figuratively or super-
naturally, such as awareness of the ultimate, searching for the sacred, some-
thing larger than oneself, and even striving for God if “God” is understood 
metaphorically. The rest can be easily distinguished as either figurative or 
supernatural. 
The figurative sense of spirituality encompasses a broad range of atti-
tudes, interests, concerns, activities, and emotional states. From the list 
generated by La Cour et al., the figurative sense includes items such as 
gratitude, love, joy, meaning in life, compassion, wisdom, values, emotive 
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person, profound person, music, poetry, artistic, and willing to develop one’s 
self. This sense is typically articulated, both in the scholarly literature and 
by practitioners, with words such as deep, meaningful, significant, serious, 
and profound. It is characterized by emotions such as compassion, loving 
kindness, awe and wonder, connectedness with others, cosmic connectedness, 
feeling one with nature, and a sense of something greater than ourselves.
Similar to the way many scholars have attempted to define “religious” 
in extremely broad terms to subsume all instances of nonsuperficiality un-
der its umbrella, others have been even more sweeping with the concept 
of spirituality. Consider just two examples. Robert Fuller developed the 
following working definition for his pioneering study of the “spiritual but 
not religious” identity:
Spirituality exists wherever we struggle with the issue of how our lives fit 
into the greater cosmic scheme of things; . . . every time we wonder where 
the universe comes from, why we are here, or what happens when we 
die; . . . when we become moved by values such as beauty, love, or creativity 
that seem to reveal a meaning or power beyond our visible world. An idea 
or practice is “spiritual” when it reveals our personal desire to establish a 
felt-relationship with the deepest meanings or powers governing life. Peo-
ple find spiritual inspiration not just in sermons, but also in books and 
seminars about humanity’s creative potentials. (2001:8–9)
Similarly, in the introduction to a volume entitled Spirituality and the Sec-
ular Quest, volume editor Peter Van Ness devised the following expansive 
definition:
The spiritual dimension of life is the embodied task of realizing one’s 
truest self in the context of reality apprehended as a cosmic totality. It is 
the quest for attaining an optimal relationship between what one truly 
is and everything that is. . . . Facing outward, human existence is spiritual 
insofar as one engages reality as a maximally inclusive whole and makes 
the cosmos an intentional object of thought and feeling. Facing inward, 
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life has a spiritual dimension to the extent that it is apprehended as a 
project of people’s most enduring and vital selves, and is structured by 
experiences of sudden self-transformation and subsequent gradual devel-
opment. (1996:5)
Note that, aside from a vague reference to “meaning or power beyond our 
visible world”—which could be interpreted either way—neither of these 
definitions necessarily entail a supernatural worldview at all. Defined in 
such sweepingly broad terms, any thoughtful, self-reflective, morally con-
scious, and socially responsible human being could very well be catego-
rized as “spiritual,” regardless of supernatural beliefs.
The supernatural sense of spirituality unequivocally involves supernat-
ural beliefs about the nature of reality. It can be thought of as the literal 
sense of the word, in that “spirit” is not considered a mere metaphor, but is 
thought to refer to some kind of ontologically real, immaterial entity, in-
dependent of the physical body—a disembodied mind. The supernatural 
sense encompasses items from La Cour et al. such as: personal relation to 
God, life after death, guardian angels, reincarnation, clairvoyance, astrology, 
occultism, spiritism, and ghosts. People who include the supernatural sense 
in their spiritual identities do not consider their beliefs to be mere allegory 
or metaphor. Practitioners of New Age spirituality, for example, really do 
believe that crystals have supernatural healing powers and that mediums 
can communicate with the disembodied minds of people long deceased. 
Catholic pilgrims to Medjugorje really do believe that the Blessed Virgin 
Mary appeared before six children in 1981, roughly 1900 years after her 
lifetime. Modern, liberal theologians may have developed sophisticated 
interpretations of Christian doctrines which allow them to sidestep the su-
pernatural implications, but when evangelicals speak of “the risen Christ,” 
they most assuredly do not have a metaphorical interpretation in mind.
Despite attempts by many scholars to construct definitions of religion 
and spirituality that exclude any reference to supernatural belief, many 
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continue to define them in supernatural terms. Eliade, for example, saw a 
supernatural worldview as essential to being religious, declaring religious 
man’s very “mode of being in the world” as always believing that there is 
“an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends this world” (1959:202). 
Theologian Keith Ward defined religion as “a set of practices for establish-
ing a relationship to a supernatural or transcendent reality, for the sake 
of obtaining human good or avoiding harm” (2004:3). Robert Wuthnow 
says that, “at its core, spirituality consists of all the beliefs and activities by 
which individuals attempt to relate their lives to God or to a divine being 
or some other conception of a transcendent reality” (1998:viii). Rodney 
Stark more explicitly states that religion consists of “explanations of exis-
tence based on supernatural assumptions and including statements about 
the nature of the supernatural and about ultimate meaning” (2004:14). 
Considering the bulk of those definitions, “transcendent reality” and “ul-
timate meaning” presumably reside someplace other than the natural uni-
verse.
As Karen Fields noted (1995:xlv–xlvi), for Durkheim, sacredness was 
not some supernatural attribute inherent in certain objects. Rather, he 
saw sacredness as a quality conferred upon objects by human beings in the 
very act of setting them apart from the ordinary (profane). Durkheim’s 
argument, as Fields explained it, was that “[h]umans acting collectively 
make and remake this quality of sacredness but then encounter it after 
the fact as if it had always been built into objects and was ready-made” 
(1995:xlvi). Eliade expressed the exact opposite view: “men are not free 
to choose the sacred, . . . they only seek for it and find it by the help of 
mysterious signs” (1959:28). Eliade described the sacred as something 
otherworldly which manifests itself in certain objects and places. Humans 
can only know it when they encounter “an irruption [sic] of the sacred 
into the world” (1959:45). In case the supernatural component was still 
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unclear, Eliade stated it more plainly: “for those to whom a stone reveals 
itself as sacred, its immediate reality is transmuted into a supernatural 
reality” (1959:12).
These two broad senses are the source of interminable confusion, 
misunderstanding, and false characterization. For example, when theolo-
gian Reinhold Niehbuhr wrote that “secularism is most succinctly defined 
as the explicit disavowal of the sacred” ([1937]1986:79), did he mean 
“sacred” in a figurative or supernatural sense (or both)? If someone ex-
plicitly disavows the sacred in the supernatural sense, but fully embraces 
the sacred in a figurative sense, would Niehbuhr have still considered that 
person secular? Similarly, Eliade declared that a man who is not religious 
is “a man who rejects the sacrality of the world, who accepts only a pro-
fane existence” (1959:23). For those who identify as neither religious nor 
spiritual, yet who would not reject the idea of sacrality in a purely figu-
rative sense, would Eliade see them as doomed to a profane existence? 
The ambiguity of their language prevents us from determining how either 
scholar would have answered these questions. Suffice to say—as described 
above, and which I will discuss extensively below—secularity is most often 
considered a rejection of both the supernatural and the figurative senses of 
spirituality.
“Nonsuperficiality” as a Placeholder Category
Because the subject of this research is the nonreligious and nonspiritual, 
suppose we approach the question of definition from the opposite direc-
tion. That is, rather than ask what we mean when we identify as “being 
religious” or “being spiritual,” let us ask instead, what is it that we are 
identifying ourselves against? In other words, what are we intending to 
communicate about what we are not? Consider for a moment all the words 
and phrases enumerated in the previous section to articulate and charac-
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terize the figurative sense of spirituality: love, joy, meaning in life, com-
passion, wisdom, values, profound person, et al. As attributes of a person’s 
identity, all of these qualities describe a particular disposition, one that is 
the opposite of superficial. Now consider the various ways in which Robert 
Coles characterized the “secular mind”: spiritual indifference, cold, calcu-
lating, heartless rationalism, sin and hedonistic temptation, self-centered, 
selfish living, consumerism/materialism, et al. What kind of person do 
those describe? They all describe a mind that is superficial.
It follows, then, that if we want to find an identity label that indicates 
a nonsuperficial disposition, without any reference to something supernat-
ural, we need only find the antonym of “superficial.” Open any English 
thesaurus, however, and you will find no single antonym that represents the 
full range of meanings that are diametrically opposite to the exceptionally 
broad range of meanings represented by the single word “superficial.” To 
be sure, a good thesaurus will provide a long list of words as ostensible ant-
onyms. Each of those words, however, only represents one aspect of non-
superficiality; not one comes anywhere close to capturing the full range of 
meanings encompassed by the word “superficial.” In fact, those words are 
really only antonyms for the very words that are listed as synonyms:
Deep ↔ Shallow 
Profound ↔ Mundane 
Meaningful ↔ Trivial 
Significant ↔ Inconsequential 
Fulfilled ↔ Empty 
Serious ↔ Frivolous 
Authentic ↔ Insincere 
Wise ↔ Foolish
Each of those words has a single antonym that sufficiently represents the 
opposite of its meaning. What, then, is a sufficient antonym for “super-
ficial”?
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If we wanted to describe someone as not superficial, what single word 
or small phrase could we use to signify that? As we will discover below, a 
great deal hinges on this question, and as it turns out, it is far more diffi-
cult to answer than one might expect. A somewhat amusing, yet surpris-
ingly exemplary, demonstration of this conundrum can be found on the 
Stack Exchange website in its “English Language and Usage” forum. A user 
named John Wu posed the following question:
I would like to tell my friend to stop dating men who are so superficial, 
but state it in a positive way. Please help me complete the sentence: “You 
should date men who are more __________.” So far the only word I’ve 
been able to come up with is “real,” which seems ambiguous and lacks 
gravitas. (Wu 2015)
How might we answer that question? Suggestions from other readers 
included words such as deep, profound, serious, thoughtful, authentic, 
genuine, sincere, earnest, mature, wise, sensible, introspective, insightful, 
and perceptive. All of those words taken together come close to describing 
nonsuperficiality, but needless to say, no one could find a single word that 
sufficiently captured all the meaning this individual wished to express. But 
let us try one more option: “You should date men who are more spiritual.” 
Everything about the figurative sense of “spiritual” sufficiently fulfills the 
meaning that John wanted to express. In this sense, in the absence of any 
other options, the word “spiritual” has becomes the de facto antonym of 
“superficial.” But because it carries with it an extra set of meanings from 
its supernatural sense, John could run the risk of being quite misunder-
stood if he chose that word. His friend might think he is telling her to 
find someone who prays regularly, or consults psychics, or worships nature 
spirits.
Definitions of spirituality in the figurative sense, such as Fuller’s, are 
so all-encompassing that they subsume any nonsuperficial sentiment or 
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activity. We are described as “being spiritual” when we devote ourselves to 
such pursuits as contemplating the “big” or “ultimate” questions, search-
ing for meaning and purpose in life, cultivating an “inner life” with mind-
fulness and introspective self-awareness, being of service to others, experi-
encing overwhelming awe and wonder, feeling “deeply moved” by a song 
or story, or undergoing a transformational experience. Ellen Debenport 
(a minister and spirituality author) wrote an article about what she calls 
“spiritual superfoods,” a list of five “spiritual practices that are so nourish-
ing we should partake of them every day” (2016): (1) create quiet time; 
(2) practice denials and affirmations; (3) speak positive words; (4) hold 
a vision for your life; and (5) put your spiritual/moral convictions into 
action. None of these experiences and practices require any supernatural 
beliefs. Whatever else we may gain from partaking of them, they are all 
ways in which we attempt to keep our lives from being superficial. For 
the purposes of my inquiry, in lieu of an unambiguous alternative to the 
figurative senses of religiosity and spirituality, “nonsuperficiality” will serve 
as a placeholder. 
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Prejudice and Negative Characterizations of Nonbelievers
As discussed below, identity work by nonbelievers involves, to a large 
extent, oppositional work against prejudice and negative stereotypes. 
Many studies have now confirmed the negative characterizations of, and 
prejudice against nonbelievers in the United States. Cragun, Kosman, 
Keysar et al. (2012), for example, analyzed data from the 2008 American 
Religious Identification Survey (ARIS) and found that, among all respon-
dents who identified with none of the religion options, only 21.6 percent 
reported discrimination, but of those who self-identified as atheist or agnos-
tic, 42.9 percent reported discrimination.
Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann spearheaded this new wave of re-
search with their seminal 2006 study in which they analyzed how and why 
atheists are the least accepted minority in American society. They found 
that “out of a long list of ethnic and cultural minorities, Americans are less 
willing to accept intermarriage with atheists than with any other group, 
and less likely to imagine that atheists share their vision of American soci-
ety” (2006:216). They also found that, while other minority groups (such 
as gays and lesbians) have slowly gained acceptance in American society, 
the same is not true of atheists. Gervais, Shariff, and Norenzayan deter-
mined that “[t]o understand a given form of prejudice, researchers must 
first understand the threat that the target of prejudice is seen to pose” 
(2011:1190). Edgell et al. had suggested that atheists are seen as a threat 
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to the social order because they are considered to be fundamentally un-
trustworthy. Gervais et al. conducted a series of social psychology exper-
iments and found that anti-atheist prejudice is, indeed, primarily based 
on distrust.
Marcel Harper found that, because atheists remained closeted in the 
United States for so many years, religious apologists ran rampant with 
stereotypes to defame atheists. Through two studies designed to identify 
the most commonly held stereotypes against the nonreligious, he found, 
through factor analysis, six unflattering stereotypes: “skeptics,” “straight-
forward individualists,” “seekers,” “judgmental cads,” “critical cynics,” 
and “hedonistic bohemians” (2007:547). In freeform response fields, re-
spondents wrote in labels such as “aggressive,” “arrogant,” “empty,” “evil,” 
“freaks,” “ignorant,” “lost,” “miserable,” “sinners,” “stupid,” and “shallow.” 
Stereotype labels such as these form the basis of the negative characteriza-
tions of nonbelievers that will be analyzed in more detail below.
Individual and Collective Nonbeliever Identity
The literature on secular/atheist identity work falls into three general focus 
areas: (1) identity formation, (2) identity management, and (3) collective 
identity. For purposes of this study, I am interested in the first, which 
entails building a new nonreligious identity after abandoning a religious 
one. I am especially interested in any findings of attitudes toward religious 
or spiritual identities, and use of identity work to deal with the social stig-
ma of nonbelief. Kelly Church-Hearl observed in some of her participants 
a reluctance to accept self-identity labels to reference their “spiritual sides.” 
She suggested that avoiding all labels is one of the many “oppositional 
identity work” strategies that some nonbelievers use to cope with their 
stigmatized social status (2008:52). As to why nonbelievers might spe-
cifically reject the label of “religious,” Church-Hearl found that many of 
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her subjects had developed negative connotations associated with religion. 
“Many respondents claimed that they left mainstream religion because 
they felt [it] perpetuates hate, separatism, prejudice, discrimination, and 
oppression” (2008:27).
Barb Amandine observed similar behavior, but in response to all 
identity labels: “A majority of non-believers, when asked to categorize 
themselves, choose not to do so” (2011:10). Jesse Smith observed that 
avoiding the label of atheist “primarily has to do with its deviant and 
stigmatized status in American culture” (2013:84). Likewise, according to 
Smith and Cimino (2012), many nonbelievers avoid the label of atheist 
due to the many negative connotations associated with it. Some groups, 
therefore, try to “disassociate themselves from the atheist label and seek to 
promote a new secularist identity, such as the ‘brights’” (2012:22). Jesse 
Smith suggested that many atheists, while they seek to be included in the 
atheist community, also seek to produce a “change in how the public views 
that community” (2013:96). In this sense, many atheists are attempting to 
re-frame “the secular” as something positive. 
Measuring Nonreligious/Nonspiritual Identities with Surveys
Because much of the measurement of “identity” typically comes in the 
form of survey questionnaires, one would think such questions would be 
crafted with care and precision. Unfortunately, the religion-oriented ques-
tions on most of the largest surveys are fraught with problems, often as a 
result of inattention to the disparate figurative and supernatural senses of 
the words involved, and the disparate cognitive frames those words poten-
tially activate in the minds of the respondents (as discussed below). The 
consequences of ignoring the ambiguity of religious language can be quite 
staggering, potentially causing the research data to be a significant source 
of misinformation and misunderstanding. Distorted interpretations of 
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such tainted data come from journalists and scholars alike—often from 
the survey organization’s own reports.
Most large-scale surveys with any questions on religion contain 
some variation of the standard “Do you believe in God?” question. That 
question in itself suffers greatly from the extreme ambiguity of the word 
“God.” The developers of the Pew Religious Landscape Survey, however, 
decided to extend the question and broaden its scope by asking, “Do you 
believe in God or a universal spirit?” Belief in the existence of a supernatu-
ral, personal deity, whether that deity is believed to be active in the world 
(theism) or to have created the world then left it alone (deism), is a differ-
ent thing entirely from belief in an impersonal “universal spirit”—in the 
words of Coleman, Silver & Hood, “it would be (at the least) an emical 
misnomer if we were to call this ‘God’” (2016:363). If we refer to both 
beliefs with the same term—theism—we erase the conceptual distinction, 
which is counter-productive to the rigorous needs of scholarly analysis. 
Instead of improving the conditions of scholarly discourse, the authors of 
this question increased ambiguity and confusion.
To make matters worse, when the Pew Forum presents the results of 
that question in tables, graphs and reports, they display the variable title 
only as “Believe in God”—inexcusably leaving off the “or a universal spirit” 
half of the original question. Consequently, the published results literally 
erase the distinction between those who say they believe in a personal de-
ity and those who say they believe in a “universal spirit.” From this we get 
the absurd oxymoron of the atheist who believes in God. The Pew results 
indicate that 5 percent of self-identified atheists answered that they are 
“fairly certain” or “absolutely certain” that God exists, leading to popular 
news headlines such as “Why so-called atheists believe in God, Heaven, 
and even the Bible.” The author even quoted the original answer in full, 
then immediately dropped the “or a universal spirit” half to make a bold, 
newsworthy soundbite: “The graph showed that a fraction of self-identi-
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fied atheists expressed absolute certainty that there is a ‘God or universal 
spirit.’ That’s right: some atheists believe in God ” (Grant 2014).
None of the questions in any of the large national surveys bother to 
take into account which sense (figurative or supernatural) the respondents 
have in mind for words such as God, spiritual, religious, sacred, soul, and so 
forth. I have come across only one measurement scale that recognizes the 
distinction between the figurative and supernatural senses of spirituality. 
Cragun, Hammer, and Nielsen (2015) designed what they call the “Non-
Religious-NonSpiritual Scale” (NRNSS). They recognized that the two 
disparate senses of the word “spiritual” would compromise results with 
ambiguity, so they decided to specify one sense over the other, and stated 
it clearly in the instructions to eliminate any confusion:
Some people use the terms “spirituality” and “spiritual” . . . as just having 
to do with: a special or intense experience, an appreciation for existence, 
meaning in life, peacefulness, harmony, the quest for well-being, or emo-
tional connection with people, humanity, nature, or the universe. . . . In 
contrast to that broad approach, when you answer the items in THIS 
questionnaire we’d like you to think about ‘spirituality” and ‘spiritual’ in 
the specific, SUPERNATURAL sense . . . , having to do with things which 
are beyond or transcend the material universe. (2015:39)
Although their definitional choice to alleviate the ambiguity allowed them 
to differentiate between “nonreligious/spiritual” and “nonreligious/non-
spiritual,” that choice led to the exclusion of another identity. What of 
those individuals who do not call themselves religious or spiritual and do 
not hold supernatural beliefs, but who do value “an appreciation for ex-
istence, meaning in life, peacefulness, harmony, the quest for well-being, 
[and] emotional connection with people, humanity, nature, or the uni-
verse”? In other words, what of the “nonreligious/nonspiritual/nonsuper-
ficial” identity? The secular but not superficial are invisible to this scale. 
Had the researchers included a separate set of questions for the figurative 
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sense of spiritual, they might have inadvertently created a measure for the 
“nonsuperficiality” variable.
Questions of religious affiliation vary significantly from one survey 
organization to the next. The General Social Survey has always asked, 
“What is your religious preference?” and included “None” among the 
choices, along with an open-ended “Other” option. The Pew Forum 
asks, “What is your present religion, if any?” Among the options is listed: 
“Atheist (do not believe in God).” The National Survey of Religious Iden-
tification contained the simple question, “What is your religion?,” and 
included “None” among the litany of religious institutions. Curiously, it 
included both “humanist” and “agnostic” as choices, but excluded “athe-
ist.” It contained no questions about belief. The American Mosaic Project 
survey asked the question without ambiguity: “What religion, if any, were 
you raised in?” The intended sense of the word “religion” (in all these 
examples) is clearly an institution. The available options in the American 
Mosaic Project, however, only offered one choice for no religion: “No re-
ligion/Atheist/Agnostic.” And the follow up question—“And what is your 
current religious preference, if any?”—would be ambiguous if not for the 
context set by the previous question.
Asking a question in the form of “What religion are you?” is to ask 
a completely different question from “How religious are you?” The for-
mer is a question of group affiliation, the latter of personal disposition. The 
term “religion,” however, is sometimes used in the sense of personal re-
ligiosity, while “religiosity” is sometimes indicated only by measures of 
church attendance. So when the Pew Forum survey puts the question in 
the ambiguous form of “How important is religion in your life?,” the re-
spondent’s answer is significantly impacted by whether he or she thinks 
at that moment of “religion” in the sense of “religious affiliation” or in the 
sense of “traditionally religious feelings and concerns.” And by not being 
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more explicit, the developers of the questionnaire seem to have completely 
ignored the entire phenomenon of the “spiritual but not religious.”
When the Pew results indicate that 7 percent of self-labeled atheists 
answered that “religion” is somewhat or very important in their lives (Pew 
Research Center 2015:45), what does that tell us? Are they saying that 
“a religious institution” is important to them or that “thinking about the 
ultimate questions” is important to them (for example)? We have no way 
of knowing, because their use of the word “religion” is too ambiguous. 
Further complicating the issue: what wording should be used in this con-
text when speaking of “atheism”? Should it be referred to as a “religious 
group,” “religious category,” or “religious demographic”? Surely all these 
nomenclatures cannot escape the implication that atheism is somehow 
“religious,” or at least religion-like; so why refer to it as “religious” at all? 
Some researchers today are, instead, placing nonbelief within the category 
of “nonreligion” (Lee 2015; Zuckerman, Galen & Pasquale 2016), which 
has its own definitional problems, aside from continuing to define it in 
relation to religion.
Even asking a question such as “How often do you think about mean-
ing and purpose in life?” is susceptible to sense disparity. The respondent 
may think in terms of general meaning and purpose in this life here and 
now, or of the ultimate meaning and purpose of existence. Someone who 
thinks that there is no such thing as inherent ultimate meaning and pur-
pose in the universe (i.e., some supernatural, guiding, disembodied mind 
that “has a plan” for it all) may be inclined to say that they don’t think 
about it all that often, even if he or she does often contemplate general 
meaning and purpose in life. Someone in a more critical frame of mind 
might even hear that question and ask, “What does ‘meaning and purpose 
in life’ even mean?”
All of the issues discussed above render survey data almost useless for 
researchers interested in measuring identity in terms of being “religious” 
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or “nonreligious.” Indeed, the very concept of “religiosity” is problematic. 
Some social scientists want to define religion in extremely broad, vague 
terms and claim some kind of universal or “implicit” religiosity in every-
one (e.g., Schnell 2003; Bailey 2012). The concept of “implicit religion” 
is a prime example of an etic category defined so broadly that it can be 
imposed on almost anything. In fact, Karen Lord admitted that the term 
is “intentionally broad” (2006:205), and that “although not everything 
is implicitly religious, anything can be [emphasis added]” (2006:206). 
She readily admits that scholars who apply this concept “have tended to 
counter difficulties arising from this breadth by re-defining, refining and 
tailoring the construct to their particular field” (2006:206). The current 
study takes the opposite perspective: rather than expanding the defini-
tion of religious terms so broadly that they can subsume any and all non-
superficiality, the boundaries of what constitutes religion and spirituality 
should be more clearly demarcated. 
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The point of departure for this study is the problem of construct-
ing a new social identity after shifting from one that is normative (even 
reputable) to one that is tainted and often stigmatized. In this case, I refer 
specifically to someone shifting from a religious or spiritual identity to 
one distinguished by nonbelief in religious doctrines in particular and in 
the existence of anything supernatural in general. Such nonbelief can be 
easily concealed, thus avoiding the stigmatized status by remaining only 
potentially “discreditable” (Goffman 1963). All the subjects of this study, 
however, were specifically “out of the closet” as nonbelievers. In the pro-
cess of analyzing the data gathered from in-depth interviews, I began to 
discover points of commonality among the theoretical sources detailed 
below—points at which they could be woven together, complimenting 
and reinforcing one another, resulting in a broader gestalt framework, its 
constituents working together to form something greater than the sum of 
its parts.
The Spectrum of Social Stigma
Erving Goffman defined stigma as “an attribute that is deeply discred-
iting” (1963:3), and made the important distinction between someone 
with an unmistakably obvious stigmatizing attribute and someone with 
an attribute that can be easily concealed in order to avoid the stigma-
tized identity. Although Goffman used terms such as “discredited” and 
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“tainted” synonymously with “stigmatized,” and treated “normative” and 
“stigmatized” as binary categories, I will treat them as “graded categories” 
(Lakoff 1987:21; Saler 1993:xiv), suggesting a spectrum of graded social 
statuses. For example, although “discredited” can refer to an injured or 
defamed character, it can also refer merely to a loss of trust in someone—
not necessarily a stigmatized status. “Tainted,” however, has no lexical 
sense from which implications of corruption or contamination are absent; 
it unmistakably implies some degree of stigma. A similar distinction can 
be made on the other end of the spectrum, in that some “normative” 
identities—such as doctors, judges, and ministers—are perceived as more 
“reputable” than others. 
Cognitive Frames, Frame Semantics, and Grounded Theory
Cognitive frames can be thought of as mental structures of meaning built 
from interconnected collections of beliefs, images, sensory impressions, 
knowledge, patterns of practice, emotions, attitudes, and judgements, 
bundled into organized packages in our brains, and all brought to mind 
together as a single unit when we encounter a word or other symbol (Fill-
more & Baker 2009:314). The most effective and efficient way to grasp 
the concept is by example, and Fillmore and Baker provided a clear illus-
tration. Imagine you see a group of children entering a house, carrying 
brightly wrapped boxes with ribbons and bows. The scene is likely to acti-
vate the birthday party frame in your mind, leading you not only to in-
fer that the children are going to a birthday party, but also “to expect that 
the children’s experiences during the time of the party will include games, 
toys, and cake, and lighted candles on the cake, as well as a singing of the 
birthday song” (2009:315). Far more than the mere dictionary definition 
of “birthday party,” all of these assumptions, along with all of your mem-
ories of birthday parties that you have experienced yourself, comprise the 
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frame in your mind that gives meaning to what you have seen (and to the 
symbolic phrase “birthday party”).
It is important to understand that a cognitive frame is much more 
than a dictionary definition; it is an entire “conceptual representation, or 
mental model” (Wendland 2010:28). As Lakoff explained, “all words are 
defined relative to conceptual frames.” (2004:xv). When we hear a word, 
our brains do not function like computers (Epstein 2016) by searching 
for the word in a database and retrieving its definition. Our brains do not 
think in dictionary definitions; they think in frames. According to La-
koff, cognitive frames are “physically realized in the neurocircuitry of [our] 
brain[s]” (2008). Words and other symbols are like triggers that activate 
those circuits. “When you hear a word, its frame (or collection of frames) 
is activated in your brain” (Lakoff 2004:xv). An important consequence 
of this biological reality, as Ernst Wendland explained, is that “one cannot 
fully comprehend the meaning of a single word without access to all the 
essential background knowledge that relates to that word” (2010:30). In 
other words, you cannot lookup the full meaning of a word in a dictio-
nary, because meaning consists of all the cognitive frames activated in our 
brains that shape our understanding of the symbols of communication 
(Fillmore & Baker 2009:317).
Robert Entman distinguished four locations where frames affect 
social interactions and events: the text (any form of symbols used for 
communication), the culture (the “stock of commonly invoked frames” 
(1993:52) we are socialized into), the communicator (someone who speaks 
a word with a certain frame in mind), and the receiver (someone who hears 
the word which activates a cognitive frame). Put another way, frames are 
“embedded in personal, social, and institutional roles” (Shmueli, Elliot, 
& Kaufman 2006:217). The “texts” I am concerned with in this study are 
(1) the words, images, testimonials, etc. that constitute the stigmatizing 
frames held by believers about nonbelievers, and (2) the field of identity 
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labels available to nonbelievers for communicating social identities. As 
we analyze various types of frames discussed below, we will often need to 
recognize the location in which the frame resides.
Frame Semantics is a method of linguistic analysis that is a uniquely 
suitable compliment to Glaser and Strauss’s (1967) “grounded theory” 
approach to generating theory from concepts that emerge out of qualita-
tive research data. The objective of grounded theory is to understand the 
standpoint of those under study by paying close attention to the words (i.e., 
linguistic forms) they use to express their thoughts, attempting to discern 
“nuances of [their] language and meaning” (Charmaz 2006:32–34). Se-
mantics is the study of the meanings of words, and Frame Semantics is 
“the study of how . . . we associate linguistic forms (words, fixed phrases, 
grammatical patterns) with the cognitive structures—the frames—which 
largely determine the process (and the result) of interpreting those forms” 
(Fillmore & Baker 2009:314). Fillmore and Baker explain that “the 
ground observations about Frame Semantics must be the ways in which 
users of the language understand what is communicated by their language 
[emphasis added]” (2009:320). Thus, Frame Semantics provides a means 
of achieving the objective of generating grounded theory. By applying 
Frames Semantics to grounded theory methodology, those “nuances of 
meaning” can be uncovered by excavating the underlying cognitive frames 
that constitute those meanings.
For the remainder of this study, I have adapted a typographical con-
vention from Lakoff and Johnson (1980) by rendering the names of cog-
nitive frames in smallcaps, in the same way that they rendered names 
of metaphors. When referring specifically to identity labels, the names of 
those labels will always appear in quotation marks. In the coming pages, 
each time you read the name of a frame or identity label, take a moment 
to observe everything that arises in your mind.
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Identity Frames and Characterization Frames
Much of the literature on conflict management focuses on the mediation 
or negotiation of what are known as “intractable conflicts”—conflicts that 
seem impossible to resolve, either because the differences are too great or 
the parties involved are too difficult and stubborn. Examples include envi-
ronmental justice disputes, racial and ethnic strife, and territorial disputes. 
The conflicts between believers and nonbelievers quite often fall into this 
category. Social scientists researching the techniques of intractable conflict 
mediation recognize that the two parties in such conflicts understand a 
situation or event in completely different ways, and that the source of the 
conflict can be illuminated by analyzing the disparities in the cognitive 
frames that form each side’s understanding of identity labels. As Shmueli 
et al. explained: “As lenses through which disputants interpret conflicts, 
divergent frames limit the clarity of communication and the quality of 
information, and they encourage escalation” (2006:217). Frame analysis 
allows mediators to determine how each conflicting party views the other, 
and with that understanding, attempt to resolve the conflict by reframing 
one or both views.
In this approach, “a frame is a way of labeling these different in-
dividual interpretations of the situation” (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders 
2016:142–143). The analytic techniques of Frame Semantics can prove 
useful for the task of identifying, labeling, and “unpacking the multiple 
frames disputants hold to get a clearer picture of the conflict’s drivers” 
(Campbell & Docherty 2004:769). In the same-sex marriage debate, for 
example, we can see how communication between the opposing sides is 
severely hampered by recognizing that those opposed to same-sex mar-
riage are characterizing these relationships with the deviant sex frame, 
while the other is characterizing them with the loving couple frame. On 
a broader scale, after the mass murder of 49 people at an Orlando LGBTQ 
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nightclub, some few “supporters” of the attack, in an attempt to justify the 
murders, invoked the anti-gay sexual pervert frame (Tashman 2016) 
and pedophile frame (Rajaee 2016) to activate negative cognitive frames 
in the minds of their listeners. During their filibuster, democratic leaders 
attempted to humanize the victims by reading detailed personal stories 
of each victim, for hours on end, in order to activate positive cognitive 
frames such as the loving son/daughter frame, the upstanding cit-
izen frame, the bright future frame, and many others. Two concepts 
developed by intractable conflict mediation researchers have proven useful 
for the present study: “identity frames” and “characterization frames.”
Identity frames describe how individuals or groups view themselves, 
derived from such sources as “demographic characteristics, place or loca-
tion, roles they play, interests they hold, and institutions with which they 
are affiliated” (Campbell & Docherty 2004:774). For example, a nonbe-
liever might hold what could be called the rationalist identity frame, 
considering qualities such as being level-headed, clear thinking, and un-
impressed by specious reasoning to be important parts of his or her identity. 
According to Campbell and Docherty, identity frames are “a major con-
tributor to dispute intractability.” Threats to self or group identity (even if 
only perceived and not real) are a major source of tension that can drive 
a conflict into an intractable state. Identity frames, unfortunately, are also 
“one of the least malleable frames over time” (2004:774). Shmueli et al., 
however, assert that changing each side’s identity frames “is not necessary 
for managing conflicts or reaching agreements” (2006:211). Instead, they 
and other researchers recommend focusing on changing characterization 
frames in order to resolve the conflict.
Characterization frames (sometimes called “stereotyping frames”) 
describe how individuals or groups view others (Burgess 2003; Campbell 
& Docherty 2004:775). In intractable conflicts, characterization frames 
are typically used to delegitimize the other party’s position, to denigrate 
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the character of the opposing party, or even to dehumanize the opposition 
outright. For example, on one side, a Christian fundamentalist might hold 
the immoral atheist characterization frame for nonbelievers, convinced 
that nonbelievers cannot be trusted because they have no ultimate reason 
to be ethical; on the other side, an atheist might view Christian funda-
mentalists as embodying the self-righteous moralizer characterization 
frame, trying to impose their absolutist, dogmatic moral rules upon the 
rest of society. Negative characterization frames are the cognitive impres-
sions that fan the flames of prejudice, resentment, and hostility toward 
others. They are, however, easier to change than identity frames. In order 
to make any progress toward resolution, therefore, researchers advise that 
“stakeholders are better off focusing on reframing characterization frames” 
(Shmueli et al. 2006:211).
Oppressive Identity Work and Oppositional Identity Work
Social psychologists Michael Schwalbe and Douglas Mason-Schrock 
(1996) defined “identity work” as “anything people do, individually or 
collectively, to give meaning to themselves or others.” More important-
ly, they explained that identity work is “largely a matter of signifying, 
labeling, and defining” (1996:115). Such signifying, labeling, and defin-
ing inevitably involves words and the cognitive frames that those words 
activate. As they explained, identity itself “is not a meaning but a sign 
[i.e., label] that evokes meaning, in the form of a response [i.e., frame] 
aroused in the person who interprets it” (1996:115). Note the similarity 
in language of that last sentence to the way Lakoff, Fillmore, and Baker 
describe “evoking” cognitive frames. Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock ana-
lyze “identity-making as cultural struggle” between dominant and subor-
dinated social groups engaged in two types of subcultural identity work: 
“oppressive” and “oppositional.”
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Oppressive identity work occurs in a process called “othering,” in 
which a dominant social group stigmatizes a subordinated group (or at 
least “taints” their identities) by imposing disreputable identity attri-
butes on its members (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock 1996:139)—in other 
words, by generating and imposing characterization frames. In a now sem-
inal paper in the growing research on prejudice against atheists, Edgell et 
al. demonstrated this exact process by uncovering “the degree to which 
atheists represent a symbolic ‘other’ against which some Americans define 
themselves as good people and worthy citizens” (2006:214). They found 
that many Christian Americans hold stereotyped impressions of atheists, 
typically imagined as an individual who lacks concern for the common 
good of society and is against putative “traditional family values.” Two 
common types stood out:
Some people . . . associate [atheists] with illegality, such as drug use and 
prostitution—that is, with immoral people who threaten respectable 
community from the lower end of the status hierarchy. Others saw athe-
ists as rampant materialists and cultural elitists that threaten common 
values from above—the ostentatiously wealthy who make a lifestyle out 
of consumption or the cultural elites who think they know better than 
everyone else. (2006:225–227)
Edgell et al. thus uncovered two prime examples of negative characteri-
zation frames produced by a dominant group through oppressive iden-
tity work which we might call the lower-class criminal frame and 
upper-class elite frame, respectively—products of Christian oppressive 
identity work against nonbelievers.
Oppositional identity work occurs when a marginalized social group 
resists, or comes to terms with, the tainted or stigmatized identity at-
tributes imposed upon them by the dominant group. Members of the 
marginalized group must “transform discrediting identities into crediting 
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ones” (Schwalbe & Mason-Schrock 1996:141), redefine the identities in 
some way to render them less discrediting, or establish new identities. In 
her work on atheism as a minority identity in Appalachia, Kelly Church-
Hearl (2008) utilized Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock’s two types of identi-
ty work to describe the struggles of non-Christians in a region dominated 
by conservative Christians. According to Church-Hearl, “based on partic-
ipants’ reports, many Christians engage in . . . ‘oppressive identity work’ by 
claiming that atheists and naturalists lead immoral lives” (2008:48–49). 
The non-Christians thus had to engage in oppositional identity work to 
find strategies to counteract the negative stereotyping imposed by the 
dominant Christian culture. Church-Hearl cataloged the strategies she 
heard from her respondents, including: staying “in the closet,” avoiding 
labels, exhibiting superiority, using humor when dealing with Christians, 
being confrontational by invalidating their beliefs asking impossible 
questions that Christians can’t answer, and seeking social support from 
other non-Christians through books, the Internet, and meetup groups 
(2008:53–61).1
The theoretical frameworks detailed above weave together to form 
a cohesive whole. The linguistic technique of frame analysis offered by 
Frame Semantics lends substance to the concepts of identity and charac-
terization frames utilized in the field of intractable conflict mediation by 
analyzing them as cognitive frames. That combination then allows us to 
flesh out the social psychological concepts of oppressive and oppositional 
identity work by analyzing them in terms of characterization and identity 
frames. Uncovering and deconstructing the stereotyping characterization 
frames located within the culture of the dominant group, and identifying 
the various ways they might be manipulated in the process of oppositional 
1  I am indebted to Kelly Church-Hearl for pointing me toward the work of Schwal-
be and Mason-Schrock.
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identity work, may allow the identity frames of the subordinated group 
to be reasserted.
Research Questions
What are we to make of nonbelievers who self-identify as neither religious 
nor spiritual, yet who demonstrate the nonsuperficial disposition of the 
figurative sense of spirituality? When faced with such individuals in the 
field, social scientists often employ rhetorical acrobatics to subsume those 
observations, however tenuously, within the categories of “religious” and/
or “spiritual,” because they have difficulty categorizing them as “secular” 
(e.g., Herberg 1962; Roof 1999; Besecke 2005; Streib & Hood 2016). 
When studying individuals who do not fit into predefined identities, we 
need to take an emic approach and listen to how they identify and describe 
themselves, then attempt to discern new categories, or whole new vocabu-
laries if needs be, to avoid misrepresenting them. My aim in this research 
is to explore possible answers the following questions with regard to this 
particular segment of the “neither religious nor spiritual” population:
(1) How do they go about forming and articulating an identity of their 
own when our culture has never developed the language to speak 
about a nonsuperficial life without falling back on religious/spiritual 
language with its supernatural connotations?
(2) What new terms or metaphors, if any, have they come up with to 
express the same aspects of their personalities that “Christian minis-
ter” once expressed?
(3) How do they deal with the tainted or stigmatized status of their new 
“nonbeliever” identities?
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(4) Because they do not fit the stereotypical characterization of secular 
people—that is, as superficial—how do they deal (if at all) with the 
fact that some believers might deny that they are secular and label 
them as “spiritual” because they fit the figurative sense of that iden-
tity?
(5) If someone does not want to identify as “religious” or “spiritual,” be-
cause they do not want to imply that they hold supernatural beliefs, 
how do they communicate an identity that relates the fact that they 
are not superficial? In other words, what commonly understood 
term (or phrase) could be used as an identity label for people who 
are secular but not superficial? 
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CHAPTER IV
METHODS
Grounded Theory
I entered into this study with no fully-formed theoretical framework, 
just a general notion—based on preparatory research and prior explor-
atory observations—that George Lakoff’s technique of cognitive frame 
analysis might prove useful. I knew my goal was to make sense of the fact 
that so many thoughtful, self-reflective people, who had been deeply reli-
gious all their lives, now have trouble identifying as religious or spiritual. 
But at the outset I had no idea what theoretical frameworks might help 
make sense of it all. Glaser and Strauss (1967) designed their “constant 
comparative method” (described in more detail below) specifically for this 
research scenario, insisting that “the initial decisions are not based on a 
preconceived theoretical framework” (1967:45). Their “grounded theory” 
approach formed the foundation of my methodology.
As Kathy Charmaz points out in her exposition of grounded the-
ory, theories are not discovered, they are constructed. But such theories 
are not built out of thin air. Rather, “we construct our grounded theories 
through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, 
perspectives, and research practices” (2006:10). In other words, we begin 
with what Herbert Blumer called “sensitizing concepts” (1969:147–148), 
accumulated from prior reading, research, and experience. The sensitizing 
concepts described in the Introduction led me to ask the questions upon 
which this study is based. As Charmaz explained it, to generate grounded 
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theory “we begin by being open to what is happening in the . . . interview 
statements so that we might learn about our research participants’ lives, . . . 
study how they explain their statements, . . . and ask what analytic sense we 
can make of them” (2006:3).
Grounded theory is built through a continuously iterative process of 
coding data as it is gathered, analyzing the codes to look for any emerging 
patterns or concepts, gathering more data and revisiting previous data to 
constantly compare one to the other. This process is repeated until noth-
ing new emerges (the point of saturation), all the while constantly revis-
iting the literature looking for anything that may help make sense of the 
concepts emerging from the data. In this way, the researcher is “forced to 
develop ideas on a level of generality higher in conceptual abstraction than 
the qualitative material being analyzed” (Glaser & Strauss 1967:114). 
Thus, rather than a method of only applying pre-developed theory to 
the data, this is an analytic inductive method designed to systematically 
generate theory that “corresponds closely to the data” (Glaser & Strauss 
1967:114). In other words, “grounded theory” is grounded in the data.
Sampling
As stated above, to answer my research questions I needed participants 
who had been deeply religious for most of their adult lives, who stopped 
believing the supernatural worldview of their religions and subsequently 
left religion altogether, and who were still the same thoughtful, self-reflec-
tive people they had been. Additionally, I needed people who were not 
concealing the fact that they are nonbelievers, who had publicly come out 
of the closet, and thus had to engage in managing the stigma of a nonbe-
liever identity and to construct new identities to replace their “believer” 
identities. To find such people, as a reasonable theoretical source, I sought 
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ex-clergy who no longer believed the doctrines of their former religions 
and who were publicly open about their deconversions.
Twenty years ago it may have been nigh impossible to find openly 
nonbelieving ex-ministers. But between the Internet and the proliferation 
of local meetup.com groups, such people can finally be seen and heard. 
Random sampling was not an option in this situation because the number 
of openly nonbelieving ex-ministers is so miniscule and difficult to find 
that a random sample would be impossible. Under these conditions, op-
portunity and snowball sampling are the most appropriate sampling meth-
ods. I was fortunate to be able to begin with opportunity sampling to 
recruit four participants who I already knew through my participation 
over the past 10 years in secularist groups in two midsize, Midwestern 
cities. All four enthusiastically agreed to be interviewed, and one put me 
in contact with another ex-minister he knew.
Ex-ministers being so few and far between, I knew no one else who 
could give me referrals, and Google searches for terms such as “ex-minis-
ter” or “ex-clergy” revealed nothing. So to find more participants, I had to 
improvise on the traditional snowball sampling method by following leads 
on websites, blogs, podcasts, and so forth—a sampling method I began to 
call “cyber snowball sampling.” Roughly two years before I submitted the 
proposal for this study, I began to write down the names of any ex-clergy 
I came across on the Internet. Having been engaged with the online non-
believer community since the early 1990s (before the World Wide Web, 
when we communicated through LISTSERVs, and USENET groups), 
I have gained an extensive familiarity with the locations of nonbelievers 
on the Internet. Some ex-ministers contributed to group blogs on sites 
such as patheos.com and freethoughtblogs.com. Some maintained their 
own blogs, which were linked to from other secularist sites. Several had 
published books about their deconversions, and I heard them being inter-
viewed on podcasts such as The Humanist Hour, The Free Thought Prophet, 
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The Thinking Atheist, The Friendly Atheist, and Progressive Spirit as I lis-
tened to them to and from work. Sometimes one ex-minister would men-
tion the name of another ex-minister, and I would search for that name. I 
was also fortunate that several members of The Clergy Project2 came out 
publicly as nonbelievers during that time period.
By the time I received approval from the Institutional Review Board 
and was ready to begin soliciting participants, I had gathered a list of over 
40 ex-clergy. I searched for their names on Google and attempted to find 
contact information for them on websites, blogs, podcasts, and social sites 
such as Facebook, Twitter, and AtheistNexus.com. I was able to obtain 
some form of contact information for 25 of the names (email addresses, 
Facebook accounts, or blog contact forms). After multiple attempts—
sometimes through multiple channels—to contact each of them over a 
period of roughly two months, I received responses from 12, and was able 
to successfully schedule interviews with 10. Having been involved with 
the nonbeliever community for so many years, I had an “insider” status 
that allowed me to establish trust and rapport more easily than if I had 
been an unknown outsider or someone from a religious organization.
Of the 15 participants interviewed in this study, eight had been more 
or less theologically liberal ministers (Presbyterian, Methodist/Quaker, 
United Church of Canada, Catholic, two Independent Baptist, Black 
Baptist, and Progressive Evangelical), six had been theologically conser-
vative (three Southern Baptists, one Independent Baptist, and two Pente-
costals), and one, from the United Church of Canada, described himself 
as “right-of-center.” One participant was black, the other 14 were white. 
Three participants were women, the other 12 were men. Ages ranged from 
36 to 81, with a mean of 52 and median of 56. Number of years in active 
2  The Clergy Project is a private and anonymous online forum for ministers who 
have stopped believing but are still “in the closet” and typically still working as 
ministers.
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ministry ranged from 5 to 35, with a mean of 18 and median of 20. The 
number of years since they left the ministry had two outliers: 1.5 years and 
49 years. Without those two outliers, the number of years ranged from 5 
to 12, with both mean and median of 7 years. Finally, 14 of the partici-
pants were ex-clergy, and one was actually still an active minister who had 
come out publicly as an atheist, and so was going through a very similar 
process of finding new labels to manage the stigma and communicate 
identity.
Data Collection
After shedding their former religious identities, some ex-clergy began writ-
ing blogs to both share their arduous deconversion experiences and, more 
importantly for this study, to continue doing what made them become 
ministers in the first place: exploring, and discussing matters of substance. 
During the time I was attempting to make contact for interviews, I began 
sifting through these blogs looking for material that addressed my research 
questions. I found some data of interest in the blog posts, but much of it 
proved to be too general for my specific questions, and thus of limited use.
The use of in-depth, semi-structured interviews encourages partici-
pants to be more focused and go into greater depth, allowing insight into 
their own interpretation of the words they use and the identities they 
choose (Charmaz 2006:25–27). To say that I took a decidedly emic ap-
proach to the collection and analysis of data means that I considered the 
words, definitions, and cognitive frames drawn out of the participants 
with searching questions as paramount to gaining insight into their un-
derstandings of their identities and situations. As a purely emic endeav-
or, interviews were designed to elicit rich explanations from participants 
about why they chose to accept or reject specific identity labels, and what 
those labels mean to them.
 METHODS 47
I conducted interviews from March through May of 2016. Interview 
durations ranged from 44 minutes to 2 hours 44 minutes, with a mean 
of 1:30 and a median of 1:20. I conducted four of the local interviews 
in-person at the participant’s location of choice—either at a coffee shop or 
in the participant’s home—and recorded the interviews with a Zoom H1 
professional audio recorder. The fifth local participant preferred to be in-
terviewed over the phone, so I interviewed him, along with the 10 geo-
graphically distant participants, with Skype.
The Skype application can connect users for an audio or video call 
through the Internet, and for a small fee, Skype can even be used to call 
telephones, thus allowing researchers to efficiently and affordably include 
participants from virtually anywhere in the world (Deakin & Wakefield 
2014; Iacono, Symonds & Brown 2016). Skype conversations can also be 
easily recorded. I recorded all remote interviews with the Audio Hijack 
application by Rogue Amoeba Software, which has the ability to separate 
each side of the conversation onto the left and right channels. I transcribed 
all interviews in their entirety with the Express Scribe transcription appli-
cation by NCH Software, and replaced real names with pseudonyms for 
all participants. All data was stored in an Apple Disk Utility encrypted 
disk image and backed up to an encrypted thumb drive.
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CHAPTER V
FINDINGS
Salient Characteristics of the Participants
Deeply Religious Identities
All of the participants in this study had been deeply devoted to their 
religious beliefs, feelings, and practices for many years—devoted enough 
to dedicate their lives to their religions. As ministers, their religious con-
victions formed the core of their personal and social identities. Most had 
been religious all their lives, and many had parents or other relatives in 
the ministry. Evan, for example, was a fifth-generation Baptist minister 
whose great, great grandparents came to the United States from England 
as missionaries to Native Americans. He preached his first sermon at the 
age of 15 and was ordained at 18. He recalls how much religion saturated 
his identity:
Religion was not something I did, religion was something I was. I mean, 
it was the air I breathed and the water I drank. In my home everything 
centered around religion. Nothing else mattered. We were taught that 
your sole purpose of being here on the Earth is to glorify God. And I’d 
never questioned that.
Melissa’s parents got “baptized in the Holy Spirit” when she was a toddler, 
and raised her in a non-denominational Charismatic church where her fa-
ther was the worship pastor. From an early age, she recalls, she had always 
“filled leadership voids wherever they were,” leading children’s ministries 
 FINDINGS 49
in middle and high school. Her vocation in ministry began with a tradi-
tional “calling”:
I believed that I was hearing God’s voice. I believed that that was what I 
was called to do, was to lead and speak his truth and speak his words. And 
it was confirmed in the fact that people listened, and people followed my 
lead. . . . I wanted to help people find God’s will for their lives, and then 
help encourage them and equip them on that journey.
Others became actively religious during high school or college. Luke, 
for example, had a “conversion experience” at the age of 19, and says that 
he was a “Jesus Freak” in the ’70s (complete with “bell bottom jeans” and 
playing in a Christian Rock band). Before doubts began to creep into his 
mind in 2005, he had spent 15 years as the senior minister at one of the 
largest congregations in the United Church of Canada, and was convinced 
that his religion was the “one true faith”:
To be a spiritual person just was who I was. My faith infused almost every 
facet of my life. I couldn’t separate it out and categorize it, and say that 
I was spiritual in this area but not in this area. It was just sort of who I 
was as a person. It informed everything, from my sense of humor to, 
obviously, my activities throughout the day—of course, I was in ministry 
so, I mean, it’s my job.
Prior Supernatural Worldviews – Disparate god Frames
Before they stopped believing, their worldviews consisted of supernatural 
cognitive frames. Almost all of them had conceived of God, to a greater or 
lesser extent, as a supernatural person who was capable of emotions (i.e., 
love, jealousy, anger), who listened to prayers, and who could intervene 
in their lives even though he (and it was always a “he”) existed “beyond” 
or “outside of” the natural world. Their god frames, however, were far 
50 SECULAR BUT NOT SUPERFICIAL
from identical. Most of the theologically conservative participants held a 
god frame clearly constituted by the image of the Judeo-Christian deity as 
described in the Old Testament. Kenneth and Daniel, for example, were 
both raised in extremely conservative Christian families. Daniel was raised 
Pentecostal, but drifted away from its major tenets after joining a small 
“Hipster” church (McCracken 2010) where the pastor encouraged him 
to enroll in a Southern Baptist seminary. Kenneth grew up in a Southern 
Baptist megachurch in Mississippi. At age 15, he was the first in his family 
to become deeply involved in the church when a friend invited him to 
an evangelical youth conference. Even as a teenager, Kenneth had always 
been “very passionate about studying the New Testament and studying 
the first-century church.” Both Daniel and Kenneth, along with others, 
held many traditional cognitive frames of a personal, supernatural deity, 
including the creator god frame and the loving father god frame:
Daniel: [God was] the creator of the universe, redeemer, person running 
the show. Especially at the seminary, I would have defined it as omni-
scient, omnipresent, separate from creation. You know, like, I would have 
used all those terms.
Kenneth: Well, you know, honestly it meant the traditional, evangelical 
Christian picture of God, that was singular creator, Trinitarian Christian 
theology. I believed God was a father figure. I saw him very much as a 
loving, caring person. Definitely as a person. Not just any person, but 
a person with whom you’re supposed to have a very deep and personal 
intimate relationship.
Those who had been theologically liberal also conceived of God as 
a distinct, supernatural being, but the god frame in their minds was not 
quite as well-defined or anthropomorphic. Aaron actually did not believe 
in the existence of a supernatural deity in his youth, despite the fact that 
his father was a prominent, progressive evangelical leader. He started be-
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lieving when he had a “conversion experience” in high school. Through-
out his years in ministry, he says his “theology kept changing,” and he did 
not hide that from his followers. Bethany was raised in a liberal Catholic 
family, with a strongly devout mother. She considered becoming a nun, 
but decided to study theology at a liberal Jesuit seminary, with plans to be-
come a hospital chaplain. Both Aaron and Bethany used more amorphous 
language to describe what might be called the general loving god frame:
Aaron: God was all-loving. That was the primary identification. I be-
lieved that there was a personal God who was trying to communicate 
directly with me. And I was doing everything I could to open up that 
channel of communication, and to hear that voice. Obviously at that 
point I was thinking there is this God, who is trying to communicate with 
people. I definitely felt there was a God out there.
Bethany: Initially, God was just this loving being that wanted so much 
to share his love with humanity, and that we were just bad, because we 
continually rejected it, but that God was always calling us to relationship. 
God never stopped being that separate being.
Cheryl’s god frame was even less clearly defined. She had been raised 
in a family that attended a liberal, social justice-oriented congregation in 
the United Church of Canada, where she says they never did things like 
reciting the Nicene Creed. Although she still thought of God as a being, 
in some nebulous way, the god frame she absorbed from her upbringing 
bordered on the metaphorical god is love frame:
Well, I think I had this idea that God was a being. But it was more—
like, we used language like “love,” and the conversation was always about 
“God is love” and stuff like that. So, like, there were no pictures of God 
around my church.
As she grew older, and especially when she attended theological college, 
her conception of God became even less substantial; by the time she grad-
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uated, she no longer thought of God as an ontologically separate being 
at all. Even though the god is love frame in her mind had become pure 
metaphor, the language she used when talking about God still carried 
the implication of something separate from, and larger than the natural 
world, something like the higher power frame:
There was this being which was morphing into a “force,” or a “power,” or 
something. Like, I didn’t think of heaven as a place where people went 
when they died and where God lived. Right? I would have said that God 
was explored as a concept at that time. But I know that I talked to my 
children about God. So I do think that I had a sense of a presence that we 
could draw on for support and for comfort and stuff.
These are only a few examples of the disparate frames among Chris-
tian believers for what is arguably one of the most foundational concepts 
of their religion. We see such a wide swath of contradictory god frames 
that it should be readily apparent to any social scientist studying religion 
that the simplistic survey question, “Do you believe in God?,” will inevi-
tably yield essentially meaningless results unless further questions clarify 
what the respondent means by “God.” Such frame disparity is not con-
fined to the “god” concept. As I will examine below, believers from dif-
ferent denominations hold disparate frames for the very institutions and 
activities that we collectively identify as “religion” and “spirituality.”
Gradual Deconversions
Many of the participants said that they had either always entertained 
doubts, or had started doubting early on. Several started doubting to the 
brink of disbelief as a result of the rigorous course of study they experi-
enced in their seminary training. Others only started doubting later in 
their careers. Regardless of when they started doubting, their journeys 
away from belief shared many basic features. Doubts crept into their 
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minds slowly but tenaciously, typically over a period of two to five years 
(sometimes longer), during which they read widely, reflected deeply, and 
struggled with the conclusions they eventually could no longer avoid:
Evan: We were taught that your sole purpose of being here on the Earth is 
“to glorify God.” And I’d never questioned that. I began to question when 
I was in my sophomore year in college. Well, I struggled and struggled, 
talked to different professors, tried to talk to my father, tried to talk to 
other ministers, and I didn’t get good answers.
In addition, some of those who had been theologically conservative de-
scribed emotional turmoil during the process:
Paul: My belief in God and Christ was all wrapped in a great deal of fear. 
And so when I was challenged, like, I was terrified. Because I realized my 
theology was kind of like a Jenga block tower—that all it would take was 
one of the more important blocks to be taken out, and the whole thing 
could come crumbling down. And I was really in a cold sweat, terrified 
over that.
The long journey out of supernatural religious beliefs, for all 15 par-
ticipants, involved a great deal of reading and discussion about theology, 
philosophy, and history. Most said that they started learning more about 
the physical and life sciences, citing specific physicists, cosmologists, and 
biologists who strongly influenced their worldviews:
James: I started reading Carl Sagan. Then I started reading and listen-
ing to all the lectures from Neil deGrass Tyson. Then I started reading 
philosophy. Going back to—I’d never read Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance. I started reading Plato. I just started reading everything I 
could get my hands on.
Some—especially those who had been theologically conservative—said 
that they began to learn facts about the Bible and the history of Christi-
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anity that they had never been exposed to, facts that contradicted what 
they had always been led to believe. Many also began, for the first time, 
to read religious and philosophical authors outside the literature of their 
own denominations. Some learned this information in seminary, others 
discovered it on their own as they attempted to answer nagging questions. 
Over time, they began to notice that certain beliefs no longer made sense, 
and that the answers offered by their religions were unsatisfactory (phrases 
like “didn’t make sense anymore” and “didn’t get good answers” were com-
mon). Eventually, the arguments against their supernatural worldviews 
simply began to make more sense. Finally, they came to realize that they 
no longer believed that a supernatural deity exists:
Bethany: God never stopped being that separate being. It’s just that, 
at one point I realized I was the architect of this deity that I claimed to 
worship. . . . And then, it was just a matter of me then reconciling myself 
to this new worldview.
Subsequent Naturalistic Worldviews
Once they realized that they no longer believed in the existence of a super-
natural, personal deity, they quickly came to the conclusion that nothing 
supernatural exists:
Luke: Do I believe that there’s an invisible sky god? No. Do I believe 
that there is a force beyond ourselves? You know, right now I’d say no. I 
pretty well think this is it. I do not for a moment believe that there is an 
external, objective spiritual force that’s acting upon us. I have no evidence 
that even suggests that.
When Luke says he does not believe that there is a “force beyond our-
selves,” he is referring specifically to the concept of a supernatural force, 
not merely a vague notion of “something greater than ourselves.” The dis-
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parate senses of that concept are a common source of confusion. Chris-
topher Lasch, in his famous work on narcissism, defined God in the fol-
lowing vague sense: “In religious terms, the revolt against nature is also a 
revolt against God—that is, against the reality of our dependence on forces 
external to ourselves [emphasis added]” (1978:244). Lasch was quite possi-
bly echoing Schleiermacher’s assertion that the “feeling of absolute depen-
dence” constitutes the essence of religion ([1930] 1999:12ff). Regardless, 
as Durkheim so painstakingly established, a sense (or feeling) of a “force 
beyond ourselves” need not be conceived in supernatural terms. We expe-
rience society itself, after all, as a force greater than ourselves, upon which 
we are absolutely dependent.
Several participants mentioned conversations with former colleagues, 
congregants, and friends who deny that they can possibly be content with 
life if they really think that no God exists and that no afterlife awaits 
them—a view we could call the nihilistic atheist frame:
Stephen: In dealing with people, both publicly and privately, it’s a com-
mon thing that I have to deal with. Because it’s impossible for some peo-
ple to wrap their minds around: “How can your life have meaning and 
purpose if there is no God?” And I say, well, all I can tell you is that it 
does, that life in and of itself—because I’m a sentient, thinking, rational 
being—does have meaning and purpose.
Fear of losing all meaning and purpose in life without God is a common 
theme of Christian apologetics (e.g., Warren 2002; Moreland 2009). Self-
styled “New Age gurus,” such as Deepak Chopra, often write of the need 
for some form of belief in a “higher power,” or “guiding force” that gives 
life meaning. Most often, this view is expressed in terms of “ultimate” 
meaning or purpose, not in the temporal sense of meanings that are most 
important here and now, but in the teleological sense that there must be 
either a deity or some kind of universal guiding force that has a grand 
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plan for the universe and guides all of life toward some ultimate, precon-
ceived end. As pastor Rick Warren put it: “The purpose of your life fits 
into a much larger, cosmic purpose that God has designed for eternity” 
(2002:21). Evan refuted that perspective in a calm, reassuring tone:
I’m 81 now, and in all likelihood, maybe another 10, 15, best chance 20 
years and I’m history. I don’t think there is any intrinsic, ultimate meaning 
to life. I think we create our own meaning. I just think we’re one hundred 
percent irrelevant as far as the universe is concerned. But as far as each 
other is concerned, we’re not irrelevant. The world, for me, is meaningful 
because of meaningful, human relationships, not divine interventions. 
And that’s enough for me. It may not be enough for some people, but it is 
enough for me, and it gives my life plenty of meaning.
The participants in this study no longer believe that such a deity, force, 
power, or disembodied mind exists. And despite the claims of people like 
Warren, Moreland, and Vitz, they do not think that such a belief is neces-
sary for a meaningful, worthwhile life.
After Leaving the Ministry
Although a few seemed “burnt out” on the ministry by the time they left, 
the majority expressed the sentiment that they still feel like ministers and 
that they still feel the same concern for deeper social connections and the 
desire to serve others:
Stephen: My counselor tells me: “You know, you’re still a preacher. You 
just changed the core of your beliefs. You’re still the same person who 
wants to help people.”
Some even consider what they are doing now as a kind of continuation of 
their ministry. Most transitioned to careers with similar characteristics to 
what they had been trained to do as ministers. Evan left the ministry at age 
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32 and earned a PhD in clinical psychology. Daniel had originally planned 
on entering the graduate program in family therapy at his seminary until 
it lost its accreditation by switching to a strictly “Bible-based” curriculum. 
He chose to attend a public university, earned an MA in marriage and 
family therapy, and currently works as an independent therapist. Rob-
ert now works for a community development organization that performs 
service work in Central America. And James, after receiving his M.Div. 
in counseling psychology from his seminary, went on to earn a PhD in 
genetics at a public university and now works in the health, nutrition, and 
fitness industry as an epigeneticist and sports psychologist.
While Kenneth said that he and another ex-pastor “sometimes joke 
about being ‘secular ministers,’” a few actually did go on to create new 
“ministries” in one form or another. After leaving Christianity, for exam-
ple, Aaron still felt the passion and concern that drove him when he was 
a minister. For roughly 30 years, his ministry had been focused on the 
cultivation of community in inner-city ghettos. He now channels that 
passion in another direction by volunteering as the humanist chaplain at a 
university. He feels that the need for this kind of community is only going 
to increase as more people leave religion:
I think that over the next 25 years, fewer and fewer people are going to 
be able to believe in supernatural narratives. And that casts most of those 
people out into the world where they will have no community, where 
they will feel disconnected. And so, the question that consumes me the 
most is: How do I inspire, train, bring together people, to show them 
how to build communities that transform people’s lives by creating an 
atmosphere in which loving relationships, and a sense of wonder, and an 
excitement about making the most of your life is supported and encour-
aged.
They all felt the absence in their lives of the kind of community that reli-
gious institutions provide. Many said that the community and fellowship 
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was one of the few things they missed from their past vocations, and that 
they recognized the need for such community among nonbelievers.
Impediments to Communicating Identity
When claiming social identity labels for ourselves, we attempt to choose 
words that we think will successfully communicate something important 
about who we are—something that we feel must be communicated if our 
identity is to be more fully apprehended by others. When the participants 
in this study were ministers, they had a simple, concise identity label that 
activated a cognitive frame with a vast range of identity characteristics. 
The christian minister frame instantly established a baseline for what 
kind of person they were—their basic worldviews, values, concerns, and 
so forth—and unmistakably indicated that their values and concerns were 
not superficial. After abandoning that identity, the participants of this 
study encountered difficulties as they struggled to construct a new iden-
tity. Aaron, for example, said, “I struggled a great deal with what to call 
myself when I first was done with Christianity.” James expressed the same 
frustration quite colorfully:
I’m trying not to identify with labels. And it’s just, what the fuck do you 
call yourself? [In a mocking tone:] “I’m a freethinker”? You know, that 
sounds like you farted on accident. [Laughter.] Or, “I’m a Bright”? You 
know? That sounds like you’re a Smurf! It’s like: What are you?
Efforts to construct new identities are greatly hampered by vagueness and 
ambiguity on many levels. In this section I will attempt to identify and 
explain the most salient impeding factors that emerged from this data as 
the participants dealt with the question: “What do I call myself now?”
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Sense Disparity and Frame Disparity
The fact that a word has multiple senses—known in linguistics as “poly-
semy”—is not, in and of itself, particularly noteworthy. Most words have 
multiple senses, and religious terms are not unique in that respect. Ordi-
narily, polysemy involves a word with multiple meanings that are related 
within a more or less homogeneous semantic field. The different senses 
of “secular,” for example, all refer to some aspect of that which is not re-
ligion (nonbelief, mundane objects, social institutions, politics, etc.). The 
intended sense of a word is normally clear from the context in which the 
word is used, and we have no need to begin a conversation explicitly de-
fining our terms. But that is not always the case.
By “sense disparity” I mean a state in which two (or more) sides in 
a discourse are using significantly different meanings for the most pivotal 
words and phrases within the context of that discourse, resulting in severe 
and persistent miscommunication. The two thus continue to “talk past” 
one another, either because they do not realize or choose to ignore the fact 
that they are referring to different things with the same words.
I have already discussed the distinction between the figurative and 
supernatural meanings of religious/spiritual words. We may casually think 
of these as related “senses,” but they are actually substantially different 
meanings. To speak of supernatural beings or forces intervening in your 
life is completely different from describing a feeling of inner peace or a 
personally transformative experience. This disparity regularly impedes the 
identity work of nonbelievers. When asked how they would respond if 
someone asked them “Are you religious?” or “Are you spiritual?,” many 
said that it would depend on what sense the questioner had in mind:
Aaron: I would say, it depends on what you mean by “religious.” If you 
mean, “Am I consumed with answering life’s ultimate questions?”, then 
I would go like, “Absolutely I’m religious.” And if somebody asked, “Are 
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you spiritual?”, I would say, “Oh, it depends on what you mean by spiri-
tual.” Because I’m definitely cultivating what I would call a “secular spir-
ituality,” but there’s not a supernatural bone in my body.
Thomas: I would have to ask them what they meant by that. If you’re 
talking about values, and the interconnectedness between people, sure. 
But if you’re talking about any reality outside the space-time universe, 
you know, what science can show, then no.
In other words, if the person asking the question is using “religious” or 
“spiritual” in a strictly figurative sense (“life’s ultimate questions,” “values,” 
“interconnectedness”), then they might be willing to accept those identity 
labels, at least in that context. But if those words are being used in the 
supernatural sense (“a reality outside the space-time universe”), then they 
reject them. (In a later section I will raise the question of whether it is 
possible to avoid the supernatural sense when identifying as religious or 
spiritual.)
The extreme ambiguity of the word “spiritual” has become somewhat 
notorious among social scientists, who often lament the ongoing need to 
“unfuzzy the fuzzy” boundaries of the ill-defined category (Zinnbauer et 
al. 1997). Most of the participants in this study were reluctant to use the 
label for that very reason—they feared that it would cause confusion, be-
cause others would most likely have different understandings of the word 
than they now do. Bethany and Robert, for example, knew their answers 
immediately when asked how they respond to the question, “Are you a 
spiritual person?”:
Bethany: No. No. I don’t believe in a “spirit,” so how can I believe in 
“spirituality”? I vacillate, but mostly I land on the side of, I think we need 
to retire that word, because I think it’s just too confusing.
Robert: I would not identify myself as a “spiritual person.” I think it’s 
too confusing. So if I say I’m a spiritual person, people make all kinds of 
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assumptions based on their perception of that word. I guess for me, when 
someone asks what you are, they’re wanting clarity, not ambiguity. And I 
think “spiritual” is pretty ambiguous.
Disagreements over the definition and use of the “atheist” identity 
label provide an example of how disparate identity and characterization 
frames can develop out of sense disparity. Nonbelievers often argue about 
the “true” meanings of identity labels such as “atheist,” “agnostic,” and 
“humanist,” and vigorously debate whether to accept or reject them. Evan 
expressed a common sense disparity for the “atheist” label, one that is ar-
gued incessantly in comment threads and discussion forums throughout 
the Internet:
“Atheist” . . . means somebody who has no belief in a supernatural being. 
Sometimes people think that atheists are people who claim, “I know for 
certain that there is no supernatural being.” And of course, the reality is, 
you can’t prove a negative. So, atheist does not mean somebody who is 
100 percent certain. It’s just somebody who has no belief in a supernat-
ural being.
It may seem like an inconsequential semantic distinction, but it is a per-
sistent point of contention between nonbelievers who call themselves 
“atheists” and nonbelievers who have disdain for that label (and some-
times for the people who use it). Disparate senses of a word, of course, 
activate different cognitive frames, leading to frame disparity.
By “frame disparity” I mean a state in which a communicator un-
derstands a word or phrase with one cognitive frame, but that same word 
or phrase activates a substantially different cognitive frame in the receiver. 
In the present example, the resulting disparate frames can be determin-
ing factors in the decision to accept or reject the various identity labels 
available to nonbelievers. With the first sense of the “atheist” label, for ex-
ample, Evan is describing the common absence of belief identity frame 
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for atheism—a frame held by many who decide to claim the “atheist” la-
bel. The second sense activates a common negative characterization frame 
which we might call the arrogant dogmatic atheist frame. This frame 
is often used by theists to characterize atheists as arrogant know-it-alls 
who claim to know something they cannot know with absolute certainty. 
In fact, that very characterization frame was one reason Aaron gave for his 
complete rejection of the label:
I’ve never used the label of atheist, and never would. . . . I think for a lot of 
people what atheist means is, “I’m absolutely sure there is no God.” And, 
you can’t prove a negative. And so, just on a purely intellectual basis, the 
best I could be would be “agnostic.”
Those two quotes illustrate a common issue for nonbelievers who are 
trying to decide how to identify after abandoning religious belief. Both 
Aaron and Evan are nonbelievers (neither believes that a deity exists) and 
ontological naturalists (neither believes that anything supernatural exists). 
Evidently, they both agree that “you can’t prove a negative.” They even 
both identify with the “humanist” label. Yet one identifies with the “athe-
ist” label (with the absence of belief identity frame) while the other 
rejects that identity label. Aaron rejects the “atheist” label not necessarily 
because he himself still holds the arrogant dogmatic atheist charac-
terization frame, but because he is all too aware of the presence of that 
characterization frame in others, and chooses to avoid that identity label 
in order to avoid being mischaracterized—that is, to avoid what I will 
refer to as an “identity misfire.”
In the previous example, frame disparity was caused by disparate defi-
nitional senses. Frame disparity can also result when individuals have in-
ternalized significantly different cognitive frames early on in life, through 
socialization in different subcultures or from different life experiences. For 
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example, when James was asked how he viewed atheists when he was still 
a Christian, a stereotyping frame instantly activated for him:
Gothic! [Laughter] You know? In a small town, if you were an atheist it 
was because you were just mad. You know. “There are really no atheists.” 
That’s what you believed in a small town. . . .  There’s just people who are 
upset about the church and about God.
Call it the rebellious atheist frame. James explained how he had be-
lieved that no one ever really disbelieves in the existence of God. In his 
understanding at the time, people who claimed to not believe were really 
just rebelling against God. In his small town, the “Goth” kids evidently 
became the prototype for that characterization frame. The rebellious 
atheist frame was most likely not the identity that the Goth kids in his 
hometown has intended to communicate.
Sense Conflation and Conflated Frames
By “sense conflation” I mean a state in which a word or phrase with signifi-
cant sense disparity is regularly used without any indication, from speaker 
or context, of which sense is intended, leaving the meaning in a state of 
unresolved ambiguity. When the word is used in this state, the multiple 
senses activate their respective cognitive frames simultaneously, thus cre-
ating a conflated frame in the mind of the receiver. By “conflated frame” I 
mean a cognitive frame comprised of two or more disparate frames fused 
into one, so that the sub-frames are always activated together, and one 
sub-frame is difficult to conceive of without the other. Religious terms 
are prime examples of sense conflation and conflated frames. The figura-
tive and supernatural sense is almost always left unspecified, the intended 
sense is rarely obvious from the context, and more often than not, both 
senses are intended or assumed. The word or phrase thus remains in an 
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unacknowledged ambiguous state, everyone involved in the communica-
tion left to their own interpretations.
Throughout her many years as a minister, Cheryl has talked and 
written about spirituality, and sometimes refers to herself as spiritual. For 
some time now, however, she has been conflicted about its use. At various 
times throughout the interview, she said she does use the term, and at oth-
er times she said she does not use it. Finally, she said that she is starting to 
avoid the word:
Because I have come to find the idea of spirituality intertwined with the 
concept of a supernatural being or power, it’s now a troublesome word for 
me. I don’t believe in anything that resides or exists in a realm “beyond” 
the natural world.
Why would its association with the concept of a supernatural being or 
power make it a “troublesome word” for her? The “intertwining” she refers 
to is sense conflation of the figurative and supernatural senses. It is trou-
blesome because when she uses the word, she intends for it to be under-
stood only figuratively, but the sense conflation prevents that by activating 
a conflated spirituality frame, and it would take constant vigilance to 
keep only the figurative spirituality sub-frame activated without the 
supernatural spirituality sub-frame creeping into one’s thoughts.
If we identify with the “spiritual” label, we cannot control whether 
or not the supernatural spirituality frame will be activated along with 
the figurative spirituality frame. That seems to be the sticking point 
for many nonbelievers who might otherwise accept the label. When the 
phrase “I’m spiritual” is spoken with no qualification, a conflated frame 
is activated: a conflated spiritual frame comprised of both the figura-
tively spiritual and the supernaturally spiritual frames, fused into 
one. As Fillmore (1976) and Lakoff explained, a cognitive frame is an 
entire package of beliefs, images, impressions, and other frames, all acti-
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vated together as a single unit. Thus, when the conflated spiritual frame 
is activated, both sub-frames are inevitably activated as one, so that the 
person automatically understands the word in both figurative terms and 
supernatural terms simultaneously. As we will see below, other religious 
terms suffer from this same sense conflation, and the continuous use of 
those words without qualification has resulted in conflated frames that are 
difficult or impossible to separate.
Identity Misfire
By “identity misfire” I mean the result of a frame disparity between the 
communicator’s identity frame and the receiver’s characterization frame, 
which leaves the receiver with a significant misapprehension of the com-
municator’s identity. An identity misfire occurs when an identity label 
activates characterization frames in others which differ is a significant 
way from the identity frame the label was intending to communicate. 
An identity misfire can be either detrimental or benign. The former could 
potentially result in a tainted or stigmatized identity. The latter could have 
no effect at all, or it could lead to an embarrassing, humorous, or even 
reputable identity, but an erroneous identity nonetheless.
I asked all participants if there was anyone with whom they would 
not use the “atheist” identity label. Bethany was one of the few who said 
no:
[Without hesitation] No. I mean, I’ve used that term to define myself 
in media and at conferences. And I think it’s an important term to use, 
especially in light of the legislation in Ontario, that atheism is considered 
a “creed.”
Bethany lives in Canada where (as others from Canada confirmed) she 
says she never feels any social stigma for identifying as an atheist:
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I’m an atheist. It’s just not an issue. Most Canadians won’t say to you, 
“Oh, you’re a heartless, horrible devil that is set on the destruction of the 
universe.” Most Canadians won’t say that. My mother will. But nobody 
else I know would [laughter].
In her social context, using the “atheist” identity label does not activate 
negative characterization frames in others, and so does not result in an 
identity misfire. On the whole, for those who had been theologically liber-
al, identity misfire was minimal, with little to no consequences. For those 
who had been theologically conservative, however, the identity misfire was 
often extreme, and the consequences severe. Loss of friends, loss of job, di-
vorce, bitter confrontations with family, and estrangement from children 
were not uncommon.
After Evan had left the ministry and started graduate school, his wife 
thought that his lack of enthusiasm for religious observance was just a 
phase. Eventually she came to realize that he was not going back:
After I had finished my degree and was teaching, and she realized that 
not only was I not going to church then, but that I wasn’t ever going to 
go back to church, that just, tragically, ended the marriage. She said she 
couldn’t put up with that.
His parents died just prior to 2000, having convinced themselves that he 
was “really still a Christian,” but that he “just didn’t still use the language.” 
His siblings, however, were another matter:
I have a brother and sister who are still devoted Baptists, and they have 
decided to break off all contact with me once my book came out.
That was over six years ago, and he has had no contact with them since. 
Note that Evan had stopped believing and left the ministry almost 50 
years ago, so his siblings had known that he was a nonbeliever for almost 
45 years, but had not cut off all contact with him until he published a 
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book about his nonbelief. Evan did not elaborate any further on that rela-
tionship. I can only hypothesize that proclaiming his nonbelief in such a 
public way must have amplified the stigma of it, and that was simply too 
much for them.
Identity misfire is not limited to discredited, tainted, or stigmatized 
identities; it can occur for those who communicate an identity frame that 
is normative or reputable. If someone says, “I’m a Christian,” for exam-
ple, that label may very well activate something like the intended good 
christian frame for most people (possibly evoking images of food pan-
tries, children’s homes, a Father Knows Best family life, and the like), but 
for some people it may activate the self-righteous bigot frame (perhaps 
evoking images from the 1960s of white Christians shouting and kicking 
black people attempting to sit at a public diner). Fifty years ago, the cath-
olic priest frame in most people’s minds did not evoke the pedophile 
frame along with it. Today it often does. For most people, the christian 
pastor frame would evoke an image of a benevolent, selfless man caring 
for the needs of his “flock,” but for others it might evoke images of tel-
evangelists and faith healers getting rich off gullible people willing to send 
huge sums of money (which could be considered instances of the more 
general snake-oil salesman frame).
The resulting misidentification can differ from one person to the 
next, depending on the connotations each person associates with the iden-
tity label. The communicator may use a label that is usually normative or 
reputable and be unaware that the label activates inaccurate characteriza-
tion frames in the receiver. Consider someone who identifies as a “spiritual 
person.” At a minimum, their spiritual person identity frame would 
contain some subset of the characteristics from the figurative sense of the 
word. They may hold the quest for meaning frame, for example, or the 
self-actualization frame. When they communicate that identity, they 
might intend for the receiver to think of them as a conscientious person 
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who cares about the welfare of others, who always strives to be a better 
person, and who is deeply concerned with the things that matter most in 
life. If, however, this person had said, “I’m a spiritual person,” to Paul or 
James in the early days of their ministry careers, that phrase would have 
activated the demonic spirituality characterization frame:
Paul: “Spiritual,” when I was going through seminary and so on, to me it 
had negative connotations, because in the Pentecostal church “spiritual” 
(or “mysticism,” or “contemplation,” things like that) was a very negative 
thing—even demonic.
James: Our spirituality was that we had a relationship with the only one, 
true God, and there’s nothing outside of that. And if you found yourself 
being spiritual outside of God, then that was evil. That’s not spirituality, 
that’s demonic. . . . Anything outside of Christianity. If you believed that 
you were spiritual in any form, . . . you believed it was true because you 
were being manipulated by demons.
Hence, in their relationships with Paul or James, identifying as a “spiritu-
al person” would result in a stigmatized identity—a detrimental identity 
misfire.
If, on the other hand, this hypothetical person had said to Cheryl, 
“I’m a spiritual person,” a very different characterization frame would be 
activated in Cheryl’s mind:
When I engage with people who identify as “spiritual people,” I often 
want to gag, because they’re engaged in these self-centered, self-fulfillment 
practices which are all about them having some kind of “spiritual high.” 
Right? They’re not about engaging people. So this myopic self-fulfillment 
stuff, which “spiritual practices” often are, I [find] little meaning in that.
For Cheryl, the phrase “spiritual person” activates the self-absorbed 
spiritual seeker frame—a frame examined in detail by Edwin Schur 
in his 1976 study of the Human Potential Movement, which he charac-
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terized as “a clear invitation to self-absorption” (1976:4). Hence, in their 
relationship with Cheryl, their identity would certainly be far from what 
they intended to communicate, but would not be considered “stigma-
tized”—perhaps merely discrediting. In both cases, the identity frame that 
the person had intended to communicate with the “spiritual person” label 
missed its mark entirely, activated an undesirable characterization frame, 
and resulted in an erroneous understanding of the person’s identity. The 
first resulted in a stigmatized identity, the second resulted in what I will 
call a “foiled identity.”
Foiled Identity
When an identity misfire is benign, I am using the term “foiled identi-
ty” in contradistinction to Goffman’s “spoiled identity”—another term 
he coined for a stigmatized identity. A foiled identity is not tainted or 
stigmatized, but it is fundamentally erroneous. The foiled identity may be 
considered inconsequential, and thus be of no concern, or it may be con-
sidered objectionable (and thus undesirable) to the person whose identity 
has been foiled. Cheryl, for example, had frequent experiences of the kind 
so often described by mystics—a dissolving in the mind of the boundary 
between where you end and everything that is not you begins. When she 
told a colleague about these experiences, he put an identity label on her 
that she considered objectionable:
Marcus and I did a week-long conference together, . . . and I shared [my 
experiences], and he said, “Oh, you’re a mystic.” . . . He labeled me as a 
“mystic” at that conference. Which really bothered me. . . . And I’m like, 
don’t give me that label. I don’t want that label. . . . Because to me, that’s 
like a hierarchy of special super-spiritual people. Right? I have an experi-
ence that is very similar to an experience he has had. . . . But his was an ex-
perience of “God.” Mine was something happening in my fucking brain. 
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Right? Like, it was not an experience of God. I never even thought of it as 
an experience of God, even when I was an adolescent.
Being labeled a “mystic” would not have been discrediting or stigmatizing 
in the context of a religion and spirituality conference. On the contrary, to 
the religious audience she was speaking to, identifying as a mystic would 
have been highly reputable. Nonetheless, Cheryl was angry that her col-
league had imposed that identity upon her against her will.
Aside from Aaron and Paul, all other participants said that they gen-
erally avoid identifying as either religious or spiritual. Robert explained his 
uneasiness with the “spiritual” label:
I’m nervous about using “spiritual” because it often still implies the super-
natural. Most of the time, when I really dig into what somebody means by 
spiritual, what it really means is: “I still believe all these religious things, I 
just don’t like the church very much”—people whose core beliefs may not 
have shifted very much, but who for whatever reasons are fed up with the 
institutional church, or institutional religion.
The type of people he is referring to are those who now typically identify 
as “spiritual but not religious.” Considering that most of the participants 
in this study often do and say things that would be considered spiritual in 
the figurative sense, the “spiritual but not religious” identity would seem 
like a natural fit. Not one of the participants, however, claims that identi-
ty. Robert chooses to reject it because he does not want others to assume 
that he “still believes all those religious things” (i.e., supernatural things). 
Kenneth has a problem with it because, as a category, he thinks that it is 
too broad, and he does not want to be “lumped” into the same category 
with believers:
When large polling groups, like PRRI or Pew, try to do studies to identify 
where people are on the belief spectrum, when they use terms like “spir-
itual but not religious,” you know, if you define that as people who are 
 FINDINGS 71
interested in ultimate questions, now you’ve got a huge lump of people 
being thrown in to the same group as other people who are theists, but just 
don’t like church. And that’s a problem. You know? We need more precise 
metrics than that.
If Robert Fuller’s figurative definition was the only one with which 
the word “spiritual” was understood—that is, if the only meaning of that 
word was, essentially, the opposite of superficial—the participants of this 
study could easily identify with it. I asked Kenneth if he could identify as 
spiritual using Fuller’s definition:
Um, I would provisionally agree with him. And what I mean by that is 
that, if what he means is that I’m interested in those ultimate questions, 
then I agree with him. I think my only hang up is that that word is used 
in such specific ways where I’m from, that I would want to make sure the 
word’s not miscommunicating.
Why be concerned with such a seemingly inconsequential miscommuni-
cation of identity, especially when identifying as spiritual but not religious 
would allow them to avoid the stigma of their nonbelief? They could easily 
use the words “God” and “spiritual” in the figurative sense, and not worry 
about the fact that the receiver might assume the supernatural sense as 
well. None of the participants considered that option acceptable, because 
none of them wanted anyone to think that they still believe in anything 
supernatural. Avoiding the foiled identity of “supernaturalist” is import-
ant enough to them that they are willing to risk the tainted or stigmatized 
identity of a nonbeliever rather than be identified as something they are 
not, no matter how reputable:
William: I would not identify as being spiritual, just because of the con-
notations that that word has. Spiritual in the sense of believing in some 
kind of “spiritual reality” apart from the natural reality—“life after death,” 
having a “soul” that lives on after the death of the body, stuff like that.
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Kenneth: For many people where I am, they believe that “spirit” refers 
to a second layer of reality—like, you know, an additional layer of meta-
physical existence that coincides with the physical. And I don’t believe 
that that is a real thing. So my one hang up about the word “spiritual” is 
that I don’t actually think that “spirits” are real things, and so I get a little 
bit uncomfortable with the word for that reason.
Although all the participants share most of the characteristics asso-
ciated with the figurative spirituality frame, they do not wish to be 
affiliated with any of the worldviews that the supernatural spirituality 
frame implies. In other words, they want to avoid an identity misfire that 
would lead to a foiled identity. Confusion is difficult to avoid when the 
word “spiritual” is rarely, if ever, qualified to indicate whether the figura-
tive or supernatural sense is intended. And the situation seems to be no 
better in scholarly discourse than in common parlance. Instead, even in 
the scientific study of religion, the word is almost always used without 
clearly indicating which sense is intended, the two senses are thus conflated 
in the single word so that it activates both cognitive frames.
Forms of Oppositional Identity Work
I turn now to combining the gestalt theoretical framework woven together 
in Chapter III with the theoretical concepts explicated above, and apply-
ing them to the analysis of oppressive and oppositional identity work. 
It must be said at the outset, however, that when discussing “oppressive 
identity work” I do not mean to imply that all (nor even most) Chris-
tians consciously or actively engage in oppressive identity work against 
nonbelievers. Nor am I implying that all or most Christians overtly agree 
with the negative characterization frames. As we saw in a previous section, 
several of the participants in this study had not internalized those frames, 
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because they had friends in their past who identified as atheists or non-
believers.
As Entman explained, however, frames can be located in the culture 
as well as individuals, and Christians can be the receivers of those frames 
through many channels—books, magazines, radio, television, movies, 
church pulpits, and of course Internet websites and podcasts. These neg-
ative cultural characterization frames against nonbelievers are generated 
not only by extremists such as Pat Robertson, Ray Comfort, and Dinesh 
D’Souza, but also by ministers from the pulpits, by journalists such as Cal 
Thomas and Ross Douthat, and by professional scholars and public intel-
lectuals such as J. P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, and Paul Johnson. 
The proliferation of such frames produced from the backlash against the 
New Atheists alone would make an interesting study in and of itself.
If an individual’s stigmatized attribute is not readily apparent, he or 
she must deal with how to manage the public information about that 
attribute. Societies such as the United States are saturated with these neg-
ative characterization frames of nonbelievers. In such societies, all non-
believers—regardless of which self-identity labels they choose to accept 
or reject privately—must decide whether or not to make their nonbelief 
publicly known. As Goffman put it: “To display or not to display; to tell 
or not to tell; to let on or not to let on; to lie or not to lie; and in each 
case, to whom, how, when, and where” (1963:42). The easiest way to 
avoid the consequences of a stigmatized identity is, of course, to avoid the 
identity altogether through concealment—i.e., to stay “in the closet.” Kelly 
Church-Hearl differentiated between two types of concealment as strat-
egies of private oppositional identity work: avoiding all labels (2008:54) 
or just staying silent/closeted (2008:57) with regard to the labels that re-
veal their nonbelief. All of her participants “indicated that they are, to 
some degree, ‘in the closet’ when it comes to their personal beliefs about 
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spirituality” (2008:57) and that those two strategies allow them to pass 
as Christian—or at least as participating in the American “civil religion.”
When operating in this way, completely within the private sphere, 
concealment can be considered the most basic form of oppositional iden-
tity work. A nonbeliever can go his or her entire life without ever publicly 
discussing the topic of belief in the existence of God or the supernatural. 
Just how many nonbelievers choose “not to let on” is, for obvious rea-
sons, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure. Nonbelievers who 
choose concealment, however, are not my concern in the present study. 
All the participants of this study are “out of the closet” as nonbelievers, 
and so are all engaged in one or many types of oppositional identity work 
in the public sphere. Oppressive identity work is directed, either deliberate-
ly or unconsciously, toward engendering a foiled identity at best, or a fully 
stigmatized identity at worst. Oppositional identity work is deliberately 
directed toward alleviating foiled, tainted, and/or stigmatized identity. Be-
low, I identify and examine four types of oppositional identity work that 
emerged from my interview data.
Avoidance Identity Work
Avoiding tainted or stigmatized labels is a simple and straight forward 
strategy for dealing with the negative characterization frames wrought by 
cultural oppressive identity work. The modus operandi of avoidance iden-
tity work is simply to avoid those specific identity labels that are most 
likely to activate negative characterization frames in others, resulting in an 
identity misfire. Most participants in this study are open about their non-
belief, but avoid the “atheist” label when possible, and do not generally 
consider it their primary identity. Instead, they typically use labels such as 
“freethinker,” “secularist,” “agnostic,” or “humanist.” While they prefer not 
to identify themselves as atheists in public, most said they would answer 
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“yes” if someone asked them directly. The following statements are typical 
of their ambivalence toward, and general avoidance of, the “atheist” label:
Kenneth: I mean, I’m willing to embrace the word atheist, because it 
is a correct statement: I do, in fact, not believe in any gods. It’s just that 
it’s such a limited term. I would only embrace it if there’s only one single 
point I’m trying to make.
Luke: Well, I’m reluctant to use the word at all. I do describe myself as an 
“atheist” even though I have difficulties with that. . . . If someone says, “Are 
you an atheist?” I’ll say, “Yeah, I am.” But I’m hesitant to even describe 
myself as an atheist publicly because of the negative connotations, the 
arbitrariness of it. There’s something about the word I don’t like.
Aaron, who had emphasized that “there’s not a supernatural bone in my 
body,” was the only participant who completely rejects the “atheist” label. 
When asked if he considers himself an atheist now, he answered without 
hesitation: “I’ve never used the label of atheist, and never would.” Asked to 
clarify his reluctance, his response revealed a common dilemma ex-Chris-
tians face when attempting to construct a new identity:
I struggled a great deal with what to call myself when I first was done with 
Christianity. Because “atheist,” to many people simply means “anti-the-
ist.” It means that you actively are trying to undermine other people’s 
faith and the idea of faith. And, I’m absolutely not trying to do that. Like, 
if people are happily believing in God, I’m happy to let them do that. 
And so, I’m not an anti-theist.
Like all nonbelievers, when deliberating upon which identity labels to ap-
ply to himself, Aaron had to take into consideration any possible negative 
characterization frames associated with the “atheist” label—in this case the 
anti-religion atheist frame—and decide whether or not he can accept 
being saddled with those characterizations. 
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Considering that Aaron now volunteers as a humanist chaplain at a 
university, his reluctance is understandable. Avoiding the negative char-
acterization frames associated with the “atheist” label is particularly im-
portant for him as he tries to build community for nonbelievers at the 
university. In such a position, he must be approachable. Anything that 
would put up barriers between him and the people who need that com-
munity would work against his efforts. If people at his university constant-
ly referred to him as “the atheist chaplain,” young students coming into 
the university with strong negative characterization frames about atheists 
could easily be put off by the label. The “humanist” label does not activate 
nearly as many negative characterization frames as “atheist,” so he chooses 
to use it as his primary identity.
Aaron’s rejection of the “atheist” label is not an attempt at complete 
concealment of his nonbelief. He is, in fact, very open about the fact 
that he no longer believes in anything supernatural, and he discusses it 
regularly in his humanist campus ministry and on a podcast he produces. 
So he is not avoiding the general stigma of nonbelief. Rather, he knows 
that the “atheist” label will activate the worst of the negative characteri-
zation frames in many people, so he chooses to not use that label at all in 
an attempt to avoid the identity misfire that would lead to a stigmatized 
identity.
Dissonant Identity Work
Some individuals approach oppositional identity work from the other di-
rection; they not only accept the tainted identity labels, they openly ex-
press them in a deliberate attempt to lessen their stigmatizing power. I will 
refer to this form of oppositional identity work as dissonant identity work. 
The modus operandi of dissonant identity work is to induce cognitive dis-
sonance within the oppressive characterization framework by placing into 
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public view individuals whose characteristics starkly contradict the negative 
characterization frames associated with the tainted identity. The concept 
of cognitive dissonance refers to the unpleasant state of mental tension 
that occurs when a new “cognition” (belief, image, attitude, judgement, 
etc.) contradicts a cognition already well-established in a person’s mind. 
When such a state arises, he or she is compelled to find a way to relieve 
that tension (Cooper 2007; Aronson 2008). As we saw in Chapter III, 
beliefs, images, attitudes, and judgements are the constituents of cognitive 
frames. So to describe cognitive dissonance in terms of framing: cognitive 
dissonance occurs because the human mind rebels against the presence of 
contradictory cognitive frames. Those contradictory examples force those 
within the oppressive framework to become cognizant of the gaping frame 
disparity between their characterization frames and the identity frames of 
those who openly identify with those labels.
In a culture saturated with supernaturalist cognitive frames, anyone 
publicly communicating nonbelief in the supernatural is engaged in dis-
sonant identity work to some extent. All the participants of this study, 
for example, came out of the closet as nonbelievers (if not “atheists”), not 
only to their friends and families, but in the public sphere, through blogs, 
podcasts, letters to the editor, and through newspaper, magazine, radio, 
and television interviews. Many even published books detailing their de-
conversion stories. By doing so, they challenged the established character-
ization frames about nonbelievers, exposing those frames as erroneous by 
offering themselves as living counter-examples, despite the backlash from 
those who would defend the challenged characterization frames.
Cheryl had been leading a congregation for over 15 years. The mem-
bers of her church were well aware of her naturalistic worldview, and she 
says that the vast majority shared in that view. Nor did she hide her views 
from her colleagues, many of whom, she says, are naturalists as well. Since 
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she was ordained in 1993, no one in the leadership or higher courts of the 
denomination concerned themselves with what she or her congregation 
believed—until, that is, Cheryl decided to call herself an “atheist.” As it 
turns out, living in Canada confers no guaranteed immunity against a 
tainted identity:
It was in 2013. We were doing an “Interview an Atheist at Church Day,” 
and we had the executive director of the Clergy Project coming, and she 
was going to be interviewed by me. And then the situation in Bangladesh 
became world news. One author had been murdered and four bloggers 
were subsequently arrested. And at the same time there was a pianist in 
Turkey that had been sentenced to 10 months in prison for being an 
atheist. So, I went to my board and talked to them about also being inter-
viewed as an atheist, and taking that label on. Because clearly I was one, 
and I’d been called that publicly. But I had never identified myself as an 
atheist.
On February 15, 2013, a secular blogger named Ahmed Rajib Haid-
er was brutally mutilated and murdered in front of his home in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh for insulting Islam (Chalmers 2013). Then, in early April, 
2013, four secular bloggers in Bangladesh were arrested for “hurting reli-
gious sentiments” (Winston 2013). And on April 15, 2013, international 
pianist and composer Fazil Say was given a 10-month suspended sentence 
for blasphemy by a court in Istanbul (Arsu 2013). Cheryl had always had 
a very strong sense of social justice, and cited that as one of the main rea-
sons she became a minister. These and other atrocities against nonbelievers 
stirred her to reflect upon why, after all these years as a nonbeliever, she 
had avoided publicly identifying with the “atheist” label.
The question of what identity label best represented her position on 
theistic beliefs had been a recurring dilemma, and her story provides a 
prime example of the felt need to avoid the tainted label:
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When I wrote my first book I know I certainly didn’t believe in a super-
natural being with interventionist powers. I identified as a “nontheist” 
in that book. Then, subsequent to that, I realized that a number of my 
colleagues also identified as “nontheist,” but they still had this sense of the 
supernatural. So, I didn’t want to call myself a nontheist in my second 
book. I didn’t actually identify as an atheist personally till probably right 
when my first book was published. Shortly after that was when I realized 
that the term “nontheist” was not working and that “atheist” would have 
to be the next term. But I didn’t want to use that in my second book, so 
I identified as a “theological nonrealist”—which is all verbal calisthenics, 
right?
Asked why she had decided against “atheist” and invented a euphemism 
instead, she simply acknowledged: “I think I anticipated exactly what’s 
happened.” Despite her social status as the minister of a thriving con-
gregation, despite all that she had done for her community, and despite 
everything she had written and spoken, she knew that publicly claiming 
the “atheist” label could (even in Canada) lead certain people to disregard 
all of it and to question her worthiness as a minister.
Eventually, her sense of social justice, agitated by the events in Ban-
gladesh and many others like it in other countries, was enough to over-
come her hesitancy. As a deliberate act of oppositional identity work, she 
decided to publicly identify as an atheist:
It was an act. I mean, my church taught me how to stand in solidarity with 
people. And so, when I did that, that’s exactly what I was doing. There 
are a lot of derogatory characteristics that are put onto the word “atheist.” 
None of those bloggers identified as atheist. They identified as secular, 
and the word atheist was attached to them in order to incite hatred.
Her choice to adopt the “atheist” label is a paradigmatic case of opposi-
tional identity work. As mentioned above, the atheist identity is mired 
by a great many negative characterization frames, which are reinforced 
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through many cultural communication channels. Cheryl’s story high-
lights the fact that oppositional identity work can either operate within 
the private sphere, staying in the closet as a personal defense mechanism 
against a stigmatized identity, or it can operate within the public sphere as 
a form of social justice for all who are affected by the stigmatized identity.
Although she had been open about the discredited and potentially 
tainted identity of general nonbelief, she had avoided the heavily stigma-
tized “atheist” identity simply by not using that label publicly. She knew, 
as a matter of definition, that she was an atheist, meaning only that she 
did not believe in the existence of a supernatural, personal deity (as she 
put it: “clearly I was one”). Up to that point she had engaged only in 
private oppositional identity work in relation to that particular identity, 
avoiding the label so that the oppressive identity work within the culture 
would not affect her. In this way she could safely stand outside of its path 
and avoid the gaze of those who—consciously or unconsciously—perpet-
uate that oppression.
By publicly identifying as an atheist, she chose to engage in opposi-
tional identity work in the wider public sphere. Stepping into its path, she 
immediately felt the gaze of those who perpetuate the oppressive identity 
work against atheists. Many people were not happy about such a promi-
nent minister identifying with such a tainted label. As she so nonchalant-
ly put it: “So, yeah. My denomination was very upset.” A few ministers 
within her denomination started speaking out against her. Others made 
attempts to instigate hearings in the higher courts of the church to deter-
mine whether her beliefs were “in essential agreement” with the denomi-
nation’s official articles of faith.
Cheryl says that most of her colleagues hold a conception of God 
based on the more impersonal higher power or spiritual force frames, 
and that many others share her purely metaphorical view. Despite the fact 
that they too do not think of God as a personal, supernatural deity, many 
 FINDINGS 81
of them still held the negative characterization frames toward the “atheist” 
label itself, which they absorbed from their culture:
When my church joined the Oasis Network, one of my colleagues sent 
an email out telling everyone that we had joined an organization “that is 
trying to kill church, and prevent conversation about God in the public 
realm.” Well, that’s complete crap. So I’ve been quite frustrated with my 
colleagues, who would never assume that Muslim meant terrorist, but they 
assume that atheist means religion-hater. And that’s a problem. And they 
don’t see that as an issue. They don’t see the similarity there.
The identity frames exhibited by Cheryl profoundly conflicted with the 
characterization frames of her opponents. The angry atheist and an-
ti-religion atheist frames led them to believe that all atheists are “angry 
at God” and want to destroy religion, yet here was a prominent minister, 
obviously not against religion, identifying as an atheist. The wretched 
sinner frame evokes an image of atheists living miserable lives of moral 
depravity, yet here was a minister living a reasonably happy life and deeply 
engaged with moral concerns. The lost soul frame evokes an image of 
atheists aimlessly wandering through meaningless lives with no sense of 
value, purpose, or self-worth, yet here was a minister with a clear sense of 
meaning, value, and purpose.
Because the mind rebels against contradictory frames, it is compelled 
to find a way to relieve cognitive dissonance. In the situation at hand, 
one option would be to deny the opposing identity frames and reassert 
the negative characterization frames in an attempt to reinforce them. 
In Cheryl’s case, that meant (1) accusations that she is really against reli-
gion (despite the fact that she remained the pastor of a congregation), and 
(2) judgements that she is no longer worthy of being a minister. Another 
option, however, would be to call into question the accuracy of those neg-
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ative characterization frames, and to re-evaluate the stigmatized status of 
the tainted identity. Dissonant identity work aims for the latter.
This type of oppositional identity work is not uncommon. For ex-
ample, in an attempt to counteract the negative characterizations of Mor-
mons during Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential run, the LDS Church used 
dissonant identity work in their “I’m a Mormon” advertising campaign 
(Goodstein 2011). Similarly, Richard Dawkins’ “OUT Campaign” (Ma-
cAskill 2007) and Todd Steifel’s “Openly Secular” campaign (Dawkins & 
Blumner 2014) both attempted to counteract negative characterizations 
of nonbelievers—the former with the “atheist” label, the latter with the 
“secularist” label. Some evidence does point to the veracity of such efforts 
to raise awareness in the general public of the prevalence of nonbeliev-
ers. Using longitudinal data from the World Values Survey, Will Gervais 
found that in most societies, perceived “atheist prevalence was negatively 
related to anti-atheist prejudice” (2011:546). Through two of his own so-
cial psychological experiments, he then found that anti-atheist prejudice 
was reduced among those with a higher perception of the prevalence of 
atheists in society (2011:549). Colin Koproske, too, found that “accep-
tance of [nonbelievers] will rely on Americans’ exposure to atheists and 
their opinions” (2006:49).
It remains to be seen, however, whether the extreme stigma of the 
“atheist” label can ever be overcome. The higher courts of her denomina-
tion did eventually hold hearings, and for several months after our inter-
view Cheryl was officially “on review” to determine whether she should be 
allowed to remain a member of its clergy. Subsequently, the Review Com-
mittee delivered their verdict that they consider her to be “unsuitable for 
ministry” in the United Church of Canada. She wrote the following after 
that final meeting with the Review Committee: “As a ‘nontheist,’ I was no 
threat. As a ‘theological non-realist,’ I was probably misunderstood. But as 
an ‘atheist’? How could that be tolerated?” The identity labels we choose 
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really do make a difference in the cognitive frames evoked by those labels 
in others.
Adaptive Identity Work
We saw above how the act of publicly communicating a stigmatized iden-
tity label can operate as a form of public sphere oppositional identity work 
by challenging the dominant characterization frames in an attempt to 
destigmatize the identity. Conversely, we saw that avoiding specific taint-
ed labels can operate as a form of private sphere oppositional identity 
work, to safeguard an individual against the stigmatized identity. When 
someone who is already out as a nonbeliever wishes to avoid a stigmatized 
label such as “atheist,” other identity labels must be found to counteract 
the generally tainted status of nonbelief. Aaron and Paul chose an option 
that we might call adaptive identity work. Its modus operandi is to adapt 
the meanings of the dominant identity labels by attempting to modify 
the cognitive frames that they evoke. Some of the participants—primarily 
Aaron and Paul—are attempting to reframe the “religious” and “spiritual” 
identity frames by redefining them in such broad senses that they can ap-
ply to nonbelievers as well:
Aaron: Religion to me, and at my university, is not a particular set of be-
liefs. Religion is the pursuit of answers to life’s ultimate questions. And so, 
I work at the Office of Religious Life, and I’m happy to be there. Because 
I’m trying to answer life’s ultimate questions too. I simply answer those 
questions within the realm of the natural world.
Paul: For me, spiritual is a person’s inner life that we nurture as we strug-
gle to understand mystery, and ourselves, and one another.
This may seem like a copout, as if they are taking the easy way out by 
capitulating to the dominant culture’s identity frames. In fact, one faction 
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within the online atheist community roundly scorns nonbelievers who 
choose this option, derisively labeling them “accommodationists.” Adap-
tive identity work, however, can be anything but easy.
Both dissonant and adaptive identity work operate by attempting to 
change conceptual frames within the dominant cultural framework. The 
dissonant identity work that Cheryl eventually took upon herself is an 
attempt to change the tainted characterization frames in the dominant cul-
ture. Conversely, adaptive identity work is an attempt to change the rep-
utable identity frames of the dominant culture. Recall, however, that social 
scientists who research intractable conflict mediation (e.g., Campbell & 
Docherty 2004; Shmueli et al. 2006) have found that identity frames are 
far more difficult to change than characterization frames. It could be said, 
then, that although avoiding the stigmatized identity labels may make it 
easier to endure, adaptive identity work of this kind is far more difficult—
if not impossible—to accomplish. 
Those who attempt adaptive identity work encounter two intermina-
ble difficulties, both arising from the extreme frame disparity between the 
established cultural frames and the new frames they are trying to establish 
in their place. First, because the labels already have well-established mean-
ings, the communicators must always qualify them by including a caveat 
of some sort to explain their alternative meanings and avoid misinterpre-
tation and identity misfire:
Aaron: I don’t like it that “religion” and “spirituality” get associated ex-
clusively with supernaturalism. So, all of those things, you kind of have 
to throw the word “secular” in front of them, or else, at this stage in the 
game, you’re gonna confuse people.
Bethany: I do use the word “transcendent,” but I always give kind of a 
disclaimer when I use it. So it’s always “like” transcendence. You know, 
that sort of thing.
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Cheryl: I use the word “sacred.” It’s one of the words I use regularly. But 
I define it every time I use it. So I say, “by which I mean something that 
is too important, or crucial, or central to our human experience for us to 
degrade it, or deny it, or risk losing it.”
Whenever a nonbeliever is using religious/spiritual language, “the caveat” 
is sure to appear at some point, in an attempt to avoid a foiled identity. 
Second, despite the caveat, they cannot completely avoid misinterpreta-
tion and identity misfire. Within their own communities they may reach a 
point at which they no longer need to qualify and explain their meanings. 
But when they use such language outside the communities, frame dispari-
ty inevitably leads to identity misfire. Cheryl noted that the people in her 
congregation experience this problem when they use words like “sacred” 
with people outside the congregation:
That’s how I’ve nurtured the use of “sacred” in my congregation. But I 
don’t know that they notice me giving them a definition every single time 
I use the word. So they might use that word outside of the congregation 
and have it misinterpreted. So if someone misunderstood them, and said, 
“But I didn’t think you believed in things coming from God,” they’d say, 
“But I don’t. That’s not what I mean by ‘sacred.’”
Paul’s story could almost serve as a stand-alone case study of the pit-
falls encountered in adaptive identity work, caused by the discouraging 
confusion of these despairingly ambiguous labels. His answers to my ques-
tions reveal the kind of continuous inner conflict caused by the frame dis-
parity of such primary identity labels as “religious” and “spiritual.” Within 
a year after leaving Christianity, Paul noticed what Aaron had predicted: 
many of his readers, after leaving their religions, found themselves “cast 
out into the world,” feeling disconnected, with no community. Before 
long, he found himself filling the role of a minister once again:
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I launched my website as a site where I could provide my resources to 
help people through spiritual transition. Instead, what happened was that 
a community started to form.
The sizeable readership of his blog had followed him through the years, as 
he chronicled his journey out of Christianity. Some had traveled that road 
with him, interacting through comment posts on his blog. Others, who 
had either already left or were in the midst of leaving Christianity, came to 
his site seeking support for their own journeys.
By 2012, Paul decided this community had outgrown his personal 
website and needed to stand on its own. He created a separate site that 
could more effectively facilitate community-building, and thus began his 
new “online congregation”:
My online community provides a safe place for people to achieve their 
own spiritual freedom and independence. I say it’s about “spiritual inde-
pendence” because I want people to find their own way of being spiritual, 
whether they’re in the church or out. It’s to be able to choose, and walk, 
and live out their own spiritual paths. There’s over 200 members at this 
point. It’s just online, so people from all over.
The members hold a wide variety of worldviews and identities. Some use 
the religious/ spiritual language, others prefer to avoid it. Some reject la-
bels such as “atheist” or “secular,” others embrace them. His role in this 
new ministry is more as a facilitator than a preacher. The community itself 
is based on the exploration of ideas and beliefs rather than adherence to 
doctrines, and Paul explores along with them rather than preaching to 
them, encouraging them to come to their own, independent conclusions. 
As he likes to describe it: “We all eat at the same table but we like differ-
ent things.” The few guidelines (“table etiquette”) include the following: 
have respect for “the inherent worth and dignity of every person;” treat all 
members “with respect, compassion, equality, and dignity;” do not make 
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assumptions about the beliefs or opinions of others—listen before you 
speak; and encourage all members in a “free and responsible search for 
truth and meaning.”
Paul recognizes that each member of his community brings a differ-
ent meaning to the table for words such as “religious” and “spiritual,” and 
that the disparity in meaning can be a significant source of communica-
tion breakdown. Truth be told, he says, he prefers to not use those labels 
at all. Such extensive ambiguity, he admits, leaves him wondering what 
anyone really means when they describe themselves as “spiritual”:
“Spiritual,” now, can mean anything from yoga to crystals to the Spaghet-
ti Monster to you name it. When somebody says they’re “spiritual,” I have 
no idea what they mean. I have absolutely no idea. And the same when 
somebody says they’re “religious.” I don’t know what they mean by that. 
Do they mean that they have a liturgical cycle in their life? Or do they 
meditate in front of a candle? There’s just all kinds of baggage with it now. 
That’s why I try not to use those words.
Several other participants expressed the same desire to avoid all identi-
ty labels, along with the reluctant acknowledgement that they cannot be 
avoided. Note that, although he says that he tries not to use these terms, 
he used the word “spiritual” four times in the description of his online 
community quoted above. Moreover, when asked if he would identify 
himself as “spiritual” to someone with a New Age worldview, he reluctant-
ly said that he would, because he feels that he has no choice:
I wouldn’t avoid the word. I can’t avoid the word. That’s my problem. I 
can’t seem to avoid it. I use the word “spiritual” only because I can’t think 
of a better one.
As we will see in the next section, the inability to think of a better word is 
a pervasive problem for nonbelievers.
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Some of the other participants had chosen to identify with the “hu-
manist” label, so I asked Paul if he ever uses that word, and what it means 
to him:
Paul: “Humanist” for many people would just mean “secular.” Although 
I appreciate the word, for me humanist implies the rejection of that soul 
side of life. If I were to say, “I’m a humanist,” I’m afraid it would give 
the impression that I’m rejecting all notions of “soul,” or “spirit,” or that 
whole side of things.
Interviewer: Okay. And when you say “soul,” do you mean it in the 
sense that there is an immaterial thing that exists, called a “soul,” or . . . 
Paul: Yeah. 
Interviewer: . . . or do you mean “soul” in a metaphorical sense? 
Paul: [pause] Inner life. For the inner life. A metaphor for the inner life. 
Yeah.
That exchange left me wondering: How does Paul actually conceptualize 
the word “soul”? What does his cognitive frame for that word consist of? 
Before I finished the question, he had agreed that “soul” referred to “an 
immaterial thing that exists.” But after considering for a moment whether 
or not he meant it in a metaphorical sense, he agreed with that also, saying 
that he uses the word as a metaphor for a person’s “inner life.”
Paul regularly expressed disparate frames for words with which he 
struggled back and forth. It was a perfect example of the kinds of inner 
struggles anyone faces with deeply ambiguous words. He had the same 
problem with words like “spirit” and “spiritual”: 
I can think of one atheist friend now who struggles to understand himself 
better, interpreting his dreams using the Jungian kind of way of analyzing 
it, and wondering how he’s connected with the rest of the world, and 
his dealing with the mystery of, say, death, and suffering, and evil in the 
world. That, for me, is a “spiritual” endeavor. He would not call it that, 
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because “spiritual” for him just has too many negative connotations, and 
it implies “spirit.”
Note the sense disparity present in Paul’s dual use of the word “spirit.” In 
the previous quote, he said that he was afraid the “humanist” label would 
imply that he is “rejecting all notions of ‘soul,’ or ‘spirit,’” which would 
result in an identity misfire. In that context, he used the word “spirit” 
(synonymously with “soul”) in the figurative sense, as a metaphor for “the 
inner life,” and to refer precisely to those characteristics he described his 
atheist friend as having in the latter quote. His friend, however, rejects the 
“spiritual” label because it implies “spirit” in the supernatural sense.
If the above description of my conversation with Paul seems dis-
jointed and confusing, that is no accident. It illustrates the effects of the 
extreme frame disparity of such vague, ill-defined, “fuzzy” words. Men-
tally juggling all those disparate frames leads not just to a fundamental 
breakdown in communication, but to a fundamental breakdown in cog-
nition. That is one of the pitfalls that makes adaptive identity work so 
difficult—and perhaps impossible—to maintain. The identity frames of 
the dominant cultural group are not only venerable and vast, they are also 
continuously supported and reinforced by that dominant group. And if those 
in the marginalized group continue to use the same language, as Lakoff 
pointed out, those words will continue to evoke the dominant frames, 
thus reinforcing them. In that respect, adaptive identity work can actually 
work against its intended objective.
Historical evidence is not on the side of adaptive identity work. For 
over a century, a handful of philosophers and theologians have been pro-
moting a philosophical position known as “religious naturalism” or “spiri-
tual naturalism.” In the modern West, the idea of religion without the su-
pernatural has enjoyed a rich history, with its roots in the panentheism of 
Baruch Spinoza and the pantheism of Giordano Bruno (Stone 2008:18). 
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From John Dewey and George Santayana in the first half of the twenti-
eth-century, to Ursula Goodenough and Loyal Rue at its end, those who 
identify as “religious naturalist” or “spiritual naturalist” have attempted to 
reframe religious/spiritual language so that it only includes the figurative 
sense. After all this time, however, the number of people who self-identify 
as “religious naturalists” or “spiritual naturalists” remains miniscule. The 
vast majority of nonbelievers, even those who are similar to the partici-
pants in this study, are reluctant to use that language. Aaron, for example, 
was the only participant in this study who even mentioned the phrase “re-
ligious naturalist,” and that was only in passing as he was trying to think 
of alternative labels. He does not primarily go by that label. The identity 
simply has not gained ground among the population of nonbelievers.
Alternative Identity Work
Almost all the participants in this study prefer not to use labels such as 
“atheist” or “agnostic” as their primary identities, because those words only 
identify them by what they do not believe and say nothing about what they 
do believe. Yet they reject the “religious” and “spiritual” identity labels, 
and prefer not to use any of the language associated with religion and 
spirituality, because the supernatural connotations of those words would 
cause identity misfires and lead to foiled identities. How, then, do they 
construct new identity that communicates nonsuperficiality after leaving re-
ligion? Some engage in dissonant and/or adaptive oppositional identity 
work. And although both of those endeavors help, each in its own way, to 
fight the oppressive identity work from the dominant Christian culture, 
they do not contribute to the creation of new identity.
By refusing to identify with the labels of either the negative character-
ization frames or the positive identity frames from the dominant culture, 
most of the participants are taking an alternative path to oppositional 
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identity work. The modus operandi of alternative identity work is to step 
outside of the current cultural framework by ignoring the currently ubiq-
uitous identity and characterization frames, and attempting to invent and 
cultivate an alternative identity framework. Figuratively speaking, they are 
refusing to play the game. Consider the following two examples of how 
William and Cheryl are engaging in adaptive identity work.
William still felt a strong desire to be a minister after his decon-
version, much like Aaron and Paul. Unlike them, however, William de-
liberately avoids religious and spiritual terminology. When asked if he 
considers himself “spiritual,” he gave a weary, somewhat exasperated sigh:
Not really. Only if we carefully define what we mean by “spiritual.” And 
I would argue that an atheist can be “spiritual” in a general kind of way, 
like Sam Harris talks about. But in most cases I would not identify as 
being spiritual.
Once he came out of the closet, William became more involved with the 
community of nonbelievers in his city. Over time, he recognized some-
thing missing, a need he felt he could fill. He started a weekly meetup 
group for nonbelievers interested in study, self-reflection, and discussion 
of philosophical, scientific, and even religious topics. He calls it a “secular 
Sunday school for adults,” and treats it as a sort of “secular ministry”:
I still consider myself to be a minister. I just minister to a different group 
of people now, with a different worldview. Because the way I look at it, 
even atheists need ministry, in the sense of having community and peo-
ple around them that care about them, and will look after their welfare. 
Because to me, that’s what ministry is all about. It’s the care and nurture 
of other people.
Contrary to Aaron’s definition of religion, this group’s rejection of the 
religious and spiritual identities does not equate with a rejection of “the 
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pursuit of answers to life’s ultimate questions.” Although, the way William 
describes it, the members of his group are not so much “seeking answers” 
as they are exploring the questions.
The group meets for several hours every Sunday for breakfast at an 
Irish pub, while William facilitates discussions based on a chapter from a 
book they are studying at the time. Past selections include such titles as 
Reason and Reverence: Religious Humanism for the 21st Century by Uni-
tarian minister William Murray, and Waking Up: A Guide to Spirituality 
Without Religion by Sam Harris (one of the original four “New Atheists”). 
Although those two books use the language of religion and spirituality—
albeit, in a figurative sense—the group thoroughly enjoyed studying both, 
and even agreed with most of what the authors had written. Even so, Wil-
liam says, they constantly balked at words like “religious” and “spiritual,” 
because the religious terminology implied too much of the supernatural. 
He said that most of them felt fairly comfortable with the word “rever-
ent,” because it carries far less supernatural connotations, and is common-
ly used outside of a religious or spiritual context. So, for example, if he 
was reading a quotation from the book in which the word “religious” or 
“spiritual” appeared, he would replace it with “reverent,” and that made 
the author’s words more palatable to everyone.
Cheryl has actually been engaging in extensive alternative identity 
work with her congregation for many years. For example, she stopped 
using the word “God” because it always carries supernatural connotations. 
She rewrote the prayers used by her congregation so that they do not refer-
ence a supernatural being. Although she is a paid minister of the church, 
she does not play the role of the authority that everyone must listen to 
and accept without question. Accordingly, her talks are no longer called 
“sermons,” they are now called “perspectives.” She explains:
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We call them “perspective[s]” (and there’s a bracket around the “s” at the 
end). So the idea is that I’m merely sharing my perspective on something, 
and you have the responsibility to take it and add your perspective to it. 
Like you’re interpreting it through your perspective. And then when you 
share it again, you’re sharing it with your perspective added to it. So it’s an 
aggregate by the time somebody talks about it someplace else.
Her “perspective[s]” no longer concentrate on “god talk,” and are not al-
ways centered around the Bible. Instead, she and other speakers focus on 
values:
There’re three things that we focus on as regularly as possible. When we 
come together on Sunday, we are reminding ourselves that we are ground-
ed in the interconnectedness of life, we’re guided by love as a value, and 
we’re there to grow in wisdom. So when I’m speaking, I am generally 
talking about something to do with our relationships—with ourselves, 
with others, and with the world.
She is in the process of gradually reframing the way her congregation 
speaks of all the various nonsuperficial practices at their church. This is 
not just a matter of changing the words they use. To make real change, she 
must change the underlying cognitive frames that constitute the meanings 
of those words.
Aaron’s decision to reject the “atheist” label, and his desire to continue 
using the “religious” and “spiritual” labels, was based in part on the fact 
that the “atheist” label only indicates what someone does not believe, and 
says nothing about what someone does believe:
If I simply say “I’m an atheist,” they go like, “Oh, I get it. You don’t be-
lieve in God.” And I’m like, yeah, yeah, but that’s not my “spiritual iden-
tity.” My spiritual identity is somebody who’s convinced that this life is the 
only one that there is, and whose response to that is: “How do I make the 
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most of it?”, and whose conclusion is that the way to make the most of it 
is to commit yourself to love and justice and wonder.
This was a common opinion among the participants—even among those 
comfortable with identifying as atheists. Most agreed with Aaron that the 
label is insufficient, and many choose to identify with the “humanist” 
label for that very reason. They see “humanist” as a positive label that 
identifies them by the values they hold rather than just by what they do 
not believe:
Melissa: I find the terms like “atheist” and “agnostic” to be sorely lack-
ing. Because it really just says what you believe about God, which I find 
to be very limiting and kind of useless. I prefer to be known more by how 
I engage with the world and the people around me. And so in that sense 
I would prefer to be known as a “humanist.” 
Stephen: Atheism, to a large degree, has nothing to offer. It’s just a lack 
of belief. That’s why I’m also a humanist, because I think humanism is the 
way forward. It’s humanism that gives me my ethical and moral frame-
work by which I develop my worldview.
Many nonbelievers choose to identify as humanists. But does the 
humanist identity sufficiently signify the nonsuperficial side of life and 
cover the same range of meaning as the “spiritual” identity label? William 
seems to think that it does:
Interviewer: In the past, when you said, “I’m a minister,” that identified 
the kinds of values that you held, your basic beliefs and worldview, and so 
much more. Is there one label that could do that now? 
William: [without hesitation] That would be “humanist.” Humanist 
carries the connotations of having a deep concern for relationships with 
others, and relationships with the world—you know, that type of thing. 
So to me, humanist takes the place of spiritual.
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Like other identity labels, however, “humanist” has the potential for iden-
tity misfire, because it has multiple senses that activate disparate cogni-
tive frames. At the opposite end of the frame disparity continuum from 
William, we saw in a previous section how Paul thinks of “humanist” as 
communicating “a rejection of that soul side of life”—which is to say, a 
rejection of that nonsuperficial side of life. Thus, we have two frames for 
the “humanist” label that are polar opposites. Whereas William interprets 
“humanist” as a suitable substitute for “spiritual,” Paul sees the “human-
ist” label as completely lacking the identity content he associates with the 
“spiritual” label.
The “humanist” identity label has also accumulated negative char-
acterization frames in other cultural contexts. In his study of the spiri-
tual but not religious identity, Robert Fuller delineated “three types of 
unchurched Americans”: the “spiritual but not religious,” the “religiously 
ambiguous,” and the “religiously indifferent.” The third type, he informs 
us, are “secular humanists,” whom he characterizes as follows:
About one in every seven Americans is completely indifferent to religion. 
We often call these people “secular humanists” because they reject super-
natural understandings of the world and instead rely solely on reason and 
common sense. [emphasis added] (2001:2)
He further asserts that “secular interests and activities . . . lack any concern 
with a larger reality” (2001:8). Whereas William had said that he con-
siders “humanist” a good substitute for “spiritual” in the figurative sense, 
Fuller—a professional religious studies scholar—dismisses the secular hu-
manist identity out-of-hand by characterizing it with what we might call 
the cold rationalist frame: people who “rely solely on reason and com-
mon sense,” and are seen as being “completely indifferent” to the kinds 
of values and emotional experiences commonly ascribed only to religion 
and spirituality. Recall that I quoted Fuller’s definition of spirituality as a 
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paradigm for the figurative sense of the term. Fuller suggests that secular 
humanists, such as Bethany, do not even fit his figurative sense because 
they “reject supernatural understandings of the world.”
Aaron, who now identifies as a humanist chaplain, originally had 
misgivings about the label because it activated another common charac-
terization frame in his mind:
Initially I wasn’t really drawn to “humanist.” I mean, we’re just animals 
like all the rest of them. And so the idea that I’m a humanist would make 
it seem like I don’t care about dogs, or about elephants. And I do. And, 
you know, there are other sentient creatures that grieve the deaths of their 
loved ones, or that have social contracts, and that share and that show 
compassion.
Those who have identified as humanists for many years are all too familiar 
with this characterization frame, because this way of characterizing hu-
manism is common among its critics (e.g., Ehrenfeld 1978:5; Hitchcock 
1982:61ff; Taylor 2007:299ff). With this frame—call it the anthropo-
centric humanist frame—humanists are portrayed as deifying human 
beings, or at least raising them to the status of the “highest good.” Cheryl 
was quite familiar with this characterization, and spoke of it with derision 
(affecting a righteous tone in her voice to imitate the people who say it):
I often call myself a humanist. And, then I have to explain it, because 
people say, “Well, you know, I don’t think humans are the be-all and end-
all.” Because, you know, in that early understanding of ‘humanist,’ that’s 
where they went. So I have to explain: “Yeah, well, it’s a broader under-
standing at this point in time.” So. Yeah.
Many of these ex-ministers do, in fact, identify as humanists now. 
The “humanist” label seems to be the main contender to replace my “non-
superficial” placeholder as an alternative label for the figurative senses of 
religious and spiritual. But even those who identify with it recognize that 
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it does not fully communicate their identity. To echo Jürgen Habermas 
(2010), they have an awareness of something missing:
Evan: Those of us who have experienced a deconversion and no longer 
are believers— when at one point we were not only believers but very, 
very committed and involved believers—belonging to a religious group 
becomes an extended family. And to replace that is not an easy thing to 
do, even when you have secular groups that you belong to. Where I live 
there is a very strong humanist community. We have our own building, 
and two Sundays a month we have a meeting, where we will have various 
speakers, and then usually have a breakfast or lunch together. And that 
somewhat takes the place of it. But it’s not quite the same thing, because 
the emotional component of being a member of a church, or of any strong 
religious denomination, is so important.
That “emotional component” that comes with a large community 
with tightly integrated cognitive frames of meaning was mentioned by 
others as well. Melissa expressed this same frustration:
I miss the community. I really do. I miss—I miss singing. Like, I miss 
singing about stuff that has meaning to me, and singing about more than 
just —— I’m in a choir, you know, but that’s just words, that’s technique, 
you know. . . . And it scratches an itch, to a point. But you know, it’s not 
the same, because I’m not in the same place anymore. But I do, I miss the 
community. . . . That’s a cultural experience to me, that I will never have 
again.
On one of his podcasts, Aaron said that his efforts as a humanist chap-
lain are directed toward building “something that [is] thoroughly secular, 
and yet emotionally resonant.” He means “secular” in the sense of absence 
of religion, not antithesis of religion. In other words, he wants it to be 
secular but not superficial. It may be that the humanist identity frame 
does encompass all of the meanings and values included within the figu-
rative spirituality frame, but that in practice, humanism has difficulty 
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delivering all of the interpersonal connection and emotional support of a 
community that institutional religions successfully produce.
Before his deconversion, Paul could tell people, “I’m a pastor,” and 
that identity would communicate a great many things about him—most 
notably, the fact that his chief concerns are with the nonsuperficial side of 
life (“that soul side of life”, as he put it). I asked him if he had found any 
new labels that could communicate those same aspects of his identity that 
the “pastor” label had:
[Laughter] My wife and I talk about this all the time because, like, just 
last Saturday we went to a wedding where we were going to be sitting at 
a table with a bunch of people we didn’t know at the reception. And I’m 
like, “Honey, what am I gonna tell them what I do?” [laughter] And we 
always struggle with that. I don’t want to just say, “I’m involved with spir-
ituality.” That has a lot of implications, right? So I am nervous when I get 
to the “spiritual” part. When I say I’m an artist, people usually get that. 
But when I say, “I critique what’s wrong with the Church, and Christi-
anity, and belief,” then that’s like throwing a little grenade in there. You 
know?
I then asked him, if someone with a New Age worldview were to read the 
description of his online community (in which he used the word “spiritu-
al” four times), does he think they might assume it was a New Age group?
They probably would. And that’s why I have a problem using any of these 
words. Like “believe.” Somebody says, “Are you a believer?” I know if I 
say “Yes” then they’re gonna imagine a whole world of what that means, 
right?
In that short quote, Paul describes the fear of identity misfire and the 
desire to avoid a foiled identity shared by most of the participants in this 
study. This is the conundrum faced by anyone who chooses to avoid the 
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“religious” or “spiritual” labels, but who has what could be described as a 
religious or spiritual temperament or personality.
The following exchange with Melissa, worth quoting in its entirety, 
encapsulates the entire problem I have been investigating:
Interviewer: So then the question is, what kind of language can we use, 
without falling back on religious/spiritual language, to express our—for 
lack of a better term, our “ultimate concerns”? Without the religious and 
spiritual language, how do we talk about that side of ourselves? 
Melissa: Yeah. I actually wrote about the idea of “transcendence,” or 
wonder, or awe. And part of my argument has always been that one of the 
huge limiting factors of the “atheist community,” one of the challenges 
is that, within that group of people, there are a lot of people who are 
very—they’re feelers—or they’re, like, the artistic types. They’re the people 
like my husband, who will probably never call himself an “atheist,” even 
though he doesn’t believe there’s a god. And “agnostic” is probably even 
a little bit too harsh for him. Because he’s an artist, he’s a feeler. He was 
always the one who experienced God in a much more emotional way—
deep in his soul, you know. Where is the place for those people in atheism? 
Because we still have those feelings. We still look up at the stars and think 
about how far away they are, and just—how do you describe that feeling? 
And there’s just so many moments of awe, and transcendence, and won-
der, and, and—for lack of a better way of putting it: spiritual! You know: 
spiritual experiences. But, you know, they’re NOT “spiritual” experiences! 
[laughter] But there’s no other way to describe it! [laughter] 
Interviewer: Right. So your husband doesn’t want to use the words “ag-
nostic” or “atheist” because those imply that all of that is absent? 
Melissa: Yes. Exactly! 
Interviewer: Okay. And if you talk about that with a word like “tran-
scendence,” then what are people going to assume? 
Melissa: Yeah! [laughter] Yeah. That you’re crazy, probably. [laughter] 
Because then it becomes this, like, “WOOOOO”—kind of, you know, 
out there. 
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Interviewer: “Woo.” [laughter] Right. So let’s say you’re talking to 
somebody who’s New Agey, and you use words like “transcendent” or 
“spiritual,” what are they going to assume you mean by those words? 
Melissa: Yeah! Yep. Yep. 
Interviewer: So if you want to talk about, all of that, what words do you 
have? Because to non-humanists, “humanist” doesn’t really communicate 
that aspect about us. 
Melissa: No! And even if you go into it so far as to explain it to somebody 
in great depth, they’re still just like: “Well, isn’t that just like being a good 
person?” And, you know — yeah. But there is a philosophical underpin-
ning to being a good person. Like, what compels you to be a good person? 
What do you believe about that world, and about humanity’s role in the 
world that makes you be a good person? Like, what does that even mean? 
Interviewer: Yeah. And even the American Humanist Association has 
adopted this slogan of “Good Without God” from Greg Epstein. But is 
that all humanism really means, that you’re good without God? And if 
that’s the case, if that’s all humanism is communicating, then how do we 
communicate…
[Simultaneously] 
Interviewer: …the rest. 
Melissa:        …the rest. 
Melissa: Yeah! Yeah, exactly! It is! It is complicated.
Complicated it most certainly is. To say that “spiritual experiences” are not 
“spiritual experiences”? Such a statement is difficult to comprehend unless 
we recognize that she is contending with two highly disparate senses of the 
word “spiritual” within a single thought. What she was saying, if we parse 
out the senses, is that those moments of awe and wonder are “figurative 
spiritual experiences,” but not “supernatural spiritual experiences.” Many 
of the other participants also mentioned these kinds of experiences:
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Stephen: I do think, you know, I can sit out on the swing on a starry 
night and look up and you know, you see this awesome, wondrous sky, 
and you realize it goes on for light years, you know, and you can’t help but 
have a sense of wonder about those things. 
Luke: You can be an atheist and you can be moved by music, or moved 
by a mountain, in a way that sometimes is hard to put into words. You 
know. I could be moved to tears by a piece of classical music. And, where 
did those tears come from? I don’t know. So, you know, there’s some-
thing about us as human beings that can be very mysterious. And I try to, 
sometimes, to plumb that, to try to understand that. But I think that just, 
again, how I’m wired.
Bethany: For me, moments of awe are all about things that resonate—
things that are kind of the universal emotional events. . . . All of those little 
things, from the birth of my son to being there as someone is dying and 
just spending time with them in their final moments. All of those things 
matter, and it evokes the same emotion in me as they would in other 
people who call themselves religious. And I think religious people might 
find that shocking.
If we do not want to call such experiences “spiritual,” due to the 
supernatural connotations, what then do we call them? When I put that 
question to each of the participants, it was almost always met with long 
silence, but I could hear those proverbial wheels turning as they tried to 
come up with an answer, only to find that they could not. The part of my 
conversation with Luke just prior to the quote above is a good example:
Luke: I try to keep an open mind about meditation. But again, for me 
personally, I would not therefore call myself a “spiritual person.” Because, 
again, everybody’s got their understanding of what that means. . . . But, 
for me, if being spiritual means that there’s some sort of an external force 
in the universe out there, or force that I’m connecting with? No, I don’t 
really see it that way. 
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Interviewer: Okay. So, if you were talking with someone else who you 
knew was also an atheist who doesn’t typically use the religious language 
like that, what language would you use to describe that side of you that 
is interested in the—for lack of a better term—the deeper meanings of 
life, for example? 
Luke: [Long pause…]  Hmm.  [Long pause…]  Um.  [Longer pause…]
Interviewer: So, I think other people would say, “I’m spiritual,” right? 
And to them that kind of encompasses all that. But if you don’t want to 
say you’re “spiritual”—because, as you said, if you’re talking to an athe-
ist, they might interpret that as you saying you believe in supernatural 
spirits—how would you describe that to other atheists—other nonbeliev-
ers—other “nonsupernaturalists”? 
Luke: [Long pause…]  Um.  [Long pause…]  [Laughter] I really am 
thinking here! [laughter]. Uhhh. I guess I would [Pause.] [Sigh.] I would 
[Pause.] If somebody is an atheist and I’m trying to describe my openness 
to the deeper questions and the deeper experiences of life? I guess I would 
just try to phrase it that way. I’m not sure what labels I could use.
In his classic study of religious experiences and values, Abraham 
Maslow acknowledged the difficulty presented by our limited vocabulary. 
Lacking a neutral label as a reference for nonreligious people who are, 
nonetheless, “aware of Tillich’s ‘dimension of depth’” (i.e., nonsuperficial), 
he awkwardly referred to them as “serious” people, and put that word, 
along with the word “religionize,” in quotation marks to indicate that he 
recognized their inadequacy:
[It is] my impression that “serious” people of all kinds tend to be able to 
“religionize” any part of life, any day of the week, in any place, and under 
all sorts of circumstances. . . . Of course, it would not occur to the more 
“serious” people who are non-theists to put the label “religious experienc-
es” on what they were feeling, or to use such words  as “holy,” “pious,” 
“sacred,” or the like. (Maslow [1963] 1970:31)
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Indeed, one of Maslow’s stated goals was “to demonstrate that spiritual 
values have naturalistic meaning, . . . that they do not need supernatural 
concepts to validate them” ([1963] 1970:4). By the time he wrote the 
preface to the 1970 reprint, he confessed that he had been unable to find 
a better label for such people. “Existentialism,” he conceded, “is used in so 
many different ways by different people, . . . [that] the word is now almost 
useless, in my opinion, and had better be dropped. The trouble is that I 
have no good alternative label to offer” ([1963] 1970:xvii). Scholars today 
who have taken up the mantle of studying this topic are still struggling to 
find an adequate moniker for such people.
Alternative identity work is essentially the same method of social 
change advocated by George Lakoff in his book, Don’t Think of an Ele-
phant (2014). Applying his cognitive frame analysis techniques to politics, 
he explained how, over the past several decades, conservative politicians 
have established the language used in political discourse, and thus deter-
mined which cognitive frames are activated for various hot-button issues. 
(For example, referring to tax cuts as “tax relief ” activates a tax relief 
frame, which evokes a feeling of being afflicted by something that needs 
to be relieved. The politician can then position himself as the one who can 
provide that relief.) He explained that if you continue to use the language 
of your opponents, even when arguing against them, you will continue to 
activate those frames, and thus reinforce them: “When you argue against 
someone on the other side using their language and their frames, you are 
activating their frames, strengthening their frames in those who hear you, 
and undermining your own views” (2014:xii).
Lakoff’s advice, then, is to stop using the words of the opposition en-
tirely, and to work toward creating new words with new frames, based on 
your own values: “Because language activates frames, new language is re-
quired for new frames. Thinking differently requires speaking differently” 
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(2014:xiii). The question then becomes: How do we develop new identity 
labels, and new cognitive frames to give substance to those labels? All of the 
participants recognized the problem, but none could think of a solution:
Thomas: I realize the problem. Because if we don’t have the language, use 
the language, maybe at times insist upon it, we leave ourselves below the 
radar. I think we need new words, but I just don’t know what they are. . . . 
[When I was a Christian] I used the language that I felt was meaningful. 
But also, that language had a long history that I did nothing to create. I 
think we’re at that point. I don’t even know how we change the conversa-
tion on this. I really don’t. But I do think that working on it is better than 
throwing up our hands and not. 
Cheryl: I think it’s because we don’t yet have a word that replaces “spiri-
tual” that doesn’t have that “otherworldly” connotation. This is part of the 
challenge. You know? I don’t really know a word for that. But what we’re 
talking about, it’s when you explore what makes us human, and how can 
we make that experience rich and vibrant. . . . I think that we really have to 
find language to talk about that.
Ryan Cragun and Barry Kosmin (2011) may have been on the right 
track when they suggested that we already have the language—that it can 
be found in the many forms of human expression already employed by 
the well-established tradition of the humanities. In their critique of a book 
by Alexander and Helen Astin and Jennifer Lindholm (2010) that rec-
ommends teaching “spirituality” to college students, Cragun and Kosmin 
pointed out a glaring omission:
The crux of their argument is that colleges do not attend to the “inner” 
self; they offer students insufficient opportunities to develop self-aware-
ness. Strangely, that this is one of the key aims of the humanities in the liberal 
arts curriculum is not mentioned. Instead, it is implied that in order to de-
velop “self-awareness,” students need religion. [emphasis added] (2011:1)
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In other words, plenty of “wisdom” has been expressed—independent 
of any religious or spiritual traditions—by wise, thoughtful individuals 
throughout history, across many cultures, and through many different 
styles of communication—philosophy, literature, music, art, poetry, dra-
ma, etc. Bethany, the only participant to respond to that question without 
hesitation, had essentially the same idea:
Bethany: It seems like the language of “faith” is kind of like a dead lan-
guage to me, almost the way that Latin is for the world. That’s really how 
the wordage, and verbiage just doesn’t —— it just —— it’s an outdated 
dictionary. 
Interviewer: Interesting. So what kind of language have you found to 
replace it? 
Bethany: I would say that the English language is filled with wonder-
ful ways to describe something that you find meaningful. I mean, I talk 
about values a lot, because I think people understand values. And I think 
they understand the words like kindness, and compassion. There are a lot of 
these simple words that we use on a regular basis that very, very adequately 
represent the meaning of the hoohah that I used to use. And the other 
thing is that they make sense. They don’t need to be decoded.
Of all the types of oppositional identity work identified by this study, 
alternative identity work might have the best chance of affecting real, last-
ing change. Avoidance of volatile identity labels, of course, only helps in-
dividuals in the short term. Dissonant and adaptive identity work are both 
attempts to change long-standing cultural frames (characterization frames 
and identity frames, respectively). Although changes of that nature are not 
unheard of, we know from the literature on intractable conflict mitigation 
that such changes are extremely difficult, and limited in their effectiveness 
and scope. The religious and spiritual identity frames, and the vari-
ous nonbeliever characterization frames, may prove to be impossible to 
change, at least not to the degree required. And even if they are changed, 
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the old frames for those words will continue to linger and resurface. As La-
koff said, “framing is social change.” By the same token, framing is identity 
change. Finding new language to express values and meanings without su-
pernatural connotations would take a coordinated, cooperative effort, and 
could take many generations to yield meaningful results. But creating new 
frames seems to be the only way to eventually leave the old frames behind.
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
Sense Conflation, Conflated Frames, and the Study of Religion
A specific genre of inspirational literature uses deliberate sense 
conflation as a literary device. New Age and psychiatric spirituality au-
thors such as Deepak Chopra, Thomas Moore, and M. Scott Peck, reg-
ularly use words such as transcendent, spirit, and soul without explicitly 
stating whether they mean something supernatural or not. The power of 
this literary device comes from carefully using the words in such a way 
that the reader can interpret them figuratively or literally, or both. The 
word “soul,” for example, is a key term throughout all of Moore’s books, 
but he never explicitly states whether this term refers to some supernat-
ural, disembodied mind that exists after the body dies, or whether he is 
simply using the word in a figurative sense. By using a word like “soul” in 
this way, readers are free to supply their own interpretations. Thus, in the 
minds of a devout Christian or a New Age practitioner the word might 
activate both the figurative soul and supernatural soul frames (the 
conflated soul frame), but only activate the figurative soul frame in 
the mind of a secular humanist—and all three can get something of value 
from reading the book.
Such deliberate use of sense conflation is a perfectly acceptable tech-
nique for the self-help and inspirational spirituality genres, and it makes 
for a fine literary device in poetry and creative writing (including the reli-
gious/spiritual variety). But for the academic study of religion—especially 
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the scientific study of religion—such imprecise language is antithetical to 
the goal of cogent analysis. Far too often, professional social scientists, 
philosophers, and religious studies researchers use words such as spiritual, 
transcendent, soul, divine, and sacred without ever explicitly stating wheth-
er they are using the terms figuratively/metaphorically. Consider the fol-
lowing two examples.
Kelly Besecke has done brilliant sociological research on people hav-
ing nonsuperficial conversations “in otherwise ‘secular’ settings such as 
bookstores, lecture halls, movie theaters, and cafes” (2005:181). To in-
dicate that these conversations are more than secular (i.e., more than su-
perficial), she spreads the category of “religion” around such activity by 
interpreting it as a form of invisible religion (Luckmann 1967), defining 
religion broadly as “a societal conversation about transcendent meaning” 
(2005:181). Nowhere throughout her writings could I find an explicit 
statement indicating whether “transcendent” is meant to be understood in 
an ontological, supernatural, otherworldly sense or a metaphorical, figura-
tive sense that could include a “this-worldly” notion of transcendence. She 
does, however, define “transcendent meaning” in terms that clearly imply 
some kind of inherent purpose or significance built-in to the universe:
The idea of transcendent meaning implies an ultimate context, beyond 
other contexts, that provides eternal, cosmic significance. . . . ‘[T]he tran-
scendent’ refers to a context for life that exists on a plane beyond apparent 
reality (2002:32).
With the figurative and supernatural senses left conflated, readers are 
left to their own interpretations. Although Besecke avoids the term “su-
pernatural,” I am not sure what else she could mean by a “plane beyond 
apparent reality” on which a “context for life” exists. She never elaborates 
upon just where this plane might be located, nor of what unknown sub-
stance such a plane might consist, but she clearly indicates that it is not 
 DISCUSSION 109
something of the natural world. Nor is it clear what the word “plane” even 
means in this context. Are we to think of something akin to the supernat-
ural realms of existence in the Dungeons & Dragons fantasy role-playing 
game—the “Astral Plane” and “Ethereal Plane”? Use of such language ob-
fuscates rather than clarifies intended meaning.
Peter Berger’s seminal work, The Sacred Canopy, has been a staple of 
religious studies curricula for over forty years. Part of its appeal as a broad-
ly applicable work of scholarship in the study of religion is its neutral and 
naturalistic approach to the subject. It is neither an apologetic for any 
one religion, nor a polemic against religion in general; rather, it offers an 
intriguing metaphorical model with which to conceptualize such a com-
plex social phenomenon. Berger does not explicitly indicate whether or 
not he is talking of something supernatural with concepts like the “sacred 
canopy.”
Berger’s ambiguity on that point came back to bite him, as it were: 
within two years after its publication, Berger felt misgivings about the way 
he had portrayed religion. He realized that the book “read like a treatise 
on atheism,” and that it could “easily be read . . . as a counsel of despair 
for religion in the modern world.” Worried about “the possible effect of 
The Sacred Canopy upon the unwary reader” (1969:ix–x), he wrote a cor-
rective sequel—A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of 
the Supernatural—in which he defended the importance of supernatural 
belief to religion, explaining that “the term, particularly in its everyday 
usage denotes a fundamental category of religion, namely the assertion 
or belief that there is an other reality, and one of ultimate significance for 
man, which transcends the reality within which our everyday experience 
unfolds” (1969:2).
Sense conflation also has a deleterious effect on quantitative research. 
The Pew Forum’s survey question, “Do you believe in God or a universal 
spirit?”, is an excellent example of a survey measure gone awry by inatten-
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tiveness to sense conflation. The vast majority of believers conceive of the 
word “God” with one or more varieties of the supernatural, personal 
deity frame, an ontologically real being with a personality, who created 
the universe, cares for human beings, listens to prayers, and acts in the 
world (Hutsebaut & Verhoeven 1995; Barrett & Keil 1996; Kunkel et al. 
1999)—that is, an ontological sense of the word “God.” A relatively small 
segment of believers conceives of the same word in a broad, non-personal 
sense, typically articulated with phrases such as “higher power,” “guiding 
force,” “universal spirit,” and so forth. These divergent meanings are dis-
tinct enough that it is fair to say that belief in the existence of a “universal 
spirit” is not at all the same as belief in the existence of a “supernatural, 
personal deity.” The Pew Forum, however, asks a single question for both 
concepts, then conflates the two into the single word “God” by dropping 
the “or universal spirit” part when they display the variable in official 
graphs, tables, and reports. It is the equivalent of a bait-and-switch. The 
quality of survey questions (and hence of the data they provide) could 
be greatly enhanced if question developers had a better understanding of 
cognitive frames and took into account the disparities in the frames their 
words might activate in the minds of the respondents.
A relatively new set of theoretical terminology has been gaining cur-
rency recently: vertical transcendence versus horizontal transcendence (e.g.: 
Hood, Hill & Spilka 2009; Streib & Hood 2013; Coleman, Silver & 
Holcombe 2013). The two concepts can be thought of as “otherworldly/
supernatural transcendence” versus “worldly/naturalistic transcendence.” 
Keller, Coleman, and Silver (2016) are at least explicit about the fact that 
they are merely substituting one term for another:
Does the person refer to higher powers, to a supernatural world beyond? 
This we would call vertical transcendence. Or is the person invested in 
concerns beyond their own personal life, concerns, which, framed in a 
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theological vocabulary, might be called “ultimate”? Then we would speak 
of horizontal transcendence. (2016:258)
Streib and Hood (2016), on the other hand, suggest that the concept 
of “transcendence” should be considered one of the primary characteris-
tics of religion, and substantive beliefs in divine beings and supernatural 
agents only secondary (2016:9). They then explicitly state that they do not 
want to divide “transcendent experiences” into natural and supernatural 
so that they can talk about naturalistic transcendence as “horizontal tran-
scendence” (2016:10). This rationale begs the question: If what we really 
mean by these phrases is a feeling of transcendence that involves a sense of 
something beyond, above, or higher than the natural world, as compared 
to a feeling of transcendence that involves only experiences in the natural 
world, why then do we feel the need to avoid the obvious nomenclature 
of supernatural transcendence versus naturalistic transcendence? Why do we 
go out of our way to find euphemisms for these terms? By playing such 
semantic games, rather than increasing clarity and precision (as Streib and 
Hood claim) we are creating more obfuscation and confusion.
The issue of supernaturalism seems to be a sort of elephant in the 
room when it comes to discussions about religion and religious beliefs. 
Are we talking about something supernatural or are we not? Do we mean 
“transcendent” in a naturalistic (figurative/metaphorical) sense, or in a 
supernatural (literal/ontological) sense? Far too often it is impossible to 
discern the intended meaning. So when we read Robert Fuller state that 
“secular interests . . . lack any concern with a larger reality” (2001:8), we are 
left wondering: Is he referring to some kind of ontologically real, super-
natural realm of existence, consisting of some unknown substance, and lo-
cated somehow outside of or beyond the natural world? Or is he referring 
merely to the reality of the lived experiences that give human beings an 
understanding that they are but one part of the larger whole of society, or 
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a sense of their small place in an incomprehensively large cosmos, which 
they might describe figuratively as “transcendent”? To add insult to injury, 
many scholars of religion and spirituality avoid overtly referencing the su-
pernatural nature of their subject by shrouding it in ever more ambiguous 
euphemisms, sometimes attempting to lend them weight through capital-
ization: Divine, Mystery, Ultimate, Absolute, Infinite, Transcendent, and 
on and on.
Conflated Frames and Religious Terminology
When the senses of a word are conflated—that is, when the word is always 
(or nearly always) spoken without the intended sense clearly indicated, 
or with both intended—a frame for each sense is activated as a single con-
flated frame in the minds of those involved in the communication. When 
someone speaks or hears the word “spiritual,” for example, all the various 
attributes of both the figurative spirituality and supernatural spiri-
tuality frames are activated in the mind as a single, conflated spiritual-
ity frame. Even in the minds of people who do not believe that anything 
supernatural exists, when they hear the word “spiritual,” both frames are 
activated.
When supernaturalist believers use words like spiritual, divine, soul, 
and transcendent, they have no reason to distinguish between the two sens-
es. They will use the words with both senses in mind, and may not even be 
aware that they hold two disparate frames in their minds simultaneously 
for the same word. Indeed, they may not consider them to be disparate at 
all. The two frames are always fused into one conflated frame, and the su-
pernaturalist would have no occasion to think of one without the other. It 
would never occur to them to even conceive of one without the other—it 
simply goes without saying that spiritual sentiments and practices include 
supernatural beliefs of some sort, even if only vague and subtle.
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For anyone studying and writing about religion, this is a real prob-
lem. Although supernaturalist believers have no need to distinguish the 
two, social scientists do—we might even say that we have an obligation to 
do so, out of scholarly integrity. Durkheim, for example, did (eventually) 
get explicit about the fact that when he spoke about “the sacred” and 
“god,” he was not talking about something supernatural (something “real,” 
yes, but not something supernatural).
The word “God” suffers from severe sense conflation, which I suspect 
is one of the main sources of negative characterizations of nonbelievers. In 
its figurative sense, the word “God” is an enormous symbol, representing 
all values, virtues, hopes, emotions, and experiences in life that humans 
most deeply cherish. Ministers, apologists, and theologians repeatedly 
(and sometimes aggressively) assert that without God there can be no love, 
no joy, no morality, no hope, and so forth—that God is the source of all 
those things, and that without “Him” we would be existentially destitute. 
All of those meanings and values are concentrated within the figurative 
god frame. Because the word “God” is also almost always conceived of as 
either a supernatural deity, or supernatural force or power (“universal spir-
it”) of some kind, the figurative god frame is rarely activated separately 
from the supernatural god frame—indeed, the two seem almost insepa-
rable. So, when the word “God” is uttered, it activates the supernatural 
god frame along with the figurative god frame, and for a great many 
people, one cannot be thought of without the other.
Because religious terms are almost always used in a conflated state, 
and have been for so many centuries, even if we attempt to use the word 
only in its figurative sense, both frames will still be activated. As Lakoff 
likes to demonstrate: if you are told, “Don’t think of an elephant,” you 
cannot keep the elephant frame from being activated in your brain, even 
though you were told not to. In order to use a word like “spiritual” in 
only its figurative sense, you would have to repeatedly remind everyone 
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involved in the communication that only the figurative sense should be 
kept in mind (the caveat). The question then becomes: Is that possible? 
Can they be separated? Those are difficult questions, which I cannot an-
swer here. Since cognitive frames are automatically activated upon hearing 
a word (or any other symbol), I suspect that the unintended sub-frame 
cannot be fully suppressed. But to determine that would require extensive, 
rigorous social psychological experiments (for any social psychologist who 
is up to the challenge).
Negation of Conflated Frames and the Stigma of Nonbelief
As discussed in the previous section, the word “spiritual” activates the con-
flated spiritual frame—a fusion of the figuratively spiritual and su-
pernaturally spiritual frames—in the mind of the listener. What hap-
pens, then, when someone says, “I’m not spiritual”? As Lakoff explained, 
even “when we negate a frame, we evoke the frame [emphasis added]” 
(2014:xii). Hence, even when someone says, “I’m not spiritual,” the con-
flated spiritual frame is activated. The qualifying presence of the negative 
particle “not,” however, changes the cognitive process, so that when “not 
spiritual” is heard, two things occur in the mind of the listener. First, the 
word “spiritual” activates the listener’s conflated spiritual frame, so that 
all the meanings contained within both the figuratively spiritual and 
supernaturally spiritual frames are brought to mind. Second, because 
the identity label was negated by the word “not,” a new frame is auto-
matically generated—a negation of the conflated spiritual frame, which 
includes negated versions of both sub-frames.
When the conflated spiritual frame in the mind of a believer is 
negated by someone saying, “I’m not spiritual,” the conflated nonspir-
itual characterization frame contains the opposites of all those character 
traits contained within the figuratively spiritual frame. Consequently, 
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even though the nonbeliever only meant to negate the supernaturally 
spiritual frame, the fact that the frames are conflated means that the 
listener will get the impression that the person does not possess those 
character traits represented by the figuratively spiritual frame. Hence, 
the nonbeliever ends up with a severe identity misfire, and most likely a 
spoiled identity. This applies equally to the negation of the conflated reli-
gious frame activated by saying “I’m not religious” or “I’m secular” (since 
“secular” is equivalent to “not religious”). The believer with a conflated 
nonspiritual characterization frame does not necessarily explicitly think 
words such as, “This person who says he is not spiritual must be a shallow, 
superficial person with no meaning or purpose in life.” Cognitive frames 
are not necessarily manifest in that way in our brains. Nonetheless, that 
impression will be present to some degree.
A similar process occurs for the word “God.” When a person says, 
“I don’t believe in God,” the word “God” activates the entire conflated 
god frame in the listener, which includes all the attributes of the figura-
tive god frame, such as love, grace, compassion, community, and so forth. 
The word “don’t” then negates the entire conflated god frame. The nega-
tion of the conflated god frame contains the opposite meanings of both 
the supernatural god and figurative god frames. Consequently, when 
the listener hears someone say, “I don’t believe in God,” he or she under-
stands the person as rejecting all those values that the figurative sense of 
the word “God” symbolizes.
The words “nonbeliever,” “godless,” and “atheist” are analogous to 
“don’t believe in God,” and so negate the conflated god frame in the same 
way. Take a moment to re-read the first paragraph of chapter one, and try 
to recall what impressions or feelings were automatically activated in your 
mind when you read the words “study of nonbelievers” and “do not be-
lieve that anything supernatural exists.” Think especially about what came 
to mind when you first read the word “atheist” in that paragraph. Chances 
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are high that some negative characterizations came to mind, to a greater or 
lesser extent. So when someone says, “I’m an atheist,” the atheist frame 
activated in the mind of the listener is equivalent to the negation of the 
conflated god frame. That applies equally to the word “godless,” which is 
why a phrase such as “godless communist” is such an emotively powerful 
pejorative; to say that someone is “godless” is to imply that the person is 
against all the values that the figurative god frame stands for.
The effect of negating the conflated god frame helps partially ex-
plain why some people—including some theologians, such as John Shel-
by Spong, Don Cupitt, Lloyd Geering, and others—continue to talk of 
“God” even when they do not themselves believe that a supernatural deity 
exists. Essentially, they are using the phenomena of sense conflation and 
conflated frames to their advantage. By continuing to use “God-language” 
in the figurative sense, they are able to talk about all the meanings and val-
ues contained within the figurative god frame and still be accepted by 
believers, because just speaking the word “God” puts believers at ease by 
activating the entire conflated god frame, so that they assume the speaker 
holds those same values. For a religious public speaker such as Diana But-
ler Bass, who holds an impersonal, panentheistic god frame, envisioned 
as some kind of a universal, divine presence or force (Bass 2015; Bell 
2015), continuing to use the word “God” allows her to deliver sermons in 
churches where a completely different god frame is activated in the minds 
of the majority of her audience when they hear her say the word “God.”
We also have a conflated christian frame in our culture. The word 
“Christian” has an obvious literal sense (an adherent of the Christian re-
ligion, or at least someone who self-identifies as Christian), but it is also 
used in a figurative sense, to designate someone as a good person, as in: 
“That was very Christian of him,” or “That was a very Christian thing 
to do.” The literal christian adherent frame and the figurative good 
christian frame are fused together into a single conflated christian 
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frame activated by the word “Christian.” The figurative good christian 
frame represents all the values that Christianity ostensibly stands for. So 
when someone says, “I’m not a Christian,” with the christian adherent 
frame in mind—or even “I’m against Christianity,” with the institution-
al christianity frame, or even the abusive christian clergy frame in 
mind—the negation of the entire conflated christian frame indicates 
to the listener that that person is against all the values that Christianity 
stands for.
When nonbelievers say, “I’m not spiritual” their nonspiritual iden-
tity frames consist of the rejection of only the supernaturally spiritual 
frame, not necessarily the rejection of the figuratively spiritual frame. 
Nonbelievers may very well hold an equivalent identity frame that con-
tains all the same character traits, values, and meanings contained within 
the figuratively spiritual frame, such as gratitude, love, joy, meaning in 
life, compassion, wisdom, values, emotive person, and profound person; they 
just do not label it with the word “spiritual.” The trouble—as the respons-
es from the participants of this study indicated—is that they cannot find 
an identity label that sufficiently communicates the full breadth and depth 
of meaning contained within their equivalent of the figuratively spir-
itual frame, and thus have difficulty communicating that part of their 
identities to others.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Enchantment without the Supernatural
At the 2016 annual meeting of the Association for the Sociology of Re-
ligion, I sat listening to a presentation about Canadian “religious nones.” 
When the presenter mentioned people who say that they are “not spiritu-
al,” a woman sitting beside me made the following offhanded remark: “It 
would be really hardline to say, ‘I’m not spiritual.’” I turned my head quiz-
zically, then wrote her comment in my notebook. Such a perfect example, 
I thought, of the conflated spiritual frame. Why would saying “I’m not 
spiritual” be considered a “hardline” position? She could understand why 
people would say “I’m not religious,” meaning only that they have an 
aversion to the institution of religion (i.e., they reject the institutional 
religion frame). Moreover, when someone says, “I’m spiritual but not re-
ligious,” that clearly indicates that they are not averse to “being religious” 
in a figurative sense—they simply use the word “spiritual” to indicate that. 
To say “I’m not spiritual” seemed “hardline” to her because the conflated 
spiritual frame was activated in her mind, then negated, leading her to 
interpret the statement as a rejection of the figuratively spiritual frame.
As scholars of religion, we rightly attempt to understand religion 
from all of its dimensions and manifestations. Sometimes, we have a ten-
dency to downplay the role of supernatural beliefs in our attempt to un-
derstand the phenomenon of religion from a broader perspective. Streib 
and Hood even stipulated that belief should be considered secondary to 
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transcendence and ultimate concern (2016:9). But belief in something su-
pernatural does seem to be of significant consequence for a great many 
people. The leaders of Cheryl’s denomination, after all, decided that she 
was “unsuitable for ministry” because she openly, explicitly stated her dis-
belief in the supernatural. In Marcel Harper’s study of stereotypes toward 
nonreligious people, exploratory factor analysis revealed six subtypes, and 
he found that “the most unfavorable subtype was related to a perceived 
disbelief in religion and spirituality” (2007:539).
Charles Taylor framed his entire inquiry into the “Secular Age” in 
terms of belief versus unbelief—“on what it’s like to live as a believer or an 
unbeliever” (2007:5). He composed an 874-page tome to ponder the puz-
zle of how it could possibly have come about that belief in the existence of 
God is considered one option among many, when back in the 1500s nonbe-
lief was almost unthinkable. And he was not speaking figuratively when he 
wrote of “God” and “the transcendent.” As Warner, VanAntwerpen, and 
Calhoun observed: “Taylor really means ‘belief.’ He doesn’t want to see re-
ligion as just a number of engaging practices or quasi-ethnic customs, and 
he is critical of suggestions that the ‘essence of religion’ lies in the answers 
it offers to the ‘question of meaning’” (2010:10).
The conflated spiritual and religious frames are extremely difficult 
to separate into their figurative and supernatural sub-frames. To many, 
it does not seem possible that the figurative meanings could be sufficient 
without the supernatural beliefs. We see evidence of this in the fact that 
many prominent philosophers, theologians, and apologists argue that, if a 
nonbeliever’s sense of meaning, value, and purpose in life does not include 
a supernaturally transcendent element—an ultimate meaning to the uni-
verse as opposed to mere local, temporal meaning to life in the here and 
now—then that sense of meaning cannot be quite meaningful enough. 
In his influential essay, “An Awareness of What Is Missing,” renowned 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas tried to articulate “an expression of melan-
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choly over something which has been irretrievably lost,” by modernity’s 
displacement of religion. Similarly, Sidney Britcho and Richard Harries 
edited a collection of essays in which, as the title states, they give Two 
Cheers for Secularism—meaning that they mostly support secularism. The 
reason they “cannot give that third cheer” is because “from the perspective 
of a person with religious faith, the loss of a transcendent order giving a 
divine meaning and purpose to human existence cannot be contemplated 
without a poignant sense of loss” (1998:7). Although “supernatural” was 
not explicit, a “transcendent order”, from which “divine meaning and pur-
pose” are conferred, can only be otherworldly.
As we saw in quotations from several participants above, since leav-
ing Christianity and abandoning their previous supernatural worldviews, 
they now believe that this life is the only life they have—that there is no 
afterlife. Yet they say that this life is meaningful enough, and that they no 
longer feel a need for a supernaturally ultimate meaning to the universe. 
Philosopher James K. A. Smith argues that such a position is naïve at best, 
delusional at worst. He concedes that secular people may be happy and 
content, and that “there doesn’t seem to be anything missing in their lives 
[emphasis added].” Nonetheless, he believes that there really is something 
essential missing, that without a supernaturally ultimate meaning, their 
“existential world is flat” (2014:viii), and that they are either unable or 
unwilling to recognize it. As he put it, secular people “don’t have any 
sense that the ‘secular’ lives they’ve constructed are missing a second floor” 
(2014:vii). In other words, for Smith, sacredness is not sacred enough if it 
comes from mere human values, the way Durkheim described it; sacred-
ness must come from an otherworldly source, as Eliade had envisioned it.
The ex-clergy in this study had once thought as Smith does. They had 
believed in all the same supernaturally ultimate meaning that he considers 
so essential. Are we to believe, then, based on Smith’s assertion, that these 
ex-ministers voluntarily “flattened their existential worlds”? Considering 
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that they had been devoted ministers for the majority of their lives, can we 
really take seriously Smith’s assertion that they have now voluntarily cho-
sen to construct secular lives that are “missing a second floor”? Or might 
it be the case that, as Stephen had said, “it’s impossible for some people 
to wrap their minds around [how life can] have meaning and purpose if 
there is no God”? Might it be that Smith’s spirituality frame is so tightly 
conflated that he is unable to separate its two constituent frames, and thus 
incapable of grasping what a meaningful, fulfilled life would be like with-
out his particular supernatural worldview?
I would like to suggest an alternative interpretation of a long-stand-
ing theoretical framework from which I think Smith’s position derives. 
Smith, Taylor, Habermas, and many others, continue to view the history 
of modernity within the framework of the Weberian disenchantment nar-
rative (and thus, the religious-secular divide). Many scholars (e.g., Swed-
berg 2005:62; Schroeder 1992:72) have pointed out that the word Weber 
used, entzauberung, would be more accurately (and less ambiguously) trans-
lated as “demagification,” instead of the traditional “disenchantment.” By 
“demagification of the world,” Weber was referring to the loss of belief in 
supernatural magic. He spoke of ancient peoples when “their world was 
not yet disenchanted of its gods and demons” (1948:148), and when suf-
fering and dying men were “believed either to be possessed by a demon or 
burdened with the wrath of a god whom they had insulted.” (1948:271). 
He explained that, as scientific rationalization took hold of Western soci-
ety, we began to shed the old supernatural/superstitious explanations of 
the world around us, thus “demagifying” it.
Most commentators have interpreted Weber as saying that disen-
chantment necessarily leads to meaninglessness, hopelessness, and ni-
hilism (e.g., Greisman 1976:495; Griffin 2001:vii; Skolnik & Gordon 
2006:4). Nicholas Gane’s explanation is as good an example as any:
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The work of Weber, like that of Nietzsche, identifies in the general pro-
cess of enlightenment a movement towards nihilism (the devaluation of 
ultimate values) in the West. . . . [W]ith the onset of the rationalization of 
culture, ultimate meanings or values are disenchanted, or, in Nietzschean 
terms, which Weber adopts, devalued. (2002:2)
The disenchantment narrative of modernity has proved to have great stay-
ing power; social critics continue to lament it well into the twenty-first 
century. Charles Taylor, for example, interpreted disenchantment as 
meaning “the dissipation of our sense of the cosmos as a meaningful or-
der” (1989:17). In his view, the loss of supernatural transcendence result-
ed in “a wide sense of malaise at the disenchanted world, a sense of it as 
flat, empty” (2007:302)—hence the notion of “existentially flat.”
In the two preceding paragraphs, I described a sense disparity. Magic 
in the literal sense can refer to supernatural powers; magic in the figura-
tive sense—which Richard Dawkins calls “poetic magic”—refers to some-
thing we find “deeply moving, exhilarating: something that gives us goose 
bumps, something that makes us feel more alive” (Dawkins 2012:23). 
Likewise, disenchantment in the literal sense can mean the loss of belief 
in supernatural magic; disenchantment in the figurative sense means dis-
appointment or disillusionment with something once held in high regard.
By drawing out this distinction I am suggesting that the most com-
mon understanding of the classic Weberian disenchantment narrative is 
manifest in our minds as a conflated disenchantment frame, consisting of 
the supernatural disenchantment and figurative disenchantment 
frames fused together over almost a century of conflating these two senses 
of the words “magic” and “disenchantment.” Hence, Talal Asad described 
disenchantment not as just a loss of myth and magic, but as “a stripping 
away of myth, magic, and the sacred [emphasis added]” (2003:13). For 
James Smith, Sidney Britcho, Richard Harries, and so many others, the 
word “disenchantment” activates this conflated disenchantment frame. 
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Consequently, they seem to believe that enchantment in the figurative 
sense cannot be entirely fulfilling without the supernatural. Or to put it 
into Taylor’s (2007) terminology, a life lived solely within the “immanent 
frame” (i.e., naturalistically) cannot be quite as fulfilling or meaningful as 
life lived within the “transcendent frame” (i.e., with some form of super-
natural worldview).
Human beings, individually and collectively as a society across many 
generations, determine the nature and content of our most cherished 
meanings and values. Are we really devaluing those meanings and values 
(as Nicholas Gane suggested) by dispensing with beliefs in their supposed 
supernatural origins? Is the world really disenchanted in the figurative 
sense if no supernatural beings or “planes” exist? I am suggesting that the 
common interpretation of the disenchantment narrative, being based on 
a conflated disenchantment frame, is a non sequitur: it does not follow 
that loss of belief in the existence of supernatural magic necessarily leads to 
a loss of a sense of poetic magic in life.
Yet that is precisely what is implied by the common interpretation 
espoused by James Smith, J. P. Moreland, and so many others: that the 
rainbow is somehow less poetically magical without the supernatural magic 
of a leprechaun’s pot-o’-gold; that the depth of love and adoration we feel 
for our spouses is somehow less poetically enchanting without the blessing 
of a supernatural deity (or a shot from Cupid’s bow); that the experience 
of looking skyward on a dark Arizona night, and feeling engulfed by the 
vast expanse of our galaxy, is somehow less emotionally moving without 
believing that a supernatural deity is looking down upon us from the 
heavens—or at least that some supernaturally divine something is present. 
As the late Douglas Adams wrote: “Isn’t it enough to see that a garden is 
beautiful without having to believe that there are fairies at the bottom of 
it too?” (1979:118).
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I cannot definitively state that they are wrong. I can only point to 
the responses of the 15 participants in this study who have experienced 
life from both sides. They had believed for many years, with every ounce 
of their being, in the supernatural tenets of their religions. At some point 
in their lives, they were able to separate the conflated spirituality frame 
and disengage the supernatural spirituality sub-frame without losing 
the content of the figurative spirituality sub-frame. Now that they 
no longer believe that anything supernatural exists, they say that their 
lives have not become “existentially flat.” Some even stated that their lives 
have become all the more expansive, significant, and full of awe and won-
der since they stopped believing in the supernatural. As Eric Maisel put 
it, “it can prove a transformational and mind-opening experience to put 
all gods, religions, and supernatural enthusiasms aside and to explore the 
world from the point of view of a human being who lives, dies, and is as 
natural as a tiger or a dove” (2009:1). To revisit Peter Berger’s metaphor, 
they stepped outside the sacred canopies of their religions, and rather than 
falling into a dark abyss of chaos, they found that there was just as much 
“sacredness” (figuratively speaking) outside the sacred canopy as within—
it just takes other forms and goes by other names. Based on the words they 
have written and the conversations I have had with them, I can say that 
they are not secular in the antithesis of the religious sense. In all other senses 
of the word, however, they are completely secular, but their lives are most 
definitely not superficial.
Summary of Contributions
I have combined three established theoretical frameworks from disparate 
academic disciplines into a unique composite framework which I hope 
will prove mutually beneficial to all three fields of research. The concepts 
of identity frames and characterization frames from the field of intractable 
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conflict mitigation fit like a glove onto the framework of oppressive and 
oppositional identity work from the field of social psychology. The Frame 
Semantics approach to cognitive frame analysis, from the field of cognitive 
linguistics, provides a more substantial method for identifying and analyz-
ing those identity and characterization frames. Taken together, these three 
frameworks complement and enhance one another, and I hope to have 
sufficiently demonstrated the usefulness of applying the general method 
of Frame Semantics to the analysis of social identity labels.
To that composite framework, I added my own framework of new 
theoretical concepts which I developed through the process of analytic 
induction as they gradually emerged from my analysis of the data. I have 
attempted to explicate this new set of concepts so that they can be applied 
to a broad range of semantic analysis in any domain of social discourse. 
Application of these concepts resulted in an analytic procedure for delving 
deeper into the emic meanings of religious and nonreligious identity la-
bels, and religious terminology in general. The purpose of this procedure 
is to go beyond verbal definitions and uncover and analyze the cognitive 
frames that form the substance of meaning for those words.
The general procedure is as follows: When analyzing a discourse, 
identify pivotal words or phrases and determine the definitional senses 
each side is using for those terms. Closely observe key descriptors and 
metaphors that give insight into the content of the cognitive frames that 
those words activate for each side. Watch for caveats being used to qualify 
those terms, indicating that a side is using specific senses, and thus has 
specifically circumscribed cognitive frames in mind. As cognitive frames 
become clearly discernable, label them with unique names so that they 
can be more readily analyzed. Look for the presence of sense disparity and 
frame disparity in the use of those pivotal terms on both sides of the dis-
course. Determine whether the disparities are minor and inconsequential, 
or whether they are causing significant misapprehension and miscommu-
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nication. Watch closely for multiple disparate senses and frames in use si-
multaneously for any given word or phrase, and determine whether those 
involved are aware of the disparate meanings those words hold for them. 
Take note of any sense conflation, and identify any conflated frames. If any 
of the words are being negated by words such as “not” or “don’t,” deter-
mine the content of the negated versions of the cognitive frames activated 
by those terms—especially the conflated frames. If the pivotal words or 
phrases are used as identity labels, determine whether any sense dispari-
ties, frame disparities, conflated frames, or negated frames are causing an 
identity misfire, and whether the misfire results in a stigmatized (spoiled) 
identity or a foiled identity.
Additionally, as the title of this thesis implies, I hope to have suffi-
ciently uncovered an identity category that has been routinely overlooked 
by social scientists of religion. Lost somewhere amongst the category of 
religious “nones,” no one takes much notice of this group because they do 
not fit within any of our culture’s conventional categories. They have nat-
uralistic worldviews (not believing that anything supernatural exists), and 
they typically avoid being identified as “religious” or “spiritual” because 
they do not want others to assume the supernatural worldview implied by 
those labels. On the other hand, they recognize that because they tend to 
take seriously the perennial questions and concerns traditionally associat-
ed exclusively with religion and spirituality, others might pigeonhole them 
into those categories. They typically struggle to articulate a self-identity 
that captures their own explorations of meaning, value, and purpose in 
life without resorting to the supernaturally laden language of religion and 
spirituality. This category needs a proper name. “Secular but not superfi-
cial” is a sorry excuse for a social identity label (even worse than “spiritual 
but not religious”). But until a suitable label is found, it will suffice.
Finally, I hope this study will serve as a catalyst for conversation with-
in the enterprise of the scientific study of religion/nonreligion by pulling 
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two key issues out of the closet and laying them on the table. First, the dis-
tinction between figurative and supernatural senses of religious language, 
and the way they are so often ignored and conflated, is rarely if ever di-
rectly addressed by scholars of religion. I hope to have demonstrated how 
important this distinction is, and the consequences of ignoring it. Second, 
as discussed in the first section of this chapter, many scholars attempt to 
avoid drawing attention to the supernatural nature of the religious beliefs 
and practices they study by shrouding them in euphemisms—call it the 
“euphemization of the supernatural.” I have attempted to demonstrate the 
importance of talking directly about the supernatural sense of religious 
beliefs rather than skirting around the issue. I hope this sparks a conversa-
tion about why the topic of supernaturalism is so often “shoved under the 
rug” by obfuscating the language.
General Applicability
The purpose of grounded theory is the “conceptual and theoretical devel-
opment” (Charmaz 2006:101) of generalized theoretical concepts (Glaser 
& Strauss 1967:110–111) that can help make sense of complex social 
phenomena—and ideally be useful across a broad range of social scientific 
domains. Let us now look closely at an example of religious discourse 
outside this study, and see how the theoretical concepts I have developed 
throughout this study can help us to understand what is going on. Then I 
will briefly show an example of applying some of these concepts to a social 
domain outside of religion.
Oprah Winfrey’s interview with long-distance swimmer Diana Nyad 
(who self-identifies as an atheist) has become infamous among both 
self-identified atheists and the social scientists who study nonbelievers. It 
is awash in cognitive disparities, dissonances, and identity misfires. It also 
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provides a good example of the tendency to deny a secular identity for 
those who do not fit the preconceived image of the superficial secular-
ist characterization frame. Winfrey began the interview by confronting 
the issue of Nyad’s nonbelief head on:
Winfrey: You told our producers that you’re “not a God person,” that 
you are a person who’s “deeply in awe.”
Nyad: Yeah. I’m not a God person.
That negation of Winfrey’s conflated god frame put a confused, almost 
distasteful expression on her face as she incredulously asked the follow up 
question, which Nyad answered unfazed:
Winfrey: Do you consider yourself atheist?
Nyad: I am an atheist. And—
Winfrey cut her off. The confused expression on her face revealed the 
cognitive dissonance induced by the incompatible atheist identity frame 
that Nyad had so matter of factly thrust into her mind. It made no sense. 
How could the person sitting before her call herself an “atheist”? She stam-
mered out a half-question in her confusion, to which Nyad replied with 
cool, confident decorum:
Winfrey: But—you’re “in the awe.”
Nyad: Yeah, but, you know, I don’t understand why anybody would find 
a contradiction in that. I can stand at the beach’s edge . . . and weep with 
the beauty of this universe, and be moved by all of humanity. All the 
billions of people who have lived before us, who have loved, and hurt, 
and suffered. To me, my definition of God is humanity, and is the love of 
humanity.
Winfrey could not accept what Nyad was saying; the cognitive dissonance 
was too great. She was forced to contend with this utterly foreign cogni-
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tive frame for what the word “atheist” means, a frame considerably at odds 
with the one already in place in her mind. Her solution was to refuse to 
accept that foreign cognitive frame, and attempt to reassert her own by 
denying Nyad her own self-identity. With her usual air of authority, she 
declared that Nyad cannot possibly be an atheist—a statement that could 
easily be interpreted as Winfrey participating in the oppressive identity 
work against nonbelievers. Nyad then attempted to explain to her that all 
she means is that she does not believe that a supernatural being or pres-
ence exists—and that it does not mean that she is superficial:
Winfrey: Well I don’t call you an atheist then. I think if you believe in the 
awe, and the wonder, and the mystery, then that is what God is. God is not 
the “bearded guy in the sky.”
Nyad: There is an inference with “God” that there is a presence; there is 
either a creator or an overseer. . . . For me, I’m an atheist who’s in awe.”
Winfrey slowly repeated that last point, almost to herself, sounding as if 
she was struggling to grasp the concept: “An ‘atheist in awe.’” This demon-
strates a fundamental problem with the ambiguity of religious language. 
Nyad self-identified with the “atheist” label because she understood it to 
mean nothing more than someone who does not believe that the “bearded 
guy in the sky” exists. Her atheist frame consisted simply of the absence 
of belief frame, and nothing more. Winfrey insisted that Nyad could 
not be an atheist because she does not fit Winfrey’s preconceived notion 
that an atheist is someone who does not experience awe, wonder, and 
mystery—the superficial atheist frame.
Having summarily dismissed the anomalous cognitive frame that had 
invaded her mind, Winfrey then asked her next question with a knowing 
grin:
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Winfrey: So, do you consider yourself a “spiritual person,” even as an 
atheist?
Nyad: I do. I don’t think there’s any contradiction in those terms. I think 
you can be an atheist who doesn’t believe in an overarching being who 
created all of this and sees over it, but there’s spirituality because we hu-
man beings—and we animals, and maybe even we plants, but certainly 
the ocean, and the moon, and the stars—we all live with something that 
is cherished, and we feel the treasure of it. The older I am, I walk around 
every day with, you know, flowers, and buildings that people created, but 
certainly beings, you know, just, every pair of eyes that I look into, I see 
the souls.
Once again Nyad asserted her absence of belief frame for the “atheist” 
label, then she seemed to express a figurative frame for “spirituality,” as that 
affective aspect of human life that is deeply cherished and treasured. She 
ended, however, with a statement that seems to indicate that, although she 
does not believe in the existence of a supernatural deity, she believes that 
“souls” exist. Winfrey did not let that one pass by:
Winfrey: Okay, and how do you define that, the soul?
Nyad: The soul is your “spirit”; it’s your love of humanity; it’s your belief 
that there’s more than you. There are people before us—you could weep 
to look at the discovery of an ancient city and realize that those people 
lived, and they loved, and they danced, and they ate, and they suffered, 
and, you know, they lived, just as we are. So, there have been so many 40-, 
and 60-, and 80-year lives—billions of them. And we all have souls, and 
I feel their collective souls.
Winfrey: Wow. What do you think happens when we die?
Nyad: I think that the soul lives on because we have created so much en-
ergy. And when we display courage and hope, it lives on. But I do believe 
the body goes back to ash, and it is never more.
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The way she speaks of “soul” and “spirit” is strikingly similar to the way 
Paul had. At one moment she seems to be talking about the soul as a sep-
arate entity—“we all have souls.” Then the next moment she describes the 
soul in unmistakably figurative terms—“love of humanity,” “belief that 
there’s more than you,” the soul lives on as the energy we create “when 
we display courage and hope.” None of these characterizations bear any 
resemblance to the kind of disembodied mind that most people envision 
as separating from the body at death and going to some sort of afterlife, 
with its memories and identity still intact.
Far more interesting, however, is the glimpse into her metaphysi-
cal worldview that Nyad revealed in some of her other statements. Was 
she speaking figuratively about all the living beings who came before her 
when she said “I feel their collective souls”? Again, the ambiguous nature 
of these words, and the way she is expressing them, make that difficult to 
clearly ascertain without speaking to her. The entire context of the conver-
sation, however, indicates that she has something more figurative in mind. 
Her sentiment about feeling the collective souls of the billions of lives 
who came before her sounds like a recognition of the fact that she is the 
result of, and a constituent part in, the entire history of human societies. 
It sounded similar to a metaphor George Herbert Mead once wrote, that 
the human self is like “an eddy in the social current, and so still a part of 
the current” (1935:182).
Observe how Nyad tends to speak in a naturalistically poetic fashion: 
to “weep with the beauty of this universe, and be moved by all of humani-
ty”; “the ocean, and the moon, and the stars—we all live with something 
that is cherished.”  If we extend Mead’s metaphor in a broader, naturalisti-
cally poetic direction, we could describe a human being as an eddy in the 
cosmic current, and so still a part of the current: matter and energy coalesce 
into a sentient being, retain that form for a fleeting moment in the vast 
expanse of time, then disperse again into the continuously flowing current 
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of the cosmos. Charles Lindbergh—another individual, like Nyad, who 
had achieved an extreme feat of human endurance—expressed this senti-
ment far more poetically, conceiving of the evolution of life on earth as 
“an evolving life stream composed of countless selves”:
Individuals are custodians of the life stream—temporal manifestations 
of far greater being, forming from and returning to their essence like 
so many dreams. . . . I am one and I am many—myself and humanity in 
flux. . . . After my death, the molecules of my being will return to the earth 
and sky. They came from the stars. I am of the stars. (quoted in Taylor 
2011:232).
We could call this the cosmic existential stream frame. It entails 
an extremely broad sense of “something larger than ourselves”—the cos-
mos itself—and an understanding of ourselves as being born out of, and 
returning into, the continuously changing process of existence. If different 
words had been available to her that offered an alternative to the supe-
naturalist language of spirituality, would Nyad have used them instead? 
Again, that is impossible to ascertain without speaking with her. But judg-
ing by the few words we have from her, Nyad’s views seem far more akin 
to Lindbergh’s than to Winfrey’s.
Outside of religious discourse, these theoretical concepts can be use-
ful tools for analyzing language in other domains of social interaction. As 
a brief example, consider how sense disparity and conflation are regular-
ly exploited by politicians. Although Bernie Sanders identifies with the 
“socialist” label, he is careful to qualify that identity label by saying he is 
a democratic socialist (the caveat), thus indicating which sense he means. 
His opponents turn sense disparity to their advantage by deliberate use 
of sense conflation in their attack ads and public discourse. They conflate 
the multiple senses of the word by relentlessly repeating it without the 
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qualifying caveat. Every time the unqualified word “socialist” is uttered 
in an advertisement or during a debate, it activates the soviet socialism 
frame in the majority of their supporters. That frame immediately evokes 
images of a regressive society, destitute people standing in bread lines, loss 
of freedom, KGB torture, and of course, the ominous threat of godlessness. 
In this way, Sanders’ opponents foment and fan the flames of fear within 
their supporters—a fear that Sanders’ supporters never experience from 
the scandinavian socialism frame activated in their minds by the “so-
cialist” label.
Limitations
Generalizability was not the intent of this study. As Kathy Charmaz 
explained, grounded theory “is not about representing a population or 
increasing the statistical generalizability of your results” (2006:101). As 
such, this small, non-random sample of 15 is not generalizable, and these 
individuals are by no means representative of all ex-ministers—much less 
all nonbelievers. As just one example: all of these participants deconvert-
ed through a deliberate process of doubting, studying, deliberating, and 
finally consciously coming to the realization that they no longer believed. 
Many people, on the other hand, never give the matter much thought, 
and simply drift away from religious belief and participation during their 
high school or college years (e.g., Ozment 2016:5). 
By design, these individuals were chosen as paradigm cases for the 
“secular but not superficial” identity I was attempting to uncover. Al-
though this study was not meant to be representative and generalizable 
to all nonbelievers, it is not unreasonable to assume that a certain subset 
(albeit, an unknown percentage) of the nonbeliever population is simi-
lar to this sample in important respects. Just as there are many devoutly 
religious/spiritual people who do not become ministers, there are un-
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doubtedly many people who identify as neither religious nor spiritual, but 
who have just as much concern for the nonsuperficial side of life as these 
ex-ministers, and so should be considered secular but not superficial.
Other studies have explored a much wider variety of nonbelievers. 
Daniel Dennett and Linda LaScola (2015) published the pioneering re-
search on ministers who have stopped believing. Most of their 35 partic-
ipants were still active ministers at the time, and were still “in the closet” 
as nonbelievers, so they were in very different situations from those in this 
study. Phil Zuckerman’s book, Faith No More (2011), is an excellent anal-
ysis of a heterogeneous sample of 87 nonbelievers in the United States. 
And Greta Christina (2014) has admirably analyzed over four hundred 
“coming out atheist” stories of general nonbelievers.
Potential Areas for Further Research
Paradigm Shift as Identity Frame Replacement
One potential area of further research that I began to wonder about, and 
for which my interviews had not been designed, is what we might call the 
“point of frame replacement.” With the strong negative characterization 
frames they held about atheists, what kind of cognitive dissonance did it 
cause in their minds when they started to realize that they were actually 
becoming atheists? All of the subjects in this study had gone through a 
radical change. It wasn’t instantaneous; in most cases it took several years 
of reading, study, and self-reflection to build to that point. But at some 
point in time, each of these subjects realized that the cognitive frames they 
had harbored for concepts such as God, religion, atheism, soul, secular, and 
so forth, had been replaced with entirely different cognitive frames.
It could prove fruitful to analyze such belief system paradigm shifts 
in terms of cognitive frames, in the manner that Lakoff demonstrates in 
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Don’t Think of an Elephant (2014). How do people manage to replace 
such deeply rooted frames that held such significance for their lives? How 
long does that replacement take? Do they notice it while it was happen-
ing, or do they only realize it after the fact? Do they go through a severe 
existential upheaval? What kind of emotional stress occurs during the re-
placement process, and what are its lasting effects? In some rare situations, 
a total inversion of an extremely rigid belief system can lead to PTSD, as 
happened to Rich Lyons, an ex-Pentecostal minister who described his 
ordeal on his podcast, Living After Faith (Lyons 2010). How often, and to 
what degree, do such reactions occur?
Re-evaluation of Values after Deconversion
Most religious adherents, it goes without saying, base their values, to a 
large extent, on the doctrines of their religious traditions. As with oth-
er concepts, values are manifest in the brain as cognitive frames. What 
happens to those value frames after an individual undergoes a complete 
replacement of their religious frames? I can say, from my own conversa-
tions with fundamentalists who deconverted and became nonbelievers, 
they tell me that they went through a process of calling into question a 
large proportion of the things that they had always been taught were “sin-
ful.” A study of the effects of deconversion on a person’s system of moral 
judgements, and the process of re-evaluating those judgements, would be 
instructive for understanding the relation of value systems to particular 
systems of religious beliefs.
Secular “Ministries”
Another area I was unable to explore in depth, but that deserves a proper 
investigation on its own, is the work of ex-clergy who go on to become 
“secular ministers,” for lack of a better term. Perhaps such a project could 
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find more appropriate terminology for such social activity, to frame it 
properly without the religious and spiritual language. Humanist chaplain-
cies at universities (e.g., Greg Epstein at Harvard and Jonathan Figdor at 
Stanford), intentional communities such as the “secular Sunday school” 
that William started, online communities such as the one Paul created, 
and (on a broader scale) movements like Sunday Assembly and the Oasis 
Network, all need to be investigated. 
Meaningful Life without Supernaturally Ultimate Meaning
In Chapter VI, I quoted James Smith as saying that nonbelievers “don’t 
have any sense that the ‘secular’ lives they’ve constructed are missing a 
second floor” (2014:vii). My interview schedule was not designed to delve 
deeply into this question. Another study would be useful to specifically 
focus on the question of whether the meaning, value, and purpose people 
find in the “here and now” of their local, temporal lives—with no expecta-
tion of a supernatural, eternal afterlife—is somehow insufficient, as Smith 
suggests. 
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